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Jamie Boulding: PhD Summary 
 
“The Multiverse and Participatory Metaphysics” 
 
This dissertation brings a new philosophical perspective to an important topic in the 
contemporary theology and science dialogue, specifically the theological reception of 
multiverse thought in modern cosmology. In light of recent cosmological speculation about 
the plausibility of a ‘multiverse,’ a cosmic ensemble in which our own universe is just one of 
many, theological responses have largely focused on the question of whether such a 
multiverse might be an alternative to divine design (or might itself be compatible with divine 
design). However, this approach neglects the fundamental metaphysical issues entailed in the 
multiverse proposal, including its entanglement of the one and the many (a paradox which 
has itself been a central concern of theological reflection), as well as its intimations of cosmic 
multiplicity, diversity, and infinity. In this dissertation I provide the first systematic 
theological engagement with these metaphysical implications. My approach is to draw on 
ancient and medieval resources (neglected not only in multiverse discussions but also in the 
theology and science field more generally) to show that the concept of metaphysical 
participation provides a particularly fertile ground on which theology can engage 
constructively with multiverse thought. To that end, I focus specifically on the participatory 
thought of Plato, Aquinas, and Nicholas of Cusa, each of whom seek to understand how a 
physical cosmos of complexity and immensity might share in divine existence of unity and 
simplicity. I bring their insights into interaction with a diverse range of contemporary 
theological, philosophical, and scientific figures to demonstrate that a participatory account 
of the relationship between God and creation argues for greater continuity between theology 
and the multiverse proposal in modern cosmology. 
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Preface 
 
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of 
work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. 
 
It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently 
submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or 
any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in 
the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, 
or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the 
University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in 
the Preface and specified in the text. 
 
It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee. 
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Introduction 
 
Thesis Overview and Purpose 
 
This thesis brings a new philosophical perspective to assessing the multiverse hypothesis in 
modern cosmology, which has emerged in recent years as a significant and often contentious 
topic in the contemporary theology and science dialogue. In light of recent cosmological 
speculation about the plausibility of a ‘multiverse’, a cosmic ensemble in which our own 
universe is just one of many, theological responses have tended to focus on the question of 
whether such a multiverse might be an alternative to divine design—or, in a limited number 
of more positive responses, whether a multiverse might be compatible with divine design. My 
starting point is that this approach neglects the fundamental metaphysical issues entailed in 
the multiverse proposal, including its suggestive entanglement of the one and the many (a 
paradox which has itself been a central concern of Western theological reflection), as well as 
its intimations of cosmic multiplicity, diversity, and infinity. In light of this neglect, I will 
provide the first systematic theological engagement with the metaphysical issues arising from 
multiverse theory. To that end, I will bring the insights of three pivotal participatory thinkers 
into interaction with a diverse range of contemporary theological, philosophical, and 
scientific figures to demonstrate that a participatory account of the relationship between God 
and creation argues for greater continuity between theology and the multiverse proposal. 
 
Perhaps more than any other issue in theology and science, the multiverse hypothesis 
complicates and entangles the purportedly clear divisions between the two fields, and leads 
inescapably to metaphysical concerns of more fundamental importance than ‘design’ and 
with which theology can more productively engage. As such, my thesis will provide the first 
systematic response to the challenge raised at the end of the American theologian Mary-Jane 
Rubenstein’s recent multiverse survey. Having developed an illuminating and informative 
historical survey of ‘many worlds’ and multiverse thought in Western theology and 
philosophy, she concludes with the observation that, by virtue of its metaphysical 
implications, the multiverse proposal ‘asks more interesting and more pressing questions than 
whether the universe has been “designed” by an anthropomorphic, extracosmic deity.’1 This 
thesis not only offers the first sustained response to these metaphysical questions, but also 
                                                          
1
 Mary-Jane Rubenstein, Worlds Without End: The Many Lives of the Multiverse (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press), p. 236. I will engage extensively with Rubenstein’s work, particularly in Chapter 2.2. 
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stands as the only theological project to argue that metaphysical participation is best able to 
address them. 
 
In terms of its classification, this thesis may be placed within the broad scope of what is 
commonly referred to as ‘theology and science’, an interdisciplinary dialogue that has been 
the subject of renewed attention in light of recent scientific developments and a 
corresponding theological recognition of the need to clarify certain religious beliefs and 
concepts in light of such developments.
2
 It is worth noting that much of the recent academic 
theology and science dialogue has taken place in the Western world, within a Christian 
context, of which this thesis is a product. The assumptions of other religious traditions will 
invariably be challenged by multiverse thought, but it is not within the scope of this thesis to 
pursue such debates. 
 
Thesis Approach 
 
This thesis adopts a new and distinctive philosophical approach to engaging with modern 
multiverse thought. In the theology and science conversation, history and philosophy have 
often taken methodological roles in the academic effort to mediate between the two fields; 
that is, historical discussions of how the two areas have interacted in the past and 
philosophical investigations seeking understanding of how they might be mutually beneficial 
today. On this account, my approach would best be understood as the latter type—a 
philosophical investigation which seeks to identify and develop a metaphysical framework 
that may be fruitfully applied to an important issue in contemporary theology and science. 
 
To that end, I will draw on ancient and medieval resources (neglected not only in multiverse 
discussions but also in the theology and science field more generally) to show that the 
concept of metaphysical participation provides particularly fertile ground on which theology 
can engage constructively with multiverse thought. I will focus specifically on the 
                                                          
2
 For a concise and comprehensive survey of contemporary issues in the theology and science field, including 
discussion of multiverse thought, see Mark Harris and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Philosophy, Science and 
Religion for Everyone (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018). For other wide-ranging surveys of the ways in which 
theology and science challenge and inform each other, see Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Peter Harrison (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); J. B. Stump 
and Alan G Padgett (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012). 
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participatory thought of Plato, Aquinas, and Nicholas of Cusa.
3
 Together, I believe that they 
are among the most important and consequential participatory thinkers in the history of 
Western theology. As I will explain, Plato stands as the architect of participatory thinking as 
it has developed in Western thought. Aquinas follows in this Platonic participatory tradition 
and plays a pivotal role in its development in Christian theology, while Cusa further explores 
the conceptual limits of the tradition as part of his uniquely speculative approach. I selected 
these figures not only because of their leading roles in participatory thought, but also because 
they devote significant attention to creation and cosmology, exploring issues that are newly 
relevant in the context of modern multiverse discourse.
4
 
 
Thesis Structure 
 
The structure of the thesis can be described as follows. In the first chapter I will introduce and 
examine the two central concepts of the thesis: the multiverse hypothesis in modern 
cosmology and the notion of metaphysical participation as it has developed in Western 
theology and philosophy. Both topics will of course be further elucidated and explored in 
subsequent chapters, but it would be useful to establish a general conceptual framework to 
help situate the subsequent three chapters, which will feature specific thinkers and ideas. 
 
I will give over the three main chapters to an exploration of the three key thinkers outlined 
above—Plato, Aquinas, and Nicholas of Cusa—and the relevance of their metaphysical 
thought to modern multiverse discourse. In addition to bringing their insights into contact 
with multiverse ideas, each chapter will be based on a key theme to help anchor and focus the 
discussion. For Plato, I will consider cosmic multiplicity, for Aquinas cosmic diversity, and 
for Cusa cosmic infinity. This will help to connect each thinker more closely with a specific 
dimension of multiverse thought, and also provide for an overall structure that demonstrates 
how multiverse thought encompasses an expansive range of themes. I will begin each of 
                                                          
3
 Since this thesis addresses the theology and science dialogue, I am primarily concerned with bringing 
metaphysical insights from participatory thinkers into contact with scientific multiverse models, rather than 
addressing some of the specifically theological concerns arising from participation. Such concerns might 
include Christological questions (regarding the role of Christ in creation) or Trinitarian and salvific questions 
(regarding the relationship between creation, incarnation, and salvation). While outside the scope of this thesis, 
the role of participation in addressing these questions is integral to the theologies of both Aquinas and Cusa. For 
further discussion of the theological dimensions of participation in Aquinas’s thought, see Fergus Kerr, After 
Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002). 
4
 Of course, there are other consequential figures in the participatory tradition whose insights could be applied to 
multiverse models. I discuss such examples in Chapter 5. 
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these chapters with an extended survey of the notion of participation as developed by the 
thinker. This will be followed by three case studies in which the relevant participatory 
thought will be brought into contact with key thinkers working at the intersection of 
contemporary theology, philosophy, and science, selected for their technical expertise, their 
academic value, and their interest in multiverse models (or related concerns). 
 
In the fifth and concluding chapter, I will provide a summary of the core insights and 
arguments developed in the thesis, as well as reflections on the value that the thesis brings to 
the theology and science dialogue, and final thoughts on possible future research directions in 
light of the arguments developed herein.  
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Chapter 1: Multiverse and Participation 
 
In this chapter, I will introduce the two key issues under consideration in this thesis: the 
multiverse proposal in modern cosmology and the notion of metaphysical participation in 
theology. The introduction to the multiverse proposal will be twofold: first I will outline the 
multiverse idea as it is discussed in cosmology, with particular reference to MIT cosmologist 
Max Tegmark’s important multiverse hierarchy; and second, I will summarise initial 
responses to multiverse theory among contemporary theologians. I will then provide a 
general overview of the concept of metaphysical participation, which will be useful to 
establish before proceeding in the main three chapters to consider specific participatory 
thinkers and ideas. 
 
1.1 Multiverse Thought: Cosmology 
 
Modern cosmologists are increasingly receptive to the notion that the universe we inhabit is 
one of many, or perhaps one of an infinite set of, universes—an (as yet indeterminate) 
ensemble described as the ‘multiverse’.5 Although the existence of any kind of multiverse 
would have profound theological implications, the idea has typically been invoked to address 
the ‘anthropic principle’ (whereby the fine-tuning of our universe is seen as evidence of 
God’s existence) on the basis that, of all the existing universes, we happen to inhabit the one 
with suitable physical constants for life.
6
 In his authoritative edited volume on recent 
multiverse thought, astronomer and multiverse proponent Bernard Carr acknowledges that 
the precise meaning of ‘multiverse’ depends on the model under consideration, though he 
hints at a general definition with his observation that ‘cosmologists have come to realize that 
there are many contexts in which our universe could be just one of a (possibly infinite) 
ensemble of ‘parallel’ universes in which the physical constants vary.’7 
 
                                                          
5
 Given that ‘universe’ is commonly held to mean the totality of everything that exists, there is scope for 
semantic confusion when the concept of ‘multiverse’ is introduced. Although there is no settled consensus on a 
precise definition of the term, it will be sufficient for the purposes of this thesis to understand ‘multiverse’ to 
mean an ensemble of parallel or alternate universes, either connected or disconnected from ours, with different 
physical constants, depending on the specific model. 
6
 Physical constants are physical quantities (including the speed of light, gravity, electromagnetism, and weak 
and strong nuclear forces) generally believed to be universal and invariant. 
7
 Bernard Carr, ‘Introduction and overview’, in Bernard Carr (ed.), Universe or Multiverse? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 3-4. 
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In the absence of a firm scientific consensus on what might constitute a ‘multiverse’, initially 
it would be useful to outline the most significant multiverse theories, with particular reference 
to MIT physicist Max Tegmark’s influential (and controversial) four-level hierarchy, which 
clearly draws together the core scientific theories in a philosophically and theologically 
suggestive manner.
8
 
 
1.1.1 Scientific Origins of Multiverse Thought 
 
In a sense, the multiverse proposal is unremarkable insofar as it is broadly in line with the 
gradual historical shift of the scientific worldview—or what Carr refers to as the ‘outward 
journey’9—from geocentric to heliocentric to galactocentric to cosmocentric to the recent 
move towards a multiverse view.
10
 In the second half of the twentieth century, two key 
factors prompted a turn among some cosmologists to consider the possibility of the 
multiverse. First, multiverse scenarios have arisen out of developments in cosmology and 
particle physics, particularly in relation to cosmological inflation, quantum cosmology, and 
string theory (all of which will be discussed below). The theory of cosmic inflation
11—
whereby the universe underwent extremely rapid expansion during its earliest stages—is 
central to multiverse thought in general and the first two ‘levels’ of Tegmark’s hierarchy in 
particular. In modern cosmology, inflation is used to explain the size, uniformity, and flatness 
of the universe. In an inflationary multiverse scenario, the majority of space continues to 
stretch forever, but some regions stop stretching, break apart, and form spatially separate 
‘bubble’ universes with different laws of physics. Inflation is considered to be well supported 
by observations,
12
 and its status would be further strengthened by detection of the large-scale 
gravitational waves that it is said to produce.
13
 
                                                          
8
 While summarising multiverse theories will provide a necessary basis from which to develop the subsequent 
theological arguments, it is not the purpose of this thesis to adjudicate between such theories, each of whose 
details and overall scientific standing continue to be widely disputed. 
9
 Carr, ‘Introduction and overview’, p. 7. 
10
 Similarly, Stephen Hawking suggests that, just as the historic assumption of the earth’s uniqueness was 
confounded, recent cosmological results indicate that our universe is also one of many. See Stephen Hawking 
and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books, 2010), p. 143.  
11
 The initial expression of inflationary cosmology is widely attributed to a 1981 paper by American 
cosmologist Alan Guth. See Alan H. Guth, ‘Inflationary universe: A possible solution to the horizon and 
flatness problems’, in Physical Review D 23 (1981), pp. 347-56. 
12
 Andrew Liddle & Jon Loveday, Oxford Companion to Cosmology (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), 
p. 76. 
13
 In 2014, the detection of apparent evidence of primordial gravitational waves—ripples in spacetime created at 
the beginning of the universe’s existence and consistent with inflation—was widely reported. However, a 
subsequent report argued that interstellar dust could have influenced the results. See 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1409.5738. 
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Second, the existence of a multiverse may be implied in applications of the anthropic 
principle. This suggests that our observation of the life-enabling (or anthropic) fine-tunings 
implies a degree of necessity that we should exist to observe the fine tunings.
14
 It is now 
widely accepted among physicists that the physical constants governing our universe appear 
to be delicately and carefully balanced to enable human life to exist. If any of the physical 
constants had marginally different values, the universe would be radically different and 
human life almost certainly would not have emerged. For example, if nuclear and 
electromagnetic forces were slightly different in strength, carbon atoms and therefore human 
life would not exist. Similarly, if the neutron mass were any more than 0.2 percent lighter or 
heavier, the conditions of the early universe would have been such that human life would not 
have been possible due to an absence of hydrogen. In other words, the physical constants 
appear to be perfectly—perhaps improbably and mysteriously—conducive for humans to 
exist, or ‘finely tuned’. 
 
From a religious perspective, these anthropic considerations suggest the existence of a God 
who tuned the physical constants in such a way as to enable humanity not only to exist, but to 
be capable of reflecting on its own existence and of developing a relationship with God. In 
John Polkinghorne’s view, the anthropic fine-tunings are not just a ‘happy accident’ but the 
‘expression of the purposive design of a Creator, who has endowed it with the finely tuned 
potentiality for life.’15 Of course, this is a contemporary and scientifically-informed 
restatement of an ancient theological argument—the teleological argument, or the argument 
from design—in which the apparent deliberate design in the natural world is attributed to an 
intelligent creator.
16
 Plato’s Timaeus, which will be the central focus of the following chapter, 
stands as a classical example of a teleological vision whereby the order and harmony of the 
cosmos is understood to be the product of an intelligent cause seeking to imitate an eternal 
                                                          
14
 The principle exists in weak forms, whereby the fine-tuning is attributed to selection bias in that only a life-
supporting universe would enable life to emerge to observe the fine-tuning, and in more contentious strong 
forms, whereby the existence of observers somehow influences the constants such that the universe is compelled 
to be such that human life would emerge. Like the multiverse proposal, it is often criticised by scientists as more 
of a metaphysical or religious statement indicative of our need for an ultimate explanation. See John D. Barrow 
& Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
15
 John Polkinghorne, Science and Theology (London: SPCK, 1998), p. 75. 
16
 For a comprehensive survey of the history of design arguments, which draws widely on theological, 
philosophical, and scientific literature, see Benjamin C. Jantzen, An Introduction to Design Arguments 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Jantzen argues that modern science has discredited classical 
design arguments such as Aquinas’s fifth way (see footnote below), but that the complexity and apparent 
purposive activities of natural systems continue to require acknowledgement and explanation. 
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archetype. In his Summa Theologiae, to be discussed in Chapter Three, Aquinas provides a 
Christian formulation of the teleological argument, attributing the ‘governance of the world’ 
to God: ‘We see things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end… 
Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; 
and this being we call God.’17 Similarly, William Paley’s Natural Theology begins with his 
famous watchmaker analogy in which the discovery of a complex and functioning watch is 
taken to suggest the existence of an intelligent watchmaker, just as the complexity and order 
of the natural world should be taken to suggest the existence of a divine designer.
18
  
 
Today, for those who are disinclined to invoke such a divine designer, the main scientific 
alternative to emerge in recent decades is the multiverse, whereby our universe is one of 
many—or perhaps an infinite number of—universes, and so it should hardly be surprising 
that at least one would contain suitable conditions for human life, and that happens to be the 
one inhabited by us. Martin Rees, the influential British cosmologist who ‘much prefers’ the 
multiverse perspective to providential design, is persuaded that cosmic design becomes less 
astonishing if our universe is part of a larger multiverse ensemble.
19
 In this sense, the 
multiverse is seen to provide the most natural explanation of the anthropic fine-tunings, 
thereby dispensing with God as an explanation of cosmic design. It is precisely because of its 
ostensibly physical (or at least quasi-physical) explanatory power that multiverse proponents 
find the theory, for all of the doubt over whether it falls under the experimental and 
observational enterprise of science, preferable to God. In Bernard Carr’s stark framing, ‘If 
there is only one universe, you might have to have a fine-tuner. If you don’t want God, you’d 
better have a multiverse.’20 On this view, the multiverse proposal is perhaps the only way to 
ensure that the anthropic principle remains legitimate science rather than bad theology, a kind 
                                                          
17
 Aquinas, ST I.2.3. This is the fifth way of Aquinas’s ‘five ways’ to demonstrate the existence of God. 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns, Oates & 
Washbourne, 1920). 
18
 William Paley, Natural Theology, Matthew D. Eddy & David Knight (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), pp. 7-31. More recently, intelligent design advocate Michael Behe has offered an updated version of 
Paley’s analogy based on the idea of ‘irreducible complexity’ which rejects the possibility of evolution through 
successive modifications of natural selection in favour of complexity that must have been intelligently designed: 
‘The observation of the intelligent design of life is as momentous as the observation that the earth goes around 
the sun.’ Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box (New York, NY: Free Press, 2006), pp. 232-3. In a 2005 U.S. 
trial on the teaching of intelligent design in public schools, the court found that irreducible complexity ‘has been 
refuted in peer-reviewed research papers and has been rejected by the scientific community at large.’ See: 
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/400/707/2414073/ 
19
 Martin Rees, Our Cosmic Habitat (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 164. 
20
 Bernard Carr quoted in Tim Folger, ‘Science’s Alternative to an Intelligent Creator: the Multiverse Theory’, 
Discover, Dec 2008, http://discovermagazine.com/2008/dec/10-sciences-alternative-to-an-intelligent-creator 
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of God of the gaps category error in which theological explanations are misapplied to gaps in 
scientific understanding. 
 
1.1.2 Scientific Legitimacy of Multiverse Thought 
 
In spite of the growing mainstream scientific attention on the multiverse, it remains a highly 
contentious idea, with a substantial group of cosmologists maintaining that it is excessively 
speculative, not open to falsification, and therefore not properly scientific. Of course, 
astronomers are (and may remain) unable to view other universes, and it may never be 
possible to visit or directly experience such universes, even if they are eventually detected or 
confirmed. As will be seen, the current ‘evidence’ offered for different multiverse models is 
invariably indirect, suggestive, or open to varied interpretation. Many physicists do not 
therefore regard multiverse proposals as legitimate science at all.
21
 For example, George Ellis 
claims that ‘the very nature of the scientific enterprise is at stake in the multiverse debate’ 
since its advocates propose the ‘dangerous tactic’ of abandoning testability and explanatory 
power in light of the prospect of no direct or indirect means of testing the theory.
22
 He further 
argues that multiverse observation is impossible due to the lack of causal connection between 
our experimental apparatus and the multiverse under analysis. He infers that the multiverse is 
not scientifically testable and must be regarded as a metaphysical assumption: ‘A belief that 
is justified by faith, unsupported by direct or indirect evidence, should be clearly identified as 
such.’23 He also contends that there must be a credible link between presently known physics 
and the proposed physics underlying a given multiverse—an extrapolation for which there is 
no (and may never be any) evidence. On the possible existence of an infinite number of 
universes (of particular reference to Tegmark’s Level IV multiverse), he points out that 
infinity is not an actual number, not specifiable, and therefore not physically realisable: 
‘Whenever infinities emerge in physics, we can be reasonably sure there has been a 
breakdown in our model.’24 
 
                                                          
21
 Princeton theoretical physicist Paul Steinhardt expresses this criticism in particularly hostile terms: ‘The 
multiverse idea is baroque, unnatural, untestable and, in the end, dangerous to science and society.’ See: 
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2014/11/princeton_theor090901.html. 
22
 George Ellis, ‘Opposing the multiverse’, in Astronomy and Geophysics 49 (2008) 2.33. 
23
 George Ellis, ‘Multiverses: description, uniqueness, testing’, in Bernard Carr (ed.), Universe or Multiverse? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 401. 
24
 Ellis, ‘Multiverses: description, uniqueness, testing’, p. 397. 
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Conversely, Martin Rees (among a growing number of more sympathetic cosmologists) 
underlines that the conceptual status of other universes is no worse than theories such as 
superstrings or quarks.
25
 Unlike Ellis and other critics, Don Page believes that multiverse 
theories can be tested, on the grounds that even though such theories usually involve 
unobservable elements, ‘they may give testable predictions for observable elements if they 
include a well defined measure for observations.’26 In addition, multiverse proponents claim 
that, while it might not be directly testable, there are signs that it must be correct. Indeed, 
Carr regards the anthropic principle as one of the most powerful such signs: ‘In the absence 
of direct evidence for other universes, I regard the anthropic fine-tunings as the best indirect 
evidence.’27 Regardless of one’s view on whether the multiverse idea is properly scientific, it 
has clearly occasioned a profound reconsideration of the role and boundaries of science, 
while also vividly illustrating the extent to which cosmology intersects with metaphysics. 
Like theological reflections on the divine, the object of cosmological enquiry (the universe as 
a whole) cannot be experimented upon or directly tested or observed from ‘outside’. 
 
1.1.3 Tegmark’s Multiverse Hierarchy 
 
While modern cosmological thinking about the multiverse has been characterised by 
strikingly divergent proposals, Tegmark’s hierarchy of multiverses represents a valuable and 
widely-discussed reference point from which to consider multiverse theories.
28
 Its value lies 
in its conceptual comprehensiveness, drawing together ostensibly disparate theories, and in 
its insistence that hierarchy is itself significant, allowing for ‘progressively greater diversity’ 
of reality.
29
 However, Tegmark’s use of hierarchy can also be problematic and potentially 
misleading, as evidenced by his (scientifically provocative) claim that the ‘key question is not 
whether there is a multiverse, but rather how many levels it has.’30 This might lead one to 
                                                          
25
 Martin Rees, Before the Beginning (London: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 185. 
26
 Don N. Page, ‘Predictions and tests of multiverse theories’, in Bernard Carr (ed.), Universe or Multiverse? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 428. 
27
 Bernard Carr, ‘Defending the multiverse’, in Astronomy and Geophysics 49 (2008) 2.36. 
28
 As an alternative example, Brian Greene has identified nine types of parallel universes: quilted, inflationary, 
brane, cyclic, landscape, quantum, holographic, simulated, and ultimate. Brian Greene, The Hidden Reality 
(New York: Random House, 2011). 
29
 Max Tegmark, ‘The multiverse hierarchy’, in Bernard Carr (ed.), Universe or Multiverse? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 99. For a further development of the hierarchy see Max Tegmark, Our 
Mathematical Universe: My Quest for the Ultimate Nature of Reality (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2015). 
Rubenstein notes that Tegmark’s decision (as a self-identified Platonist) to outline a ‘hierarchy’ is telling since it 
evokes the Neoplatonic notion of a cosmic hierarchy of being with degrees of reality, extending from objects to 
animals to humans to angels and finally to God. Rubenstein, Worlds Without End, p. 205. 
30
 Tegmark, ‘The multiverse hierarchy’, p. 100. 
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imagine a set of sharply distinct levels, with lower levels subordinate to or somehow less 
‘real’ than higher levels, or perhaps even a requirement that ‘access’ to the higher levels is 
possible only after ‘passing through’ the lower levels. Yet, as will be seen below, Level III 
does not add any new types of universes to Levels I or II. In fact, given the radical nature of 
Level IV, in which all mathematical structures and possibilities are said to exist, Levels I to 
III are often grouped together by critics, with IV highlighted as a controversial outlier.
31
 
 
Level I 
 
Nevertheless, Tegmark’s hierarchy ‘begins’ with Level I, which refers to ‘regions beyond our 
cosmic horizon’, or the domain that cosmologists and astronomers can directly observe.32 
This is based on a spatially infinite cosmological model (which he regards as a prediction of 
inflation), with infinitely many other regions existing beyond our cosmic horizon, thereby 
realising all possible initial conditions. Level I universes are governed by the same laws of 
physics as our observable universe, but with different initial conditions. Contemporary 
inflationary theory suggests that these conditions were created by quantum fluctuations 
during inflation, resulting in an infinite ‘ergodic’ space containing an ensemble of universes, 
each with its own random initial conditions: ‘In other words, everything that could in 
principle have happened here did happen somewhere else.’33 As a consequence, the Level I 
multiverse is composed of infinitely many other inhabited planets, including infinitely many 
‘copies’ of each person in our universe. If there are many copies of each person, with no 
certainty about which copy truly represents each person and only probabilistic assessments as 
to how each copy will behave, Tegmark believes that this ‘kills the traditional notion of 
determinism.’34 Just as he offers a ‘crude estimate’ of how far away our copies might be, his 
conception of identity is notably brisk and imprecise. He refers to ‘identical’ copies, but then 
admits that ‘their lives will necessarily differ eventually’.35 At a minimum, the profound 
philosophical implications of infinitely many identities warrant much deeper investigation. 
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Although Tegmark asserts that the central Level I assumption of infinite space is valid—‘If 
anything, the Level I multiverse sounds obvious. How could space not be infinite? If space 
comes to an end, what lies beyond it?’36—it remains the case that spatial infinity has neither 
been proven nor refuted, and might even in principle be unknowable.
37
 The second 
assumption on which Tegmark’s Level I multiverse rests—that matter has a uniform 
distribution—is equally speculative. With reference to recent observations of the three-
dimensional galaxy distribution and the microwave background, he suggests that matter is 
typified by uniformity on large scales, and that assuming this pattern continues, ‘space 
beyond our observable universe teems with galaxies, stars and planets.’38 His interpretation of 
the evidence, then, is still explicitly based on an assumption requiring what Ellis regards as 
an ‘extreme’ extrapolation from our observable universe to unimaginably distant regions 
beyond our cosmic horizon.
39
 It is also worth noting that a Level I multiverse, with the same 
laws of physics across infinite space, would not directly address the question of fine-tuning 
that is so central to multiverse discourse, unless such a multiverse emerged as part of a 
broader Level II ensemble, as discussed below. 
 
Level II (and other variants) 
 
The Level II multiverse, which Tegmark believes is also predicted by most currently popular 
models of inflation, is best imagined as an infinite set of Level I multiverses. In this ‘post-
inflation bubble’ scenario, space generally stretches rapidly and forever, but some regions 
stop stretching and form distinct bubbles. Infinitely many of these bubbles may be created, 
each becoming an infinite embryonic Level I multiverse, with different laws of physics, 
particles, and dimensionality brought about by quantum fluctuations during inflation: ‘So the 
Level II multiverse is likely to be more diverse than the Level I multiverse, containing 
domains where not only the initial conditions differ, but also the physical constants.’40 
Whereas certain Level I multiverses could theoretically be accessible in the event of the 
deceleration of cosmic expansion, Tegmark explains that Level II domains are ‘so far away 
that you would never get to them even if you travelled at the speed of light forever’41 since 
                                                          
36
 Tegmark, ‘The multiverse hierarchy’, p. 102. 
37
 According to NASA, ‘all we can truly conclude is that the Universe is much larger than the volume we can 
directly observe.’ See http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/universe/uni_shape.html. 
38
 Tegmark, ‘The multiverse hierarchy’, p. 103. 
39
 Ellis, ‘Multiverses: description, uniqueness, testing’, p. 401. 
40
 Tegmark, ‘The multiverse hierarchy’, p. 107. 
41
 Tegmark, ‘The multiverse hierarchy’, p. 105. 
18 
 
space is being created between our Level I multiverse and other regions faster than it could be 
traversed. 
 
Tegmark believes that the highly active research area of string theory may offer a ‘specific 
realization’ of the Level II multiverse. In string theory, which is viewed by physicists such as 
Stephen Hawking to be the closest account to an accurate description of the universe, the 
fundamental objects that give rise to elementary particles are one-dimensional strings, not the 
point-like particles of elementary physics. String theory suggests that there are actually ten or 
eleven dimensions, with some of the higher dimensions ‘compactified’ and thus beyond 
direct human experience. This compactification leads Tegmark to propose four sub-levels of 
increasing diversity: IIa with the same effective laws but different post-inflationary bubbles; 
IIb with different laws according to supergravity (a type of quantum theory concerning the 
interactions of elementary particles); IIc with different ‘fluxes’ (magnetic fields) that stabilise 
extra dimensions; and IId with different compactifications and dimensionality, different 
symmetries, and different elementary particles. Similarly, Leonard Susskind’s influential 
string landscape model is based on M-theory (an attempt to unify different versions of string 
theory), which suggests an immense number of string theory vacua, each associated with a 
different universe. He concludes that the improbably large number of universes raises the 
questions of fine-tuning and of our observation of and presence in our own universe.
42
 
 
On a related point, Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok’s ‘ekpyrotic’ scenario, in which the Level 
I multiverse is cyclic and undergoes an infinite series of big bangs and crunches, is based on 
string/M theory. On this account, the Big Bang was not the beginning of time, but an 
inflection point with a past filled with endlessly repeating cycles of evolution, each 
accompanied by the creation of new matter. Our own universe lies on a brane, a multi-
dimensional object, called our ‘braneworld’, which is separated by a microscopic distance 
from a hidden second braneworld with different particles, forces, and properties.
43
 The only 
forces capable of crossing this ‘gap’ are gravity and dark energy, which eventually pull the 
two worlds together, forcing them to collide and then separate, in an event that represents the 
Big Bang. In this sense, there is an eternal process of destruction and rebirth: ‘If it exists, the 
ensemble of such incarnations would also form a multiverse, arguably with a diversity similar 
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to that of Level II.’44 Unlike Level II, though, this ekpyrotic cycle represents a temporal 
rather than a spatial multiverse and therefore fits uneasily in Tegmark’s hierarchy. Contrary 
to the Level II model, it does not introduce radically distant and unconnected regions of 
spacetime with different physical constants. Rather, it conceives of the universe as a ‘single, 
coherent entity that exists in a stable cycling state whose properties can eventually be 
understood as a consequence of the basic laws of nature.’45 
 
Although Tegmark claims that Lee Smolin’s idea of universes emerging through black holes 
rather than inflation
46
 can be seen as another Level II variant, Smolin’s most recent work is 
highly critical of multiverse thought in general and Tegmark in particular. Smolin and 
Roberto Unger argue that there is only one universe at a time, a single causally connected 
universe that contains all its causes. The universe is not a member of an ensemble of other 
simultaneously existing universes, nor does it have any copies, nor does it reflect or embody 
all mathematical structures, as Tegmark’s Level IV multiverse suggests. The single universe 
may extend indefinitely back in time, comprising earlier universes or simply earlier states of 
one universe. By contrast, Smolin and Unger pointedly reject the ‘non-empirical character’ of 
the multiverse idea: ‘it combines an absence of empirical validation, or of susceptibility to 
empirical challenge, with a lack of explanatory function.’47 This model of a single universe is 
another instance of a ‘multiverse’ theory (in the sense that it involves a Level II-type degree 
of diversity with its characteristics of eternal succession and transformation) which does not 
entirely cohere with Tegmark’s four-level hierarchy. 
 
The Level II multiverse, with its infinite production of bubble universes, is often invoked in 
relation to the anthropic principle.
48
 If there are many (or infinitely many) other universes 
with different physical constants, then it is inevitable that we find ourselves in one suitable 
for life, and not in other universes with different parameters that are not conducive to such 
existence. On this account, the statistically improbable degree of fine-tuning in our universe 
(such as the number of space-time dimensions, the strength of electromagnetic force, and the 
nature of the cosmological constant) implies the existence of other universes with at least 
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some different physical constants. If this is the case, Tegmark acknowledges that we will 
‘never be able to determine the values of all physical constants from first principles.’49 As 
with Level I, it is important to underline that the presumably radically different laws 
governing inaccessible Level II multiverses seem to present a logical problem for the theory 
itself (not addressed by Tegmark) insofar as it assumes that the laws governing our universe 
can provide the basis for speculation about other universes that would, as noted, almost 
certainly be governed according to fundamentally divergent (and likely unknowable) 
principles.  
 
Level III 
 
Tegmark’s Level III multiverse refers to the ‘many worlds’ interpretation (MWI) of quantum 
mechanics, initially proposed in 1957 by Hugh Everett as an alternative to the Copenhagen 
Interpretation of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg. According to Hewitt, the Copenhagen 
‘collapse’ postulate—whereby states of the universe are specified in terms of wave functions 
which collapse into definite classical states (such as the positions and velocities of particles) 
upon observation—is unnecessary. Rather, at each event or decision point, reality ‘splits’ in a 
manner that observers experience as a slight randomness, and every outcome actually 
happens, each in a different universe, suggesting the exponential creation of new universes as 
each quantum eventuality unfolds. While the parallel versions of each individual in Level I 
are situated elsewhere in three-dimensional space, Tegmark believes that they exist on 
‘another quantum branch in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space’ in Level III.50 
 
Paradoxically, though often regarded as the most controversial and metaphysically radical of 
the first three levels, Tegmark maintains that Level III ‘adds nothing new beyond Levels I 
and II, just more indistinguishable copies of the same universes’.51 Thus, someone 
experiencing a Level III-type ‘split’ or superposition of outcomes, such as the choice between 
reading the rest of this paragraph or doing something else, notices the branching as a flicker 
of uncertainty and is unaware of the quantum alter ego who makes the alternative decision. 
Likewise, in a Level I multiverse, different versions of the same person make different 
decisions, with the only difference being that they reside elsewhere in conventional three-
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dimensional space rather than a separate quantum branch. While the Level I (or II) and III 
subjects thereby occupy different space, it is possible to understand the Tegmarkian sense in 
which Level III ‘splitting’ or ‘branching’ can happen in Levels I and II without necessarily 
adding anything qualitatively new or contentious to the prior levels, though of course the 
perception of extreme profligacy remains controversial. In this sense, MWI proponents 
highlight the Copenhagen Interpretation’s relative complexity (since it seems to ‘add’ 
something extra to account for the ‘collapse’ of the wave function) and solipsism (since 
ontologically it seems to imply that reality is observer-dependent), in contrast to what Sean 
Carroll sees as a ‘quite thin’ ontological commitment necessitated by the MWI’s unified 
wave function.
52
 Further developments in quantum computing may strengthen (or weaken) 
the Level III notion of parallelism.  
 
Level IV 
 
Finally, Tegmark explores the widely-held physics notion that the physical world is a 
mathematical structure. He defines mathematical structures as ‘formal systems … 
consist[ing] of abstract symbols and rules for manipulating them, specifying how new strings 
of symbols referred to as theorems can be derived from given ones referred to as axioms.’53 
He claims that if it is not the case that all mathematical structures enjoy physical existence, 
then there would be a ‘fundamental, unexplained ontological asymmetry’ built into reality, 
splitting such structures into two classes of those with and without physical existence. To 
escape this apparent dilemma, he introduces the concept of ‘mathematical democracy’,54 in 
which mathematical and physical reality are equivalent, and every mathematical structure 
exists physically and corresponds to a different universe, thus permitting the existence of 
everything: ‘This implies the notion that a mathematical structure and the physical world are 
in some sense identical. It also means that mathematical structures are “out there”, in the 
sense that mathematicians discover them rather than create them.’55 
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The Level IV multiverse, described by Tegmark as ‘the ultimate ensemble theory’ and by 
Brian Greene as the ‘Ultimate Multiverse’, allegedly comprises all mathematically possible 
universes, subsumes all other ensembles, and therefore ‘brings closure to the hierarchy of 
multiverses’, such that there cannot be a Level V.’56 While Level I universes join seamlessly, 
and Level II and Level III universes are demarcated by inflation and decoherence 
respectively, Level IV universes are completely disconnected. The evidence for Level IV is 
what Tegmark sees as the ‘unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics’ (that is, the utility of 
mathematics for describing the physical world, which he attributes to the idea that the world 
is mathematical structure), though he concedes that failure to unify general relativity and 
quantum field theory, and thus to find a mathematical structure to match our universe, would 
necessitate the abandonment of Level IV since this would undermine its assumption of the 
unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in describing our physical universe.
57
 
 
While the multiverse models depicted in Levels I, II, and III are the subject of varying 
degrees of debate among cosmologists, Tegmark’s Level IV multiverse has been strongly 
criticised for its extravagance and profligacy. In response to Tegmark’s troubling and ill-
defined conflation of mathematical and physical reality, Ellis notes that we ‘cannot even 
describe [Level IV] properly, let alone prove it occurs. Claiming existence of something you 
cannot properly characterize has dubious scientific merit.’58 Echoing many scientific (and 
religious) critics, Page highlights the logical absurdities raised by the co-existence of 
contradictory mathematical structures. He contends that there must be one unique 
mathematical structure that describes reality, and so it is logically nonsensical to posit 
different structures describing different parts of what is ultimately one overarching reality. 
 
Intriguingly, Tegmark suggests that the debate over quantum mechanics and parallel 
universes is secondary to the deeper conflict between what he sees as the Platonic paradigm, 
whereby the external/mathematical perspective is real, while our internal human perspective 
is merely approximate, and the Aristotelian paradigm, which he sees as subordinating 
mathematical language to the internal perspective: ‘if you prefer the Platonic paradigm, you 
should find multiverses natural. In this case, all of physics is ultimately a mathematics 
problem … there is a TOE [Theory of Everything] at the top of the tree, whose axioms are 
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purely mathematical’.59 For Tegmark, the Level IV premise that all mathematical structures 
exist physically ‘can be viewed as a form of radical Platonism, asserting that the 
mathematical structures in Plato’s realm of ideas … exist “out there” in a physical sense’.60 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, this idiosyncratic interpretation of Platonism, with 
reality identified with the physical, seems to be at odds with Plato’s vision in which physical 
things exist as an image of and a participation in the non-physical, eternal Forms, which lie 
beyond the material world as its source and model. While the particular contours of 
Tegmark’s reading of Plato are dubious, his warning against dismissing things ‘merely 
because we cannot observe them from our vantage point’61 is a fitting expression of the 
Platonic love of the unseen and eternal. In addition, the Forms raise philosophical issues of 
direct relevance to the multiverse, such as the relation of the universe to whatever deeper 
reality lies beyond it, as well as the metaphysical question of ‘universals’, or what particular 
things share in common. 
 
That Tegmark’s hierarchy entails progressively greater diversity opens it (and multiverse 
thought in general) to the charge of violating Ockham’s razor, or the idea that any theory 
should avoid unnecessary complexity.
62
 On this point, Tegmark counterintuitively argues that 
the higher multiverse levels are simpler due to the ‘symmetry and simplicity inherent in the 
totality of all the elements taken together … The opulence of complexity is all in the 
subjective perceptions of observers’.63 He identifies complexity with particularity, such that 
restricting attention to one aspect of an ensemble detracts from its overall simplicity. In this 
way, the movement up through the multiverse hierarchy becomes a journey away from 
complexity: away from the specification of initial conditions (Level I), then away from the 
specification of physical constants (Level II), and ultimately away from the specification of 
anything at all (Level IV). 
 
 
  
                                                          
59
 Tegmark, ‘The multiverse hierarchy’, p. 116. 
60
 Tegmark, ‘The multiverse hierarchy’, p. 118. 
61
 Tegmark, ‘The multiverse hierarchy’, p. 100. 
62
 This point will be considered further in the next section. 
63
 Tegmark, ‘The multiverse hierarchy’, p. 123. 
24 
 
1.2 Multiverse Thought: Theology 
 
In contemporary theology, multiverse theory is discussed primarily in the context of the 
question of ‘design’. This is consistent with both the historic theological importance of design 
(particularly as the subject of natural theology) and the increasing attention in contemporary 
science on anthropic reasoning (which has itself occasioned the recent turn to multiverse 
speculation). While the emphasis on design is as important as it is inevitable, the central 
premise of this thesis is that the ultimately rather limited issue of design fails to reflect the 
profound theological and metaphysical implications of the multiverse proposal. As noted 
earlier, Rubenstein concludes her survey with the suggestion that the multiverse could 
provide the basis for the development of a theology that asks more fundamental metaphysical 
questions than whether the universe has been designed.
64
 The purpose of this thesis is to 
outline such a theology by drawing on Platonic and medieval resources to demonstrate that a 
metaphysic of participation can facilitate an effective theological engagement with the 
multiverse. 
 
Prior to outlining in Section 1.3 what such a metaphysical framework might entail, it would 
be instructive in this section to provide an overview of the intellectual context of 
contemporary theological multiverse assessments. First, I will focus on theological objections 
to the multiverse, which have tended to characterise the initial theological response. Second, I 
will assess the more positive (albeit still tentative) ways in which other theologians have 
approached the subject.
65
 
 
1.2.1 Theological Criticism of Multiverse Thought 
 
Design 
 
Given that the multiverse has often been presented in explicitly atheistic terms as an 
alternative to divine design, with its advocates expecting it to ‘have the same impact in the 
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context of cosmic design as evolution did in the context of biological design’66 it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the issue of design has been the focus of initial (and in most cases 
unsympathetic) theological engagement. Thus, Christoph Schönborn, the Archbishop of 
Vienna, identifies the multiverse hypothesis (along with ‘neo-Darwinism’) as a hostile 
scientific claim, ‘invented to avoid the overwhelming evidence for purpose and design found 
in modern science’.67 This careful emphasis on defending what Schönborn sees as the limits 
and findings of science places him in the unexpected position of dismissing the multiverse on 
scientific rather than theological grounds. His concern is that modern science—‘the light of 
reason’—is being misappropriated by the ideological project of denying purpose and 
design.
68
 The logical—and potentially theologically fruitful—corollary of Schönborn’s 
argument is that a more scientifically modest and restrained multiverse account, not intended 
to reduce the cosmos to pure chance and necessity, could be compatible with belief in God. 
Contrary to the historic conflict model
69
 suggested by his claim that the Church will ‘again’ 
defend reason, perhaps it might be possible to reconcile God and the multiverse (and, by 
implication, theology and science) in a manner that acknowledges the participation of human 
reason in divine reason, and the proper role of reason in helping to discern its own divine 
source and ground in the complex ordering of the cosmos. 
 
While Schönborn objects to invoking the multiverse to undermine cosmic design, other 
theistic multiverse critics argue that its alleged ad hoc nature and its metaphysical 
extravagance serve unintentionally to reinforce the notion of design. According to the 
evangelical theologian William Lane Craig, the fact that ‘detractors of design’ feel obliged to 
resort to such a radical and scientifically contentious theory merely underlines the point that 
cosmic fine-tuning is ‘not explicable in terms of physical necessity alone or in terms of sheer 
chance’ and therefore the multiverse hypothesis is ‘a sort of backhanded compliment’ to the 
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design hypothesis.
70
 In this vein, Neil Manson suggests that the multiverse might be thought 
of as ‘the last resort for the desperate atheist’.71 This approach of acknowledging the 
profound metaphysical issues raised by the multiverse hypothesis (usually in dismissive and 
contemptuous terms), followed by a swift retreat back to the question of design, is 
characteristic of many early theological responses. The premise of this thesis is that, having 
hinted at the metaphysics, it would be more constructive to pursue this in a sustained manner. 
 
Extravagance and Profligacy 
 
In addition to criticism that the multiverse represents an ideological, rather than strictly 
scientific, attempt to replace divine design, theologians have also widely criticised the 
multiverse for its lack of simplicity and economy, particularly in relation to Tegmark’s 
controversial Level IV multiverse.
72
 This theological perspective goes beyond the standard 
scientific concern that the multiverse radically violates Ockham’s razor73 to contend that the 
hypothesis of a divine designer is vastly more simple, coherent, and thus plausible. For 
instance, Keith Ward argues that Tegmark’s Level IV multiverse, in which everything will be 
true somewhere, is ‘more extravagant’ than any religious creed: ‘[The Level IV model] does 
not have much to offer in the way of economy, simplicity, or plausibility…to say that it is 
simpler than proposing an intelligent Creator is not convincing.’74 If the choice is between a 
huge number of universes existing for no particular reason, and a supreme intelligent being 
with necessary existence able to bring contingent universes into being for the sake of their 
value, he maintains that God is the ‘simpler and more rational hypothesis.’75 In Ward’s view, 
the arbitrariness and profligacy of the multiverse can only be redeemed by the existence of 
underlying value; specifically, a mind-like ultimate existent with the power to bring about the 
existence of universes for the sake of realising certain values or worthwhile states of affairs. 
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On this account, the multiverse would not necessarily be an alternative to God, but rather an 
extension of the creative power of God. 
 
Similarly, Rodney Holder maintains that the multiverse is ‘distinctly non-simple and 
uneconomical’ in comparison with belief in God.76 He identifies a number of fundamental 
(and as yet unanswered) problems with the multiverse hypothesis, such as whether infinitely 
many universes are physically realisable; whether the hypothesis is testable; whether it is 
simple (and therefore more probable than theism); what kind of explanation it provides; why 
there appears to be more fine-tuning in this universe than is required for life; and why the 
order for life persists in this universe.
77
 On the apparent surfeit of fine-tuning, Holder refers 
to Roger Penrose’s research concerning the entropy of the universe, which suggests that our 
universe is significantly more special than required merely in order for human life to exist. 
The multiverse proposal might offer an explanation for fine-tuning as such, but not for our 
own universe’s ultra fine-tuning, which remains an ‘unexplained brute fact’,78 as does the 
persistence of order in our universe—neither of which are fully explained by the multiverse 
hypothesis, and both of which indicate that our universe is much more special than a 
randomly generated universe within a multiverse. 
 
For Holder, the multiverse is a complex explanation, multiplying entities in a ‘catch-all’ way 
that is generally discouraged in science, yet still fails as an ultimate explanation, as it does not 
address the questions of why there is something rather than nothing, and why there is this 
multiverse model rather than that multiverse model—or, as the physicist Paul Davies puts it, 
‘multiverses merely shift the problem up one level’.79 In contrast, Holder believes God 
provides the ultimate explanation for our single universe, since God exists necessarily, and 
represents a simpler, more economical explanation of design (and its persistence), on the 
basis that a good, loving God would bring about (and maintain) the conditions for human life. 
Due to its lack of observable consequences, Holder dismisses the multiverse as ‘a 
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metaphysical explanation of life’ rather than a scientific one.80 As an alternative to Holder’s 
use of Bayesian probability theory to evaluate competing metaphysical hypotheses, which 
calls to mind Swinburne’s similar methodology to ‘demonstrate’ the existence of God,81 this 
thesis will respond to the metaphysical nature of the multiverse proposal, aptly highlighted by 
Holder and others, by applying the metaphysical framework of participation.  
 
In light of claims by theistic multiverse sceptics such as Holder and Swinburne that an 
infinite God is a simpler explanation than a randomly occurring universe or multiverse and 
thereby preferable on the grounds of Ockham’s razor, Davies notes that one surprising feature 
of algorithmic complexity theory (a branch of mathematics that can be used to provide 
definitions of simplicity and complexity) is that the whole can sometimes be simpler than its 
component parts. In this way, he claims that ‘God-plus-Universe’ can be simpler than either 
in isolation, though this presents the theologically problematic implication that God is part of 
the whole, as in ‘multiverse pantheism’ described below. This assumption is not shared by 
Richard Dawkins, who avers that God must be at least as complex as any system that God 
creates, nor by Victor Stenger, who concludes his new survey of theological and scientific 
multiverse thought with a denial of the simplicity of God: ‘In the spirit of Ockham’s razor, 
we must recognise that currently God is an additional hypothesis not required by the data. If 
he were, he would be included in the set of premises that constitute scientific theories.’82 If 
this appears to be a misguided conflation of distinct scientific and theological categories, it is 
shared and developed in Davies’ provocative contention that the multiverse ‘is really an old-
fashioned God in disguise’.83 He believes that both appeal to infinite, unknowable systems 
and both require an infinite amount of information to be discarded just to explain our own 
finite universe. Further, he speculates that algorithmic complexity theory would show that 
some versions of the multiverse and ‘naïve deism’ (whereby God picks a single real universe 
from an infinite shopping list of possible but unreal universes) would be equivalently—and 
likely infinitely—complex: ‘[The multiverse] is basically just a religious conviction rather 
than a scientific argument.’84 Regardless of the validity of this hypothesis, Davies is helpful 
in terms of warning that considerable care is needed in using terms like ‘simple’ and 
‘complex’ in the multiverse and theology debate. 
                                                          
80
 Holder, God, the Multiverse, and Everything, p. 123. 
81
 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
82
 Victor J. Stenger, God and the Multiverse (New York: Prometheus Books, 2015), p. 371. 
83
 Davies, ‘Universes galore: where will it all end?’, p. 495. 
84
 Davies, ‘Universes galore: where will it all end?’, p. 495. 
29 
 
Absurdity and Non-Intelligibility 
 
In addition to concerns about simplicity, theistic multiverse critics often suggest that the 
complexity (and, it is claimed, absurdity) inherent in multiverse design is at odds with the 
traditional Christian conception of creation. For instance, Robert B. Mann dismisses the 
compatibility of God and the Level IV multiverse on the grounds that ‘positing a deity that 
creates everything is a radical departure from standard monotheism’, particularly traditional 
Christian belief in God.
85
 He contends that the limitless character of the multiverse 
necessitates a radical revision of what he sees as the biblical view of creation as ‘limited, 
subordinate to and dependent on God for its origin, existence, and fulfillment.’86 Echoing 
Ward’s objections, Mann claims that the ‘imbecilic generation of all conceivable universes’ 
would undermine any alleged link between the intelligibility of God and creation. He adds 
that the most promising way of reconciling God and the multiverse would be to find ‘some 
deeper principle underlying the multiverse, one that more fully reflects the existence, glory, 
and intelligibility of its Creator.’87 This longing for a deeper, ultimate intelligibility to our 
cosmic habitat is evocative of Simon Conway Morris’ theory of convergence, which holds 
that evolutionary patterns in our biological habitat tend to converge, and that human life is 
not an accident.
88
 Both approaches seek to restore a sense of purposive design (and thus 
compatibility with God) in cosmology and biology that might otherwise be threatened by 
multiverse and evolutionary theory, respectively. 
 
1.2.2 Positive Theological Engagement with Multiverse Thought 
 
As the multiverse has been subjected to heightened scientific scrutiny, there has been a 
corresponding shift in recent years among several theologians toward a more positive and 
constructive engagement that denies the dichotomy between attributing anthropic fine-
tunings to God or the multiverse. Not only do such figures argue that there is no reason God 
should not act through the multiverse, some even claim that multiple universes are precisely 
what we should expect if God exists. 
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Artistry and Creativity 
 
Adopting Nicholas of Cusa’s analogy of God as creative artist89—also evident in the Thomist 
depiction of creation as artificiatum divinae artis, or an artistic product of divine 
workmanship
90—Robin Collins argues for a theistic version of the Level II multiverse on the 
basis that an infinitely creative God would operate through some sort of universe-generator, 
since this would be ‘somewhat more elegant and ingenious than just creating them ex 
nihilo.’91 Similarly, Robert Spitzer argues that inflationary-type multiverse proposals will 
likely entail fine-tuning, thus increasing the likelihood of a supernatural explanation.
92
 
Instead of negating the need for God, then, the multiverse proposal is perhaps more 
explicable in the context of a purposeful divine designer with a motive for creation; an artist 
expressing creativity and ingenuity, rather than an engineer concerned only with efficiency. 
 
If the multiverse-generator itself requires design, then this could be said ‘to kick the issue of 
design up one level, to the question of who designed the multiverse-generator.’93 Keith Ward, 
mindful of Stephen Hawking’s memorable imagery of what could possibly ‘breathe fire’ into 
the equations and make a universe for them to describe, argues that universes could not be 
generated by chance through the laws of quantum physics alone. He believes that a ‘selection 
principle’ would be necessary, such that a universe would be ‘chosen for the sake of realizing 
some otherwise unobtainable value or set of states and processes.’94 This implies a mind-like 
‘Ultimate Reality’, with the causal power to bring universes into being, existing beyond any 
material universe ‘like the classical idea of God as the cause of all finite existence through 
knowledge and intention.’95 However, the idea that a multiverse-generator would itself 
require (divine) fine-tuning might be thought to be at odds with William Stoeger’s warning 
against putting God in the scientific gaps as a ‘secondary or created cause’ that could one day 
be superseded scientifically, rather than as a primary or ultimate cause more suited to a 
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theological or metaphysical frame of reference.
96
 Moreover, the theological imperative to 
associate multiverse generation with divine purpose is unable to provide a full account of the 
nature and meaning of creation, and the extent to which it might be considered a divine gift, 
or act of love, or sharing in God’s likeness. 
 
In a variant of God as an artist guiding multiverse design, Peter Forrest proposes a ‘selection 
theory of creation’ whereby God is aware of all possible universes and selects some of them 
to bring into existence, leaving others as unactualised might-have-beens: ‘We may think of 
God as a master sculptor carving one or probably many rough figures out of a vast and 
variegated block of marble.’97 Aside from appearing to closely conform to Davies’ definition 
of naïve deism, this raises (and leaves unexplored) the crucial theological dichotomy of 
actuality and potentiality, and the notion of what God ‘could’ do. Forrest favours what he 
calls the ‘Hyperspace’ multiverse account (similar to Tegmark’s Level I) over the ‘bubbling’ 
or ‘splitting’ universes of Levels II and III on the basis that each ‘hyperspace’ in these models 
would require its own God, necessitating a sort of polytheism that he finds unacceptably 
heterodox (ironically given his own unorthodox pantheistic conclusions). In his view, God 
does not have power to bring things into existence ex nihilo, which raises the problem of how 
the initial Hyperspace came into being. He explains that the Hyperspace is God, thus arriving 
at a modified pantheism in which God is identified not with our universe, but with the actual 
Universe, ‘which is initially the whole Universe, pregnant with all possibility.’98 
 
In line with Collins, Kraay, and Leslie (discussed below), Don Page argues from a theistic 
perspective that the multiverse might be suggestive of an even more grand design of the 
universe. If God is infinitely creative, it makes sense to assume that God might create ‘a 
physical reality much larger than the single visible part of the universe or multiverse that we 
can observe directly.’99 Further, ‘it might seem simpler’ for God to choose many sets of 
physical constants (a multiverse rather than a single universe) since Page sees no reason that 
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the constants we observe should be uniquely preferred over other possibilities.
100
 Like Carr’s 
‘outward journey’ (from a geocentric to heliocentric to galactocentric to multiverse view), 
Page regards the idea as a ‘natural extension of our usual ideas of accepting a reality beyond 
one’s immediate conscious perception.’101 As with other theistic multiverse accounts, though, 
Page only tentatively hints at the motive and purpose underlying multiverse creation: ‘[God] 
might prefer elegance in the principles by which He creates a vast multiverse over a paucity 
of universes’.102 
 
Tentative Metaphysics 
 
In a defence of the compatibility of God and the multiverse that begins to move beyond strict 
considerations of design towards more metaphysical considerations, John Leslie outlines an 
account of creation that he bases on the Platonic notion (from Book VI of The Republic) that 
The Good, itself ‘beyond being’, is responsible for the existence of things. He depicts a 
model of reality in which there are infinitely many universes, each constituting a thought 
pattern contemplated by a divine mind. He suggests four ways in which God could be 
conceived in this scheme, although he is neutral as to which is most apt: God is the entire 
‘infinite ocean of infinite minds’; God is the infinite mind inside which we exist; God is the 
‘Platonic principle’ that the ethical need for the multiverse to exist is its own source of 
existence; or God is an ‘all-seeing, personality-imbued region or aspect of [an] infinite 
mind.’103 While this scheme (at least somewhat) reflects the fundamental Platonic insight that 
there is a surplus of ultimate meaning, it requires substantial further development, particularly 
in terms of its conception of God, and is advanced in oblique and immanentist terms. Like 
various other analytic philosophers of religion, rather than exploring the metaphysical 
implications of his multiverse model, Leslie restricts himself to a brief consideration of how 
it might address a rather narrow logical problem in the field, in this case the problem of 
evil.
104
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1.2.3 Summary 
 
The multiverse proposal, then, has generated a mixed and at times hostile reaction from 
theologians, though there is an emerging (if minority) group willing to constructively engage 
with the proposal and in some cases to argue for its compatibility with Christian theism. 
However, as illustrated in this section, both sides have been largely defined (and constrained) 
by a persistent focus on whether the apparent fine-tuning of the physical constants is evidence 
of divine design or a mindless multiverse. Ironically, the scientific multiverse sceptics—the 
physicists and cosmologists who compare multiverse theory to religious belief in 
contemptuous terms—might unwittingly disclose a more fruitful approach for a theological 
revival of the multiverse. In the absence of direct experimental data, Davies dismisses the 
multiverse as ‘basically just a religious conviction rather than a scientific argument’, 105 while 
George Ellis contends that it will ‘always’ be a question of faith.’106 Such commentators view 
the claims of multiverse proponents to be immune to testing or falsification, with a deeply 
problematic emphasis on infinity that is riddled with logical and mathematical contradictions. 
For them, multiverse thought belongs more properly to metaphysics rather than science. 
 
Although this is meant as a rebuke to sympathetic scientists, it should remind theologians that 
the multiverse proposal complicates and entangles the purportedly clear divisions between 
science and religion, and leads inescapably to metaphysical concerns of more fundamental 
importance than ‘design’ and with which theology can more productively engage. As 
Rubenstein concludes, having considered the implications and apparent experimental bases of 
each level of Tegmark’s hierarchy: ‘every multiverse hierarchy opens in one way or another 
onto uncannily metaphysical—even theological—terrain…the very observations and 
experiments that promise to establish the multiverse as “physics” also establish it as 
metaphysics.’107 In strict etymological terms, metaphysics refers to the conjunction of the 
Greek words for ‘beyond’ and ‘physics’. The multiverse proposal, perhaps more than any 
other issue in theology and science, embodies this metaphysical nature through its vision of 
many universes existing beyond our known physical universe, and its contemporary scientific 
expression of the ancient philosophical problems of the ontological entanglement of the one 
and the many, of singularity and plurality, and parts and wholes. 
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As such, I will address Rubenstein’s (as yet) undeveloped idea that theological engagement 
with the multiverse should be situated on metaphysical grounds. More specifically—and in 
contrast to any other theological multiverse account—I will argue that metaphysical 
participation is best able to facilitate an effective theological retrieval of the multiverse. I will 
introduce the concept of participation in the following section. 
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1.3 Participation 
 
In general terms, the metaphysical concept of participation refers to a structure or order of 
relations whereby beings share to varying degrees in a perfection received from a source that 
itself embodies the fullness of that perfection. Participation is central to the development and 
conceptual framework of Christian metaphysics. In this context, participation expresses the 
metaphysical relationship between created things as they share in various degrees of being 
with the absolute source of being, God. The idea is that everything comes from, is sustained 
by, is utterly dependent on, and in some way participates in God. 
 
In this section I will sketch the meaning and development of the notion of metaphysical 
participation. Since participation is detailed at length in the following three chapters in the 
context of the relevant figure, it will be sufficient in this instance to provide a general account 
of the tradition, its ideas, and its critics. As such, I will begin with a summary of participation 
as articulated by Plato and Aquinas, two of the central figures in the tradition. I will then 
trace subsequent developments as the idea falls into relative disuse in the modern era, albeit 
with a recent revival in some academic theological circles. I will conclude with brief 
reflections on the thematic applicability of participatory thought to multiverse considerations. 
 
1.3.1 Plato and Aquinas 
 
Plato is the first major thinker to examine metaphysical participation and to make a sustained 
philosophical attempt to address ‘the problem of how to maintain a relationship between two 
worlds—the divine and the human—that seemed [in Athenian philosophy] to be growing 
further apart.’108 Indeed, in ancient Greek philosophy in general, the search for reality—what 
might be said to be eternal, immutable, and truly real as opposed to the everyday world of 
change and uncertainty—was paramount. Plato’s theory of the Forms is the most powerful 
expression of this imperative to reconcile divinity and materiality, and hugely influential in 
terms of the development of Christian participatory metaphysics. In the Platonic vision, 
reality comprises two distinct but not wholly separate realms—the visible world of material 
things and the divine realm of Forms—whose relationship is defined and structured by 
participation. As such, a beautiful tree not only represents the existence of true and eternal 
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Beauty, but owes its beauty to its participation in Beauty itself. Given that the beautiful tree is 
an embodiment of the Form in which it participates and from which it receives its beauty, it is 
evident that the two realms—what might be thought of as becoming and being—are 
fundamentally related: ‘The participated Forms are of an ontologically different but 
nevertheless related order than the particular beings that participate in them.’109 While Plato 
describes a profoundly relational (and therefore more theological) universe, in which the 
identity of each thing is not entirely located within itself but rather points beyond itself to its 
true source of reality, it is important to remember that the Platonic Forms are not synonymous 
with God. In Book VI of The Republic, which also examines the movement from transient, 
changeable objects to eternal, immutable truth, the Form of the Good (not God) is disclosed 
as the ultimate source of all goodness and truth in the world, responsible for the existence of 
the other Forms. 
 
Although Platonic participation will be explored at length in the following chapter, it is worth 
noting some indicative instances of this participatory language. In the Phaedo, Plato depicts 
the physical world as ‘participating’ in the Forms, which are ‘immutable’, ‘eternal’, and 
‘divine’.110 In the Timaeus, participation expresses the connection between the sensible and 
intelligible world, with the world of becoming depicted as a ‘likeness’ of its eternal source.111 
More broadly, Plato introduces and explores the notion of cosmic multiplicity with a 
cosmological vision in which the entire universe is a harmonious and beautiful unity while 
also composed of differences and pluralities, in a subtle interplay of the one and the many. 
Plato is concerned not with establishing a stark division between the physical world and the 
divine Forms, but with a sort of mixing of realms with the presence of transcendent forms in 
sensible images, governed by a participatory relationship.  
 
This ‘in-between’ realm of participation is closely associated with love. For instance, in the 
Symposium love is depicted as the essential element in moving the soul towards its divine 
end: ‘Love longs for the good to be his own forever’.112 To return to the earlier example of 
beauty, Plato depicts the ascent to absolute beauty, driven by love. Love of physical beauty in 
the world should be followed by a progression to recognising the beauty of the soul, followed 
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by institutional and intellectual beauties and, finally, supreme beauty, in which every other 
beautiful thing participates: ‘Starting from individual beauties, the quest for the universal 
beauty must find him ever mounting the heavenly ladder, stepping rung from rung... until at 
last he comes to know what beauty is.’113 In a vivid metaphor, Socrates compares the soul to 
a winged chariot, pulled by two horses. Stirred by love, it is capable of soaring to the heavens 
and participating in the divine: ‘Such a one, as soon as he beholds the beauty of the world, is 
reminded of true beauty, and his wings begin to grow; then he is fain to lift his wings and fly 
upward’.114 
 
Plato’s participatory theory of Forms is immensely significant in terms of the development of 
Christian metaphysics, though his student Aristotle is less sympathetic.
115
 He argues that the 
Forms lack explanatory power, merely providing a parallel realm of shadows whose 
existence is doubtful and whose status as the giver of being to sensible entities is unclear: ‘to 
say that [the Forms] are paradigms and that other things participate in them is to say nothing 
and to give poetic metaphors.’116 His God is the final cause, neither an efficient nor formal 
cause of the physical cosmos, nor the basis for creaturely participation in divine being. While 
he accepts the existence of forms as inherent in physical matter and possessed by things of 
the same type, he does not view this in participatory terms—perhaps at most as a notional or 
paradigmatic sort of participation, not a ‘real’ one. In this sense, whereas Plato envisions a 
world infused with the divinity from which it originates and in which it participates, 
Aristotle’s conception of divinity is separated from physicality and multiplicity. 
 
Following Plato, Aquinas is the next major figure in participatory thought. His work is not 
only rich with participatory language and themes, but also occupies a central role in 
developing and refining the tradition by seeking to reconcile Aristotelian cosmology with the 
participatory vision of earlier thinkers such as Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius. He explicitly 
considers questions related to creation and cosmology in participatory terms and in a way that 
will be seen to be of direct and perhaps surprising relevance for this thesis. His influence on 
subsequent participatory thought, which continues in contemporary theology, also 
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necessitates his inclusion in any summary of participation. Aquinas sought to address the 
fundamental question of why anything exists, in contrast to the Platonic and Aristotelian 
systems of how things are structured and ordered. Unlike Aristotle, Aquinas accepts that an 
effect may participate in its cause, a causal view of participation whereby the physical world 
is dependent upon a perfect transcendent source for its being—precisely the kind of 
participatory relationship shared by God and created beings. For Aquinas, participation is a 
structural relationship between beings such that ‘they all share in various degrees of fullness 
in some positive property or perfection common to them all, as received from the same one 
source: all finite beings participate in existence from God.’117  
 
Crucially, Aquinas modifies the Platonic notion of participation according to his own crucial 
distinction between essence and existence. Instead of conceiving of being in terms of essence 
(the what-ness of being), he focuses on the act of being, of existence itself, as primary. 
Within his creation account, the existence of all things is a gift from God, a continually 
received participation in and ecstatic relationship with the divine ground of existence. 
Participation is a measure of our radical dependence on God—or, as Aquinas puts it, ‘the 
very dependency of the created act of being upon the principle from which it is produced.’118 
To exist is to be created and to experience the reception of an infinite source in whose 
likeness we are made. 
 
Of further significance to Christian participatory metaphysics, Aquinas seeks to reconcile his 
essence-existence distinction with Trinitarian theology. In his view, God’s essence and 
existence perfectly coincide, unlike created beings whose essence and existence differ: ‘In 
God essence and being are identical.’119 The essence of a created being exists in the divine 
mind (in God’s Word, the cause of all things) as an instance of the dazzling multiplicity of 
ways in which creaturely participation in God is possible: ‘every creature has its own proper 
species, according to which it participates in some mode in likeness to the divine essence.’120  
 
1.3.2 Subsequent Developments 
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Although metaphysical participation is a central concept of Platonism and Thomism, and 
what might be viewed as a participatory approach is evident in Church Fathers (such as 
Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor, Pseudo-Dionysius, and John of Damascus), it is 
relatively marginal in much post-17
th
 century Western philosophy. In particular, the Platonic 
ascent to and participation in an eternal realm, which is absorbed and reformulated by 
Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas,
121
 assumes a hierarchy of being that is no longer accepted 
as self-evident in contemporary theology or philosophy. After Immanuel Kant’s critique of 
the notion that it is possible to reason from qualities such as beauty or goodness to the actual 
existence of a perfect source of beauty or goodness in which those qualities participate and by 
which they are measured, this metaphysical framework in the Christian tradition is often 
viewed with suspicion.
122
 
 
Indeed, Francis Bacon flatly rejects participation on the grounds that, while the world might 
illustrate God’s power and creativity, it need not bear any likeness to its divine source, just as 
a watch might suggest the existence of a maker but not necessarily exemplify or reflect 
anything about the maker’s nature: 
 
For as all works do show forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his image, 
so it is of the works of God, which do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the 
Maker, but not His image. And therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from 
the sacred truth: for they supposed the world to be the image of God, and man to be 
an extract or compendious image of the world; but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to 
attribute to the world that honour, as to be the image of God, but only the work of His 
hands; neither do they speak of any other image of God but man.
123
 
 
In addition to what he refers to as Plato’s ‘formal’ participatory turn (addressing the 
intelligibility of beings) and Aquinas’ ‘existential’ participatory turn (addressing the facticity 
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of beings), the American participatory theologian Jacob Sherman identifies a third ‘creative’ 
turn, a ‘mode whereby not only are essence and existence participated, but creativity itself is 
shared through the series of participatory mediations.’124 He does not associate this turn 
(which remains in progress in contemporary theory) with any particular figure, but rather as a 
broad trajectory among philosophers who cannot be easily identified as Platonists and who 
may not use participatory language, but who nevertheless employ conceptual frameworks that 
are suggestive of participation. Specifically, he cites Meister Eckhart’s account of human 
imagination as participating in the divine mind, Benedict Spinoza’s extreme pantheistic 
variant of creative participation, and Friedrich Schelling’s theory that we participate in God’s 
creativity, thereby revealing the infinite in finite forms of human expression.
125
 
 
To Sherman’s list, it might be possible to add Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s theory of the 
participation of monads (basic objects/substances of existence) in the divine mind, or Alfred 
North Whitehead’s notion of ‘ingression’, in which ‘eternal objects’ can be given expression 
in physical things: ‘[Ingression] refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of an 
eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity, contributing to the definiteness of that 
actual entity.’126 More recently, the German-American theologian Paul Tillich uses strikingly 
participatory language, such as his contention that participation in ultimate reality brings 
certainty to religious belief.
127
 In light of the enduring interest in participatory ideas, even if 
significantly removed from Platonic and Thomistic assumptions, we might consider that the 
apparent turn away from participation is more akin to a kind of reconfiguration in its 
expression and application than an outright rejection. 
 
Perhaps, then, the diversity of participatory metaphysical systems devised by philosophers 
and theologians in recent centuries suggests that the idea of participation is more resilient 
than might otherwise be expected. While the concepts and language have been transformed 
almost beyond recognition, the notion of participation—the need to explain and traverse the 
gap between this world and whatever lies beyond—remains as salient as ever. In fact, in 
recent years there has been a reconsideration of the participatory thought in Plato, Augustine, 
and Aquinas, particularly within the Radical Orthodoxy movement which makes use of their 
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insights to critique modern secularism.
128
 In addition, there has been a revival in attention to 
participation in the twentieth century, occasioned by a number of theologians who recognise 
the significance of participation in Aquinas.
129
 
 
1.3.3 Multiverse Applicability 
 
Given that participation is inextricably linked with issues such as universals, analogies, part-
whole relations, perfection, and even the problem of evil, it will continue to be of particular 
relevance in the science and theology dialogue in general and in multiverse thought in 
particular. The basic premise of participation—that something has its reality by virtue of 
something other than itself—is fundamental to multiverse theory, yet this insight has been 
entirely overlooked in contemporary theological examinations of the multiverse. 
 
Moreover, participation necessarily entails theologically suggestive ideas of sharing, likeness, 
donation, and reception—all of which (as will be discussed) might also be useful frameworks 
for approaching multiverse theory. For example, Aquinas argues that everything exists by 
sharing in God’s existence. In blunt terms, creation in itself is nothing because of its 
reception of being from God; it is always held in existence by God’s donation of being. Here 
we might think of a multiverse (or its constituent parts) as not one entity apart from God, but 
as held in existence in all its diversity and immensity by God’s generous donation of being. 
We might also consider cosmological models that seem to suggest different cosmic realms in 
a multiverse share a common source or bear a likeness to a governing principle or source of 
being. These are preliminary lines of enquiry, but indicative of the openness to interaction 
between participatory thinking and multiverse thinking that will characterise this thesis. 
 
In the following chapters, I will draw on Platonic and medieval participatory resources (often 
overlooked in multiverse discussions and in the broader theology and science field) to 
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demonstrate that the concept of metaphysical participation provides an invaluable way for 
engaging with, and helping to illuminate, important ideas within multiverse theory, such as 
multiplicity, diversity, and infinity. I will begin with an examination of Plato’s participatory 
metaphysics and its applicability to the startling cosmic multiplicity that is inherent in the 
multiverse hypothesis. 
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Chapter 2: Multiplicity (Plato) 
 
In this chapter, I will bring Platonic participatory metaphysics into constructive mutual 
interaction with key figures in the appraisal of multiverse theory in the theology and science 
dialogue. I will show that, in each case, this new approach would add significant theological 
and philosophical depth to an area of interdisciplinary study that is insufficiently 
metaphysical. Plato, as the father of Western participatory thinking, provides a logical 
starting point for engaging systematically with questions of cosmic multiplicity, which will 
be the theme of this chapter. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Initially, I will provide a general overview of 
Plato’s doctrine of metaphysical participation, with particular reference to the development of 
his participatory thought in the Phaedo, Parmenides, Sophist, Philebus, and Symposium. 
Second, I will focus specifically on participation in the Timaeus, Plato’s account of the 
creation of the universe, which is often cited in theological multiverse discourse yet hitherto 
without any reference to its participatory basis. 
 
In the subsequent three sections, I will draw on this rich metaphysical inheritance, entirely 
neglected in theological responses to multiverse thought, and critically engage with important 
thinkers in the contemporary theology and science dialogue. First, I will take up the 
concluding thought in Mary-Jane Rubenstein’s recent volume that the multiverse proposal 
raises fundamental metaphysical implications. I will apply this logic to her own account of 
the Timaeus and I will also suggest ways in which such a metaphysical perspective can 
enhance theological engagement with multiverse theory, such as Laura Mersini-Houghton’s 
model of a ‘connected’ multiverse. Second, I will evaluate Max Tegmark’s identification of 
Platonism with multiverse theory. I will argue that a properly metaphysical understanding of 
Plato would strengthen certain aspects of Tegmark’s influential multiverse hierarchy in ironic 
and unexpected ways. Third, I will consider Verity Harte’s discussion of metaphysical 
structure, which is of particular relevance in the creation account of the Timaeus. I will 
identify an underdeveloped strand of participatory thinking in her work in order to highlight 
new ways of thinking about a multiverse model from a theological perspective. 
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2.1 Plato on Participation 
 
In this section, I will provide a brief general overview of Plato’s participatory metaphysics, 
which he develops to bridge the ontological gap between the sensible and intelligible realms, 
and to provide a relational structure in which the two realms might be defined, explained, and 
reconciled. With this general background in mind, I will then consider his notion of 
participation in the Phaedo, Parmenides, Sophist, Philebus, and Symposium. It is important to 
consider the range of his participatory works in this manner for two reasons: first, to 
demonstrate the development in his language and thought over time; and second, to provide 
the broader context in which to consider participation in the Timaeus, which inherits and 
preserves the theory of participation in the other dialogues, and which I will discuss at length 
in the following section. 
 
The concept of participation (methexis)
130
 has a long and complex history in Western thought. 
In general terms, it refers to a structure or order of relationship whereby beings share to 
varying degrees in a positive quality or perfection, received from a source that exemplifies 
this perfection. Thus, for Plato, to be beautiful is to participate in the Form of Beauty itself. 
He is the first major figure to employ participation not just in the trivially familiar sense of 
sharing in something, but as a fundamental philosophical idea intended to make sense of a 
world in which divinity seems to be at once immediately present and radically distant. 
 
While his participatory turn was itself singular and momentous, it was also a function of the 
long-standing and fraught dilemma in Greek philosophy of how to reconcile the sensible and 
intelligible realms. Amidst a physical world of change and contingency, the intelligble 
realm—eternal, immutable, perfect—seemed to be of an entirely different order. In addition, 
the transience and fragility of the physical world—the troubling sense that it does not contain 
its own reason for being—appeared to represent an inadequate basis for the possibility of 
intelligibility and value, and therefore for long-term social cohesion and security. 
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In Plato’s metaphysical vision, reality consists of the intelligible realm of the Forms and the 
human realm of physical particulars, the material things comprising our everyday experiences 
yet not self-grounding and always subject to change. Although these two realms should be 
clearly distinguished, they are not to be thought of as entirely separate or different. They 
share a constitutive relationship, with participation (or methexis) explaining the connection of 
one realm to the other. To return to the example of beauty mentioned above, a beautiful 
flower is beautiful by virtue of its participation in the Form of Beauty itself. In this scheme, 
the flower embodies and exemplifies the Form of Beauty in its own physical mode. The Form 
is ontologically different, yet fundamentally related as the constitutive cause of being (or 
beauty) in the participating being. The two realms are thus neither identical nor wholly 
different, but share a participatory and, in a sense, causal relationship: a beautiful flower is 
not just incidentally beautiful, but embodies Beauty by virtue of a constitutive relationship to 
(the Form of) Beauty itself. The notion of ‘cause’ in participation—with the Form of Beauty 
as the cause which makes things beautiful by its presence somehow within them—will be 
considered further in the discussion of the Phaedo below. 
 
2.1.1 Phaedo 
 
The Phaedo, a seminal dialogue of Plato’s middle period,131 is the first text in which he 
discusses methexis. This arises in a dialogue between Cebes and Socrates in which the latter 
reflects on his youthful excitement with natural science and explanations of causes, including 
how things occur in the heavens and on earth. He describes Anaxagoras’ stated view that 
‘mind’ directs and causes all things, and that everything is arranged for the best in a 
teleological manner such that, for example, the heavenly bodies move the way they do 
because this is the best possible way for them to be. Upon closer study, though, Socrates 
came to believe that Anaxagoras did not in fact attribute causality for the order of the world 
to mind, but rather to reductive materialist explanations such as air, ether, and water. He sees 
this kind of explanation—which would attribute his presence in the room to his bones and 
sinews—as ‘a very lax and inaccurate form of expression. Fancy being unable to distinguish 
between the cause of a thing and the condition without which it could not be a cause!’132 
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Having rejected as unacceptable the materialist explanations of his youth, Socrates formulates 
his own alternative approach, widely referred to as his ‘second voyage’.133 This nautical 
metaphor refers to the moment at which the natural progression of a journey with wind in the 
sails (representing the easy answers of the naturalists) is interrupted by an absence of wind, 
necessitating a second voyage made with the strenuous effort of rowing (representing the new 
method of ascending to the intelligible realm of the Forms and grasping the real truth of 
things). As noted earlier, this new approach entails the twofold classification of reality into 
the sensible realm and the intelligible realm of the Forms. In the latter case, he assumes ‘the 
existence of absolute beauty and goodness and magnitude’.134 
 
In the next crucial participatory step, Socrates employs these Forms as explanations for all 
other things: ‘It seems to me that whatever else is beautiful apart from absolute beauty is 
beautiful because it partakes of that absolute beauty, and for no other reason.’135 To explain 
beauty in terms of colour or shape or any other attribute is to fall into Anaxagoras’ error of 
reductionism. Instead, he encourages his interlocutor to consider the participatory 
‘explanation that the one thing that makes that object beautiful is the presence in it or 
association with it, in whatever way the relation comes about, of absolute beauty… it is by 
beauty that beautiful things are beautiful.’136 In other words, participation expresses a 
relational order of being. The flower is beautiful by virtue of its relationship to Beauty itself, 
not because beauty is attributed or assigned to it in terms of its colour or shape. It is by beauty 
that beautiful things are beautiful. Likewise, it is by Largeness that large things are large, and 
by Smallness that small things are small.  
 
In response to this preliminary participatory account—a ‘makeshift approach’ to which 
Socrates clings ‘no doubt foolishly’137—one might ask how it is possible for the Form of 
Beauty to be present in many different things, and whether the Form might have something in 
common with them. Here Socrates introduces a threefold participatory structure: the Form 
(such as Beauty), which exists in the intelligible realm; the participated quality or perfection 
(beauty), which exists in many ways in different beautiful things in our physical realm; and 
the thing that participates in the form (such as a flower or a human), which receives the 
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participated beauty by which it is beautiful.
138
 The second factor—the participated perfection, 
or the Form-in-the-thing—enables the transcendent Form to exist as an immanent perfection 
in different ways in different participants. In this way, a single Form can be in many different 
participants and have something in common with them. It is because of this commonality that 
participants may be named and identified accordingly: ‘the various forms exist, and the 
reason why other things are called after the forms is that they participate in the forms’.139 As 
the dialogue shifts to the issue of the immortality of the soul, any misgivings about the 
relationship of participated perfections to Forms and participants are left to be further 
discussed in the Parmenides.  
 
2.1.2 Parmenides 
 
In this complex dialogue,
140
 which in many ways takes up some of the unanswered questions 
raised by the Phaedo, Socrates defends his theory of participation against a series of powerful 
criticisms by Parmenides. In particular, he addresses the above-referenced problem, only 
tentatively explored in the Phaedo, of how it might be possible for a single Form to be 
present in many different participants: ‘Then each thing that partakes receives as its share 
either the form as a whole or part of it? Or can there be any other way of partaking besides 
this?’141 Given the description in the Phaedo of Forms as immutable, eternal, and divine, it 
would be incoherent to suppose that a single Form might be divided among many 
participants. Yet for a Form to be present entirely in a thing also seems to be unacceptable, 
given that the two realms, while related, are nevertheless ontologically distinct. 
 
Socrates therefore proposes an alternative view of Forms as ‘patterns fixed in the nature of 
things. The other things are made in their image and are likenesses, and this participation they 
come to have in the Forms is nothing but their being made in their image.’142 So a participant 
is not merely like the Form in which it partakes, but is made (or caused) to be like it, and 
exists as an image of it. This causation is the result of the direction of the Form as an 
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exemplary cause (which refers to the pattern or model conceived by an intelligent being to 
bring about some effect) and the mental activity of the physical and intelligent agent as an 
efficient cause (which refers to the agent that produces the action). Both of these causalities 
are the subject of further examination in the Sophist, which will be discussed in the next sub-
section. 
 
With this notion of participation of things existing as the image of Forms, it is possible to 
more clearly understand the origin of participated perfections and the way in which many 
participants might share in the same Form. To return to the earlier example of beauty, the 
Form of Beauty produces beauty exemplarily by directing the participant towards beauty 
through its intelligent activity. The combination of the direction of the Form as source and 
pattern, and the efficient activity of the agent, means that the Form can represent the source 
of many participated perfections, which remain distinct from the Forms and the participants. 
So the participated perfection of beauty enables the participant to be beautiful, enables the 
Form of Beauty to be present in the participant, and represent the commonality between the 
Form and its many different participants. The Form of Beauty is not divided or weakened, but 
remains entirely what it is (as described in the Phaedo) while also being shared in by many 
participants through the participations of beauty. 
 
It is worth noting that the idea of Forms as patterns in nature presented in this part of the 
Parmenides is significant in terms of Aristotle’s criticism of participation and, in particular, 
what came to be known as the Third Man argument. As noted earlier, Aristotle believes that 
the Forms lack explanatory power and that the notion of things participating in them is akin 
to poetry rather than philosophy. To a certain degree, Plato himself seems to anticipate such 
criticism of participatory thinking in the form of Parmenides’ criticisms.143 In a piece of 
reasoning that was further developed by Aristotle and came to be known as the ‘Third Man’ 
argument, Parmenides suggests that participatory metaphysics implies an infinite regress in 
the sense that if something (such as a beautiful flower) is what it is by virtue of participation 
in the form of what it is, then a third form would be required to account for what both the 
thing and its form are, and so on. On this account, participation merely adds another thing or 
realm to be explained, which would itself then require explanation, ad infinitum. 
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While the logical structure of this argument has been the subject of intense philosophical 
scrutiny,
144
 it overlooks the radical difference in the ontological status of that which 
participates and that in which it participates. For Plato, the realm of the Forms is not 
equivalent or comparable to the sensible realm. Rather, the Forms are transcendent and 
should not therefore be understood in the same logical terms as imperfect physical entities. 
There are many beautiful things that might participate in the Form of Beauty, but the Form 
itself is not just another thing to which other beautiful things can be compared, but a wholly 
different order of being. In addition, the criticism of an infinite regress does not take into 
account the third factor of participated perfections, and the way in which they relate to Forms 
and participants, as described above.  
 
2.1.3 Sophist 
 
The Sophist is a late Platonic dialogue in which he continues to develop his metaphysics 
having subjected the theory of participation to sustained criticism in the Parmenides. He 
provides additional clarification about the causal factors of participation, particularly in terms 
of the efficient causality of the intelligent participant. If such an agent, operating on the basis 
of intelligence, is central to participation (as is the Form as model or pattern), then 
intelligence itself must be of a higher order than might generally be supposed. In a rhetorical 
flourish at the end of a debate about reality between two characters—‘a battle of gods and 
giants’,145 or whether reality is physical or non-physical—Plato (through the words of the 
Stranger) appears to elevate intelligence to the same level of reality occupied by the Forms: 
‘But tell me, in heaven's name, are we really to be so easily convinced that change, life, soul, 
understanding have no place in that which is perfectly real—that it has neither life nor 
thought, but stands immutable in solemn aloofness, devoid of intelligence?’146 
 
Since intelligence is so valuable that it should be regarded as perfectly real, it is reasonable to 
infer that Plato similarly believes that the kind of efficient causality brought out about by 
intelligent participating agents is a vital aspect of participation. In his final analysis of the 
philosopher who truly values intelligence, he dismisses the false dichotomy of the gods/giants 
                                                          
144
 See, for example, Gregory Vlastos’ important article in which he celebrates (and logically scrutinises) Plato’s 
willingness to construct an argument that, if successful, would be damaging to the foundations of his own life’s 
work. Gregory Vlastos, ‘The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides’, in Philosophical Review 63 (1954), pp. 
319–349. 
145
 Sophist, 246a. 
146
 Sophist, 249a. 
50 
 
battle in which reality is either changeless (the Forms) or changing (intelligence). Instead, the 
philosopher must declare that ‘reality or the sum of things is both at once—all that is 
unchangeable and all that is in change.’147 In participatory terms, this suggests that a 
comprehensive vision of reality includes both exemplary and efficient causes (the Forms and 
intelligent agents) as key factors in allowing the multiplicity of creation to participate in the 
eternal, divine, immutable Forms.  
 
Plato goes on to employ the metaphor of divine and human artistry to illustrate the nature of 
exemplarity in participation, which will also be an important aspect of the discussion in the 
next sub-section on the Timaeus. All physical things in our sensible world come into being, 
not as a result of spontaneous natural causes, but ‘divine craftsmanship’.148 Everything in 
existence is a product of divine artistry, coming from ‘a cause which, working with reason 
and art, is divine and proceeds from divinity.’149 Just as a human artist might build or paint 
according to a certain model or pattern, so the divine Forms produce effects according to a 
pattern. Each thing in our human realm has been made to be a likeness of and a participation 
in that divine pattern, such that there are two products of divine workmanship—‘the original 
and the image that in every case accompanies it.’150 In this sense, the entire physical universe 
is defined and permeated by participation, with the universe itself standing as a work of 
divine art, a likeness of its perfect image. 
 
2.1.4 Philebus 
 
In the Philebus, generally agreed to have been composed in the last two decades of his life, 
Plato returns to the problem of participation, particularly in terms of how Forms might relate 
to particulars in the sensible world.  In the dialogue, Socrates confronts the dilemma of the 
vast diversity and multiplicity of being. This threatens to collapse into the kind of infinite 
regress discussed earlier: he suggests that the one-many dilemma is central to the plausibility 
of the Forms themselves; that is, how it can be possible for Forms to retain their unity if they 
are, so to speak, split up or divided among an indefinite number of sensible particulars: ‘[how 
are we to conceive of] this single unity [that] subsequently comes to be in the infinite number 
of things that come into being—an identical unity being thus found simultaneously in unity 
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and in plurality.’151 Socrates argues that all things consist of a one and a many, ‘and have in 
their nature a conjunction of limit and unlimitedness.’152 
 
Socrates proceeds to delineate a fourfold classification of beings. First, he describes the 
Unlimited, encompassing all that allows an indefinite variation in magnitude or degree. For 
instance, he believes that temperature is indicative of an unlimited or boundless quality, since 
anything can be hotter or colder than it already is: ‘Once you give definite quantity to 
“hotter” and “colder” they cease to be; “hotter” never stops where it is but is always going a 
point further, and the same applies to “colder”; whereas definite quantity is something that 
has to be stopped going on and is fixed. It follows therefore from what I say that “hotter”, and 
its opposite with it, must be unlimited.’153 Second, as indicated in the previous quotation, 
Socrates describes Limit, which refers to whatever does not allow for variance, such as 
precise mathematical numbers, ratios, and measurements. Third, there is said to be a 
‘mixture’ or combination of both of these constituents in which the precision of limit is 
applied to a magnitude of a certain (unlimited) quality in the correct proportion. For example, 
there is a definite ratio or balance of ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ or ‘moist’ or ‘dry’ indicative of good 
health, and which at a certain point should not be further modified. The process of changing a 
quality such as temperature and then arriving at a determination of the correct ratio (at which 
limit can measure and regulate potentially unlimited degrees of variance) is, according to 
Socrates, a ‘coming-into-being’.154 Fourth, Socrates attributes the agent responsible for the 
process of bringing proper mixtures into being to a kind of universal intelligence that imposes 
limit on the unlimited and thereby facilitates all perfections such as goodness, beauty, and 
truth. 
 
With this fourfold classification of being, Plato suggests that a metaphysics of participation is 
the only way to reconcile the one and the many, to bring meaning and coherence to the 
multiplicity of reality, and to help bridge the gap between the sensible and intelligible realms. 
The third category of mixture, which might be associated with the way in which universals 
(or Forms) can exist in diverse concrete particulars, is directed by divine intelligence (the 
fourth category) working as an exemplary cause. With the Limit and Unlimited reconciled in 
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mixture, which is itself ordered toward and participating in divine intelligence, it becomes 
possible for the philosopher to begin to bring order to the cosmic manifold. 
 
2.1.5 Symposium 
 
In the Symposium, Plato depicts his celebrated metaphysical ascent to absolute beauty in 
strikingly participatory language. This ascent expresses his central participatory insight that 
what lies beyond the human realm is eternal and most important. He depicts love as the 
essential element in stirring the soul to seek its creator; it ‘longs for the good to be his own 
forever’.155 The ascent towards beauty and divinity begins with love of physical beauty, then 
recognition of the beauty of the soul, and then recognition of institutional and intellectual 
beauty, and ultimately apprehension of divine beauty, in which every other beautiful thing 
participates: ‘the quest for the universal beauty must find him ever mounting the heavenly 
ladder, stepping from rung to rung… to the special lore that pertains to nothing but the 
beautiful itself—until at last he comes to know what beauty is.’156 Given the centrality of 
participation to Plato’s thought, to live a good life is to be drawn by desire and love towards 
the beauty of participation. This might be thought of as the aesthetic side of participation. 
The beauty and plenitude and perfection of the intelligible realm draw finite beings toward 
their perfection. For Plato, beauty is an alluring force which draws us on, towards knowledge 
and wisdom, but also towards what lies beyond our own physical realm.
157
 
 
In fact, the role of love in Platonic participatory metaphysics is related to the cosmological 
account of the universe’s features in the Timaeus, to be discussed in the following section. 
Physical motion is generated by the ontological gap between eternal perfection and physical 
finitude. The beauty and perfection of ideal being in the intelligible realm draws created 
being in our contingent physical world toward its perfection. In this sense, motion itself is the 
mechanism by which finite beings participate in and embody the perfection of the intelligible 
realm. The desire for beauty, driven by love, draws us towards participation in perfection: 
                                                          
155
 Symposium, 206a. See also Catherine Osborne’s important account of the central role of love in Plato (and 
subsequent Christian thought), in which love is understood not in transactional terms of motive, but in terms of 
an ontological vision in which the beloved is transfigured by love. Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled: Plato and 
the God of Love (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
156
 Symposium, 211c. 
157
 In the Pheadrus, Socrates compares the soul to a winged chariot, pulled by two horses. Stirred by love, it is 
capable of soaring to the heavens and participating in the divine, which is the true beauty by which the wings of 
the soul are nourished and grow. See 246a, 249e. 
53 
 
‘For Plato, then, insofar as he makes participation central, the good life, the religious life, and 
the philosophic life come together in an erotic journey toward the persistent discovery of 
beauty in the participatory mediations of the phenomenal world.’158 
 
2.1.6 Summary  
 
In Plato’s metaphysical vision, the human realm participates in the divine realm. In the 
Phaedo, he explains how things participate in their Forms, which cause the things to be what 
they are through the presence of participated perfections. In the Parmenides and the Sophist, 
he connects participation with exemplary and efficient causality to explain the production of 
participated perfections without compromising the unity or the transcendence of the Forms. 
In the Philebus, he applies a metaphysic of participation to account for the multiplicity of the 
physical universe, while he provides vivid and poetic metaphors of the ascent to the divine 
realm of the Forms in the Symposium, as well as in the Phaedrus and the Republic. In light of 
the foregoing ideas and themes, it will now be instructive to focus in detail on the Timaeus, 
whose participatory metaphysical framework is directed to cosmological ends and is 
therefore of particular relevance to the dialogue with scientific multiverse theory.
159
 
 
2.1.7 Timaeus 
 
In this section, I will discuss Plato’s cosmological account of the formation of the universe, 
with particular focus on its participatory language and themes, which broadly preserve the 
theory of participation inherited from the other dialogues. The reason for giving over a full 
section to consider participation in the Timaeus is that, as will be seen in the following 
section, this dialogue is often cited in theological studies of multiverse theory as an important 
historical example of a philosophical system that rejects cosmic pluralism. However, such a 
literal and narrow reading misses the profound value of the text’s rich and complex 
participatory thought. In the Timaeus, the world of becoming is a likeness of its intelligible 
archetype, a world which finds its meaning only in its origin and participation in the divine 
realm of the Forms. 
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Initially, I will discuss the participatory metaphysics underpinning his cosmological vision in 
the Timaeus. I will demonstrate how Plato’s metaphysics of participation expresses the 
connection between the sensible and the intelligible world. I will then focus on the important 
concept of the Receptacle, which functions as the fundamental participant in our physical 
universe. In the subsequent three sections of this chapter, I will draw on Plato’s participatory 
metaphysics, with specific attention to the Timaeus, in order to engage with three key 
thinkers in contemporary multiverse discourse at the intersection of science, theology, and 
philosophy.  
 
Cosmology and Participation 
 
The question of whether reality is one or many is perhaps given its most significant 
philosophical expression among Plato’s dialogues in the elaborate and multifaceted dialogue 
of the Timaeus, written in the 4
th
 century BC during the later stages of Plato’s career. Its 
titular character asks, ‘Are we right in saying that there is one world, or that they are many 
and infinite?’160 For Timaeus, arguing against the contemporary atomistic belief in 
innumerable worlds, the universe’s eternity can only be secured by its singularity as one 
permanent universe, unthreatened by any ‘external’ realities or forces. He seeks to describe 
the creation and the nature of the cosmos, in a way that is scientific insofar as it delineates an 
orderly cosmos which behaves according to certain harmonious proportions and patterns, but 
also theological insofar as the cosmos is understood as an active, living, complex realm of 
becoming, and in terms of its participation in its transcendent origin and purpose. 
 
Initially—and pace the later Aristotelian critique of participation as introducing a kind of 
unhelpful poetical ambiguity and perhaps even an entirely new layer of complexity—it is 
important to recognise that the Timaeus is inescapably and intentionally poetic. In its 
imaginative treatment of the rational ordering of the cosmos, patterned on and participating in 
its eternal source, the dialogue should not be interpreted narrowly and literally in the manner 
of a piece of scientific literature. Given the changing nature of the cosmos and its constituent 
parts, Plato’s participatory vision is inherently poetic, imprecise, incomplete, and at times 
even inconsistent. That is not, however, to say that the dialogue (and, in particular, Plato’s 
participatory metaphysics) is not intended to express truth. The participatory character of the 
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dialogue is a kind of truth that cannot be subjected to the modern logic or language of 
materialism.
161
 
 
For Plato, the order and beauty of the universe is striking and requires an explanation. While 
his protagonist Timaeus follows his Atomist predecessors in maintaining that the formation 
of the cosmos represented an ordering of disorder, he differs in attributing this process not to 
the mindless work of a random principle, but to the creative, purposeful creation of a divine 
craftsman, or creator God, the ‘Demiurge’. This Demiurge imposes order upon preexistent 
visible chaos to create a universe that is good and ordered by necessity and emblematic of an 
unchanging and eternal model: ‘God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad… 
out of disorder he brought order, considering that this was in every way better than the 
other.’162 The visible universe is declared to be a living creature made in the likeness of (and 
therefore a participation in) an eternal original, a kind of generic Form of Living Being 
containing within it the Forms of all species that inhabit the cosmos: ‘But let us suppose the 
world to be the very image of that whole of which all other [beings] are portions. For the 
original of the universe contains in itself all intelligible beings, just as this world 
comprehends us and all other visible creatures.’163 In other words, the Demiurge, finding the 
universe to be disordered and inharmonious, fashioned it after the likeness of an eternal 
model belonging to the divine realm of Forms from which it derives its being and meaning. 
 
This eternal model, according to which the Demiurge generates order out of existing chaos, 
exists independently of the Demiurge. For Plato, this Form of the Living Creature contains 
within it the Forms that correspond with the different kinds of creatures and parts in our 
visible world. On this account, the whole visible universe is a living creature, participating in 
and corresponding with the intelligible living creature. As a consequence, the physical 
universe—as an image of, or participant in, divine perfection—is ‘the greatest, best, fairest, 
most perfect’.164 Since the Form of the Living Being, serving as the model to direct divine 
creative activity, is the most ideal and complete intelligible reality, it follows that our 
universe’s sharing in its perfection provides the highest degree of goodness and beauty for the 
whole and each of its constituent parts.  
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In spite of his initial emphasis on cosmic singularity, Plato proceeds to radically complicate 
his cosmological portrait with layers of multiplicity and complexity. The world’s body, he 
reports, consists of water, air, fire, and earth, carefully proportioned to provide the highest 
degree of internal unity.
165
 The world’s soul, which was made before the body and might 
therefore be expected to be immaterial, is in fact composed of a bewildering mixture of 
mixtures. With mystifying symbolism whose precise meaning is not entirely clear and has 
been variously interpreted, Timaeus explains that, in addition to ‘indivisible existence’ (the 
eternal realm of perfect being) and ‘divisible existence’ (the temporal world of becoming), 
the Demiurge adds and mixes ‘a third and intermediate kind of being.’166 He fashions a 
‘compound intermediate’ between sameness and difference, and finally blends the three 
together into one form. Although the world soul thereby comprises one form, it is a mixture 
with many components and subdivisions. In this way, the very soul of the cosmos is an 
entanglement of, and multifaceted negotiation between, sameness and difference, oneness 
and multiplicity.  
 
For Plato, both the world soul and all individual souls in the cosmos belong to and participate 
in the realms of both being and becoming. As eternal and indestructible, the soul bears a 
likeness to the unchanging Forms in the divine realm, and particularly the eternal model on 
which all of creation is patterned. At the same time, though, the soul is unlike the Forms in 
the sense that it is alive and intelligent and therefore subject to the contingencies of change 
and time. Like Nicholas of Cusa’s idea of an infinite God without centre and circumference 
(to be discussed in chapter four), Plato’s world soul is described as extended throughout the 
centre and circumference of creation: ‘And in the center he [the Demiurge] put the soul, 
which he diffused throughout the body, making it also to be the exterior environment of it, 
and he made the universe a circle moving in a circle’.167 In this sense, it shares in the divided, 
third form of being mentioned above, extending to and pervading every part and every living 
creature in the cosmos. This is the intermediate form of existence, mixing the temporal and 
eternal realms. Individual souls comprise the inferior residue of the world soul, and are 
ultimately embodied in physical bodies. 
 
                                                          
165
 Timaeus, 31b. In participatory terms, it is also worth noting that fire, air, water, and earth are caused to be 
like their Forms by divine activity shaping them from triangles into geometrical solids (53c-55c). 
166
 Timaeus, 35a. 
167
 Timaeus, 34b. 
57 
 
Having subverted his own insistence on oneness, Timaeus proceeds to subvert his entire 
creation narrative by abruptly deciding to ‘return again and find another suitable 
beginning’.168 This is because, he explains, the Demiurge has been acting subject to 
limitations over which he has no control, and that—halfway through the story—it is now 
necessary to go back to the real beginning of the story, not to discuss divine intelligence, but 
to consider the governing principle of ‘necessity’. In the first part of the dialogue, it could be 
said that Plato was observing the universe from above and beyond, while the second part is 
more concerned with the perspective and the limitations and the inheritances of the 
Demiurge. The structure of the cosmos is determined as a matter of necessity, and it is not 
entirely open to the Demiurge to change or eliminate the structures and their properties. The 
properties enable the Demiurge to act in certain desirable ways to bring order out of disorder 
and to fashion the universe as closely as possible according to divine intelligence. The 
universe is therefore a mixed product of the combination of reason and necessity, not a 
chance product of random natural forces, but highly expressive of rational and intelligible 
design. 
 
Receptacle 
 
In addition to its portrayal of the participation of the physical universe in its perfect model, 
the Timaeus is also significant in terms of metaphysical participation because Plato describes 
in considerable detail what might be said to function as the basic participant through the 
universe: the Receptacle. It represents a third form of reality, in addition to the eternal model 
and physical world already outlined in the dialogue. It is ‘the receptacle, and in a manner the 
nurse, of all generation’169 in which the cosmos becomes itself. The universe is not self-
subsisting, but requires this Receptacle to support and sustain it. The Receptacle is ‘invisible 
and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence 
only.’170 It is ‘the universal nature which receives all bodies’, receiving all things but never 
departing from its own nature.
171
 It is not matter, nor is it out of which things are made, but 
rather in which our physical world comes to exist. The Receptacle has no distinctive qualities 
of its own before others enter it: ‘she is the natural recipient of all impressions… the forms 
which enter into and go out of her are the likenesses of eternal realities modeled after their 
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patterns in a wonderful and mysterious manner’.172 Timaeus likens the Receptacle to a 
quantity of plastic material, molded and remolded into different shapes. The Forms impress 
themselves in some mysterious way on the Receptacle, changing and modifying it in a 
constantly shifting and complex pattern. As Receptacle, its purpose is to be the participant of 
participated perfections of Forms through the divine intelligence bringing into existence the 
physical universe. 
 
To illustrate the concept of the Receptacle, Timaeus draws an analogy between the father, the 
mother, and the child, and the eternal Form, the Receptacle, and Becoming: ‘we may liken 
the receiving principle to a mother, and the source or spring to a father, and the intermediate 
nature to a child’.173 Strikingly, for the purposes of an account of Platonic participatory 
metaphysics, Timaeus goes on to suggest that the Receptacle is not only invisible, 
characterless, and all-receiving, but that it should be seen as an ‘invisible and formless being 
which receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most 
incomprehensible.’174 This is ambiguous language, but might be understood as a kind of 
bridge or link between the realms of being and becoming, or of the former somehow 
informing and imprinting upon the latter. 
 
Before the coming into being of the ordered world, there were three ‘distinct things’: being, 
the Receptacle (or khora), and becoming. Without a Receptacle for it to come into being, 
there was no becoming as such, just a primordial state of chaos in which the contents of the 
cosmos were held in non-relation, continually being separated and scattered in various 
directions.
175
 Yet in the pre-cosmic state, prior to the activity of the Demiurge, the Receptacle 
is erratic and disorderly, and its contents—which subsequently come to be known and shaped 
as fire, air, water, and earth—are merely ‘faint traces of themselves’.176 Thus, the role of the 
Demiurge was to ensure that these elements became genuine images (or participations) of 
their respective Forms and to ensure that their proportion and volume would be suitable to 
enable the existence of a cosmos that would be patterned on and participating in its ideal 
model. 
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The ordered cosmos, as constituted by the interplay of divine intelligence and necessity, is a 
result of bringing the three aspects of reality (being, Receptacle, becoming) into existence by 
relating, mixing, and entangling them. Although the Forms might seem to exist beyond the 
world of becoming, the mechanism for their existence in the context of our cosmos is the 
Receptacle. In this sense, the three realities are interdependent, each a part of the mixed fabric 
and layered structure of the cosmos—which itself embodies multiplicity and plurality to a far 
greater extent than is initially suggested in the text and is generally admitted in the readings 
of multiverse sceptics who seek to conscript Plato as a proponent of a simplistically singular 
universe. 
 
2.1.8 Summary 
 
In the Timaeus, Plato presents a physical universe that is the most excellent, beautiful, and 
perfect creation possible, as a consequence of its likeness to and participation in an eternal 
model, brought about by the work of the divine workman operating according to intelligence 
and necessity. In the dialogue, Forms serve as both models (in which physical things 
participate) and goals (by which the physical universe is caused to be good and beautiful). 
The Receptacle, whose description is enigmatic and elusive, seems to function as an initially 
errant and disorderly factor, which nevertheless proves to be the essential and pervasive 
participant of the transcendent Forms. 
 
Ultimately, Timaeus’s narrative, which is itself multifaceted and intricately structured, with 
its mixture of mixtures, or multiplicity of multiplicities, is entirely consistent with the 
participatory insight that a changing world of finitude is best able to reflect the infinite and 
infinitely creative God through overwhelming diversity. Moreover, the participatory vision of 
Platonic cosmology outlined in the Timaeus provides a particularly fertile ground on which to 
reconsider the metaphysical implications of multiverse theory, which will be the focus of the 
rest of this chapter. 
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2.2 Mary-Jane Rubenstein on Multiplicity 
 
In this section, I will critically evaluate the American postmodern philosophical theologian 
Mary-Jane Rubenstein’s imaginative and important work on multiverse cosmology. I will 
argue that her acute insight that theological receptions of multiverse thought have been 
insufficiently metaphysical might usefully be applied to her own study of Platonic 
cosmology, which is excessively preoccupied with postmodern questions of perspective and 
is also marked by elusive and ambiguous language. To that end, I will argue that her reading 
of Plato’s Timaeus fails to consider the participatory nature of the dialogue’s cosmological 
narrative in general, as well as the role of the Receptacle in particular. I will propose that an 
explicitly participatory reading of Plato would be more consistent with her own demand for 
rigorous metaphysical scrutiny of cosmic multiplicity. Finally, I will apply just such a 
participatory approach to the American cosmologist Laura Mersini-Houghton’s connected 
multiverse theory. I will note that multiverse theorists like Mersini-Houghton cannot avoid 
using participatory concepts and thus inescapably find themselves in this territory, bearing 
witness to the participatory tradition. 
 
2.2.1 Rubenstein on Multiverse Cosmology 
 
In the context of theological engagement with scientific multiverse thought, Mary-Jane 
Rubenstein’s recent study, Worlds Without End: The Many Lives of the Multiverse, is highly 
significant for two principal reasons. First, her work is the most comprehensive theological 
excavation of the historical and conceptual roots of the current debate on multiverses.
177
 
Second, she concludes with the intriguing (and regrettably brief) insight that multiverse 
cosmology implies an ‘ontology that entangles the one and the many… [and] a theology that 
asks more interesting and more pressing questions than whether the universe has been 
“designed” by an anthropomorphic, extracosmic deity.’178 The idea that theological 
multiverse engagement should move beyond narrow questions of design to consider 
metaphysical issues is central to this thesis and, more broadly, is likely to be pivotal in terms 
of encouraging theologians to adopt a more constructive and historically-informed approach 
to multiverse thought. 
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For Rubenstein, multiverse cosmology—even if it could be subject to empirical testing and 
falsification—is inescapably metaphysical in two ways. In a broad sense, she uses the term 
metaphysics to refer to that which is beyond the physical—the idea that multiverse theories 
‘posit realms that, however imprinted on or entangled with our own, remain inexorably 
beyond it.’179 In a more technical philosophical sense, she regards multiverse theories as 
metaphysical because they address the fundamental question of ‘what is’—the idea that 
Western metaphysics is an ongoing journey to ascertain whether reality is one or many. 
Throughout her rich historical survey, she traces the cosmological expressions of this 
conundrum, from Plato to Aristotle, Aquinas to Descartes, Giordano Bruno to Kant, and 
among modern scientists and philosophers. She discovers that proponents of cosmic 
singularity find themselves colliding with plurality (as she argues in the case of the Timaeus), 
and vice versa (as with the cosmic pluralist Bruno ultimately admitting that unity is 
paramount), such that each episode merely serves to demonstrate that ‘the world is neither 
one nor many, but many in its oneness or one in its manyness or many in a certain light and 
one in another.’180 
 
According to Rubenstein, this emphasis on cosmic multiplicity has implications for how we 
might understand the ‘many worlds’ of multiverse theories. In some way, these worlds must 
be ontologically connected (and not wholly ‘other’) if they are ever to be the subject of 
scientific observation and experimentation. At the same time, though, they must remain 
extremely ‘other’, separated by space (as in inflationary or bubble universes), time (as in 
cyclical universe models), or branches of reality (as in the many-worlds interpretation of 
quantum mechanics). While Rubenstein artfully and imaginatively traces the persistence of 
cosmic multiplicity, or the ‘many-oneness’ of reality, throughout the history of western 
thought on many worlds or universes, she arrives at a rather ambiguous, elusive, and 
equivocal conclusion. She tentatively hints that, from a divine perspective, ‘it may be that… 
there is only one world. It may be that there are many.’181 
 
This playful, wayward, vague and mystifying language is a function of the self-consciously 
postmodernist tradition in which she operates and which often serves primarily to obscure the 
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thrust of her arguments. As we will see, her reading of the description of the Receptacle in 
the Timaeus is heavily influenced by Jacques Derrida, and her language and style are 
similarly in keeping with the obscure and enigmatic way in which the French philosopher 
expresses his ideas. In another instance of the elusive nature of her project, she closes with 
what she refers to as an ‘unscientific postscribble’ in which she speculates that whether the 
universe is one or many, infinite or finite, will depend on ‘the theoretical and experimental 
configuration that examines it. In other words, the shape, number, and character of the 
cosmos might well depend on the question we ask it.’182 This is another instance of her 
‘perspectival’ reading of the multiverse whereby its singularity or plurality, or its finitude or 
infinitude, depends on the theoretical configuration under which it is scientifically examined. 
In this sense, her approach echoes the recent turn among some postmodern theologians to 
‘polodoxy’, the idea that the decline of religious institutions and authority will lead us to 
recognise the value of a multiplicity of individual perspectives and their interrelations.
183
 It is 
sufficient to observe in this instance that such an unmistakably postmodern approach is not 
evident in Plato, for whom participation expresses the relationship between the sensible and 
intelligible realms. He is thereby concerned with eternal and unchanging truth, not the 
kaleidoscope of perspectives coveted by polodoxists. 
 
Having identified the ‘many-oneness’ inherent in many philosophical antecedents of 
multiverse thought, Rubenstein opts not to focus on the metaphysical implications in any 
systematic manner. While the scope of her project is clearly to provide a broad historical 
perspective to the current multiverse debate, many of her case studies would be enriched by 
adopting a participatory approach that would be more in line with the kind of metaphysical 
outlook she advocates at the end of her study. This is particularly true in terms of her 
treatment of Plato’s Timaeus, which it would now be useful to examine. 
 
2.2.2 Rubenstein on the Timaeus 
 
As Rubenstein observes, the cosmological vision of the Timaeus—which seems to privilege 
singularity over plurality, order over disorder, and unity over difference—would be 
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profoundly influential in setting the trajectory of Western cosmology up to the present day. 
The conventional—and overly literal and insufficiently metaphysical—reception of this 
vision also accounts for why it is often cited in the theology and science dialogue as an 
important example of a philosophical system that rejects cosmic pluralism and is therefore of 
doubtful value or relevance to multiverse discourse.
184
 Against these standard readings, she 
correctly identifies within the Timeaus a subtle yet highly consequential insistence on 
multiplicity: ‘Plato offers a unique and undivided cosmos that is nevertheless composed of 
difference, mixtures, and pluralities.’185 In her view, Plato’s cosmological vision is therefore 
better understood as an interplay of singularity and plurality, of order and disorder, and of 
unity and difference. It leaves us not with a simplistic emphasis on oneness, but with a 
‘strange dance between the one and the many.’186 
 
Initially, Rubenstein associates Plato’s project of ‘mixing the multiple’ with his description of 
the world’s soul, which (as discussed earlier) appears to comprise a threefold combination of 
aspects of the Forms, the physical world, and a third kind of mixed intermediate between 
them. These three components are then mixed into a single unity, which she describes with 
characteristic obscurity as ‘a conglomeration of indivisible existence, divisible existence, 
indivisible sameness, divisible sameness, indivisible difference, divisible difference, neither 
divisible nor indivisible existence, neither divisible nor indivisible sameness, and neither 
divisible nor indivisible difference.’187 The Demiurge then finishes the soul by making 
subdivisions, each containing a mixture of the three components. Rubenstein proposes to 
classify this bewildering ‘cosmic intermingling’ as an instance of ‘the multiple’.188 Whenever 
the Timaeus seems to assert the oneness of the cosmos, in the manner attributed to the text in 
most theological multiverse readings, it actually ‘collides with something like multiplicity… 
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one cannot help but agree that the will toward oneness in the Timaeus finds itself multiply 
interrupted.’189 
 
Having detailed this mixture of mixtures, Rubenstein proceeds to consider the introduction of 
the Receptacle as the dialogue turns to its second precosmic beginning. Although she uses 
notably participatory language to describe the Receptacle (referring to its function in terms of 
reception, bearing, and tracing),
190
 her reading owes more to postmodernism and 
deconstruction than a Platonic or Christian Neoplatonist account. In line with Derrida’s 
conception of the Receptacle as the space of deconstruction, eluding all history, theology, and 
truth,
191
 Rubenstein describes it in terms of non-reality and non-being as ‘nothing’ and that 
which ‘is not’.192 She goes on to argue that the work of creation is to bring things into 
existence by relating and mixing them together. So ‘chaos’ refers to the unrelated plurality of 
being, Receptacle, and becoming, while ‘cosmos’ refers to their ‘interrelation—the mixture 
of mixtures that worlds the world.’193 On this account, the three distinct realities can only be 
said to exist in relation to each other, having been mixed together by necessity: ‘each of them 
is woven into the (mixed) fabric of the cosmos, becoming itself only as part of this melee… 
[so a world is born] from unrelated differences to their related mix—from plurality, one 
might add, to multiplicity.’194 
 
Yet this interpretation does not take into account the participatory nature of both the 
Receptacle and Plato’s cosmological vision in general, and thus does not go far enough in 
offering the kind of metaphysical attention that Rubenstein herself identifies as so crucial to 
theological engagement with multiverse thought. Contrary to the notion that the Receptacle is 
‘nothing’ or to be viewed in terms of negation, it is in fact a participant that affords a basis for 
the participated perfections it receives. It is like a mirror or, as Francis Cornford puts it, ‘the 
room or place where things are, not intervals or stretches of vacancy where things are not.’195 
It has some kind of permanent being, retaining its own nature as the basic permanent 
participant in the physical universe: ‘[The Receptacle is the] universal nature which receives 
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all bodies [but] never departs at all from her own nature and never, in any way or at any time, 
assumes a form like that of any of the things which enter into her; she is the natural recipient 
of all impressions.’196 It is all-receiving, the place in which the ‘likenesses’ (or participations) 
of eternal realities appear. In some mysterious way, it serves to be the participant of 
participated perfections (or images) of the Forms, ordered and directed through divine 
intelligence.
197
 
 
Absent from Rubenstein’s account is the recognition that, with the Receptacle, Plato presents 
additional detail and depth to his doctrine of participation. As discussed earlier, the Phaedo 
examines the threefold relationship between Forms, participated perfections, and participants. 
In the Parmenides and Sophist, he connects participation with exemplary and efficient 
causalities to explain how participation can happen without dividing Forms. In these 
preceding dialogues, though, he makes only brief references to participants.
198
 By contrast, 
the Timaeus provides considerable detail about the Receptacle, as the eternal, all-receiving 
participant of the cosmos. Of crucial importance, the Receptacle lends itself to a specifically 
participatory understanding, rather than Rubenstein’s postmodern account of different cosmic 
parts being mixed together, as with the ingredients of a cake. Platonic participation is a matter 
of donation and reception, and not just a matter of mixtures or multiples. This participatory 
outlook will now be applied to a new multiverse theory in modern cosmology, Mersini-
Houghton’s connected multiverse. 
 
2.2.3 Laura Mersini-Houghton’s Connected Multiverse 
 
To illustrate the applicability of Platonic participatory metaphysics to a contemporary 
multiverse theory, it would be instructive to consider the example of cosmologist Laura 
Mersini-Houghton’s ‘connected’ multiverse, not least because it is briefly assessed in a 
different part of Rubenstein’s volume, but without any reference to her earlier discussion of 
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Plato. In the past decade, Mersini-Houghton has argued that, in its very early moments, our 
universe was ‘connected’ to other universes in a kind of pre-inflationary cosmic bath 
containing all possible initial conditions. As our universe grew unimaginably rapidly, it 
separated from the other universes, but remains ontologically entangled with them due to the 
unitarity principle of quantum mechanics, whereby information about a system is never 
destroyed. In fact, the extent of the entanglement is such that this theory can be (and in some 
aspects has already been) empirically tested through measurement of the strength of the 
cosmic microwave background, the distribution of matter in the universe, and observation of 
the entanglement at large scales. 
 
As discussed earlier, the cosmological theory of inflation (the exponential expansion of the 
early universe) provides the basis for some major multiverse theories, including the first two 
levels of Tegmark’s hierarchy. Although inflation seems to explain the flatness, homogeneity, 
and structure of the universe, Mersini-Houghton begins her investigation by questioning the 
origin and nature of inflation itself. In the same way that the selection principle of multiverse 
theories is often identified as a foundational problem to be solved,
199
 she notes that the 
selection of the initial state of inflation is ‘a new and more severe mystery’.200 She believes 
that the kind of inflation behind the expansion of our universe was oddly improbable and far 
less likely than starting with a large universe structured as ours is today. 
 
To explain the emergence of our own universe within a broader multiverse, Mersini-
Houghton starts with a pre-cosmic and disorderly ‘bath’ of all possible initial conditions on 
the string landscape. As discussed in Chapter 1 in the context of Tegmark and others, string 
theory holds that every landscape vacua corresponds with a potential universe. To this chaotic 
mix, she applies a kind of principle of natural selection whereby only a fraction of possible 
universes out of the ensemble of all possible universes survive. The so-called ‘survivor’ 
universes start at high energies and low entropies and are physically able to develop into 
physical universes. Other initial states, starting at low energies, are subjected to gravitational 
instabilities that crunch them into nothing, resulting in no universe. As such, this theory 
provides a ‘superselection rule’ for the birth of the universe on the basis of the quantum 
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dynamics of gravity and matter on a string landscape with all possible initial conditions.
201
 In 
her view, it provides a satisfactory explanation for the inflation of the early universe, or the 
‘deep mystery of the selection of the initial state’.202 
 
Of particular relevance to this section, Mersini-Houghton is mindful of the profound 
ontological implications of her theory. If our universe started in a mixed state in the 
precosmic bath, or landscape multiverse, it is fundamentally entangled or connected with all 
other universes. According to the unitarity principle of quantum mechanics, whereby 
information can never be lost, our universe can never evolve into a purely independent self-
contained state. The entanglement of our cosmic domain with everything else in the 
multiverse leaves ‘imprints’ on the cosmic microwave background and large-scale structure 
of the universe in numerous observable ways. In her memorable expression, this remarkable 
ontological connectivity ‘leaves its traces everywhere in the present observable sky.’203 Since 
all parts of the connected multiverse are ‘relevant parts of reality for all times’, she argues 
that this model is more likely to describe reality than Tegmark’s Level IV multiverse with its 
disconnected domains governed by different fundamental laws of physics. The connected 
multiverse is more economical since all its parts share the same background spacetime, in 
contrast to the wholly different parts of spacetime proposed in Level IV.  
 
There are suggestive resonances between Mersini-Houghton’s connected multiverse and the 
participatory cosmological vision described in Plato’s Timaeus. In particular, it is difficult not 
to see the Receptacle as a kind of philosophical analogue to her precosmic, chaotic bath of 
initial conditions. As discussed earlier, the Receptacle is the basic participant of the physical 
universe, which existed before the universe, and is the space or ‘nurse’ which gives birth to 
all items in the universe. The Forms which pass through the Receptacle are the ‘likenesses of 
eternal realities modelled after their patterns’204 in some mysterious manner. It receives 
‘every variety of form’ in a constantly shifting pattern, while itself remaining ‘formless and 
free from the impress of any of those shapes’.205 Just as the various initial states in the bath of 
the connected multiverse are subject to gravitational instabilities, so the Receptacle is 
described as naturally chaotic, transferring chaotic motion to the traces of the elements 
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contained within: ‘when the world began to get into order, fire and water and earth and air did 
indeed show faint traces of themselves, but were altogether in such a condition as one may 
expect to find wherever God is absent.’206 So when Mersini-Houghton describes the ‘traces’ 
in the sky left by the connected parts of the universe, there is a direct and distinct echo of the 
depiction of ‘traces’ within the Receptacle. Divine intelligence, in the form of the Demiurge, 
was responsible for bringing the elements in this chaotic Receptacle into suitable proportion 
and harmony so that the cosmos would exemplify the goodness and beauty of its eternal 
model. With Plato’s Receptacle and Mersini-Houghton’s multiverse bath, we have pre-
cosmic depictions of tumultuous landscapes that nonetheless operate according to distinct 
principles giving rise to ontologically connected parts of the cosmos, whose physical 
characteristics bear traces of their underlying common source.
207
 
 
It is possible to suggest one further point of contact between the sense of unity in multiplicity 
embodied by Plato’s participatory cosmology and the notion of tracing and entanglement in 
Mersini-Houghton’s concept of a connected multiverse. As discussed earlier, the Demiurge in 
the Timaeus constructs the cosmos as a perfect image and participation of the Form of the 
Living Being, which contains the Forms of all other beings and thus all parts of the cosmos. 
As a consequence of our cosmos sharing in the Form of the Living Being, it is as good and 
beautiful as possible, both in terms of its totality and each of its constituent parts. Just as the 
goodness and beauty of a certain part of the Platonic cosmos is indicative of the broader 
whole (and its underlying source), the connectivity of Mersini-Houghton’s multiverse means 
that the entanglement of our domain with all other parts of the cosmos leaves imprints in 
various observable features of the physical cosmos. 
 
With these noteworthy similarities between aspects of Platonic participatory thought and the 
connected multiverse, the clear point to emerge is that Mersini-Houghton cannot avoid using 
participatory language and ideas. Thus, she uses strikingly participatory language to describe 
the common origin of her entangled domains, such as ‘sharing’, ‘traces’, and ‘imprints’. 
Indeed, her repeated claim that the mark of the entanglement of our universe with its origin is 
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preserved in the sky strongly echoes Plato’s supposition that ‘the created heaven might be as 
like as possible to the perfect and intelligible animal, by imitation of its eternal nature.’208 
This demonstrates that multiverse theorists such as Mersini-Houghton find themselves 
inescapably operating in the territory of participation. In that sense, they bear witness to the 
participatory tradition, even while ostensibly engaged in the practice of modern cosmology. 
In light of this, the discussion of multiverse thought within the theology and science field 
would profit from acknowledging this dynamic, as well as explicitly considering the salience 
of participation within this cosmological context. 
 
Without such a participatory framework, Rubenstein construes Mersini-Houghton’s 
connected multiverse through the prism of postmodern relativism. It is, she submits, ‘either 
one or many, depending on how you look at it.’209 In characteristically cryptic language, she 
concludes that the connected multiverse is ‘not one, but neither is it simply many; rather, it is 
many by virtue of its complex unity and united in its irreducible manyness.’210 But Mersini-
Houghton’s theory is not just another instance of what Rubenstein calls ‘the multiple’, a term 
she uses to reflect the unexpected persistence of cosmic multiplicity in the ostensibly singular 
universe of the Timaeus. For Plato, as for Mersini-Houghton, cosmology is not just a vague, 
perspectival mixing of different parts or perspectives, but lends itself to a participatory 
account of sharing, imparting, and reception. Thus Platonic participatory metaphysics 
provides additional depth and proves to be of surprising relevance to the ‘multiplicity’ 
identified by Rubenstein and inherent in multiverse theories. 
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2.4 Max Tegmark on Mathematics 
 
In this section, I will critically evaluate the curious interpretation of Platonism presented 
within the theoretical physicist and multiverse theorist Max Tegmark’s influential multiverse 
hierarchy, particularly in terms of its implications for his Level IV multiverse.
211
 First, I will 
show that Tegmark’s reading of Platonism is mistaken in important ways. He mistakenly 
believes that his Level IV multiverse embodies a radical form of Platonism, but there are 
profound differences between his theory and the participatory metaphysics found in the 
Timaeus. He sees mathematics as the highest form of knowledge, whereas for Plato it serves 
a mediating role in bridging the sensible and intelligible realms. He also controversially 
invokes Plato to claim that all mathematical structures exist physically, whereas for Plato the 
physical cosmos is distinct from its intelligible source. Since these (among other) 
discrepancies serve to further complicate an already contentious model of extreme 
mathematical realism, I will propose that a more accurate and participatory reading of Plato 
would ironically strengthen the other levels of Tegmark’s hierarchy. 
 
2.4.1 Tegmark on Platonism 
 
Having outlined the first three levels of his multiverse hierarchy (regions beyond our cosmic 
horizon; other post-inflation bubbles; the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics), 
Tegmark pauses to suggest that, while undoubtedly contentious, the debate over these models 
of parallel universes and the underlying physics is only ‘the tip of an iceberg’.212 He believes 
that a deeper metaphysical question remains, concerning the relationship between 
mathematics and physical reality, which he traces as far back as Plato and Aristotle, as 
follows:
213
 
 
Aristotelian paradigm: The internal perspective is physically real, while the external 
perspective and all its mathematical language is merely a useful approximation. 
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Platonic paradigm: The external perspective (the mathematical structure) is 
physically real, while the internal perspective and all the human language we use to 
describe it is merely a useful approximation for describing our subjective perceptions. 
 
Tegmark favours the Platonic paradigm in which mathematical structure is the true reality, 
and observers perceive it imperfectly. He contends that the influence of the so-called 
Aristotelian paradigm (with which we are allegedly indoctrinated as children) induces us to 
dismiss parallel universes as peculiar, particularly the branching universes of Level III. From 
the external perspective, each decision creates a ‘split’ whereby one person continues to read 
and another does not. From the internal (Aristotelian) perspective, each person is unaware of 
this branching and is unable to see their alter ego occupying different quantum branches in 
infinite-dimensional space. This reflects the difference between viewing a physical theory 
from the external view of a physicist studying equations and the internal view of an observer 
living in the world described by the equations. He believes that proponents of the external 
view should find multiverses natural, since on this view physics is ultimately a mathematics 
problem, and there exists a Theory of Everything (TOE) whose axioms would be purely 
mathematical. 
 
In light of his preference for the Platonist paradigm and his acceptance of the possibility of a 
TOE, Tegmark proposes his controversial Level IV multiverse, often the subject of 
theological and scientific criticism, and which he regards as ‘a form of radical Platonism’.214 
The Level IV multiverse involves what he calls ‘complete mathematical democracy’, 
whereby ‘mathematical existence and physical existence are equivalent, so that all 
mathematical structures exist physically as well.’215 This also implies that mathematical 
structures are ‘out there’ such that they are discovered rather than created by mathematicians. 
For Tegmark, a mathematical structure is ‘an abstract, immutable entity’ that exists outside of 
space and time.
216
 All mathematical structures amount to formal systems consisting of 
‘abstract symbols and rules for manipulating them’.217 In other words, mathematics is not 
simply about manipulating numbers, but defining the relations between abstract objects such 
as functions, sets, spaces, and operators. It is precisely because of this distillation of 
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mathematics to abstract relations that computers can prove geometric theorems without 
physical intuition of space. 
 
As a way to establish a dilemma that provides the basis for his Level IV multiverse, Tegmark 
proceeds to consider whether the physical world is a mathematical structure. This part of his 
argument is not entirely clear or convincing, and has been the subject of considerable 
criticism among physicists.
218
 If the physical world is, as Tegmark believes, a mathematical 
structure, then mathematical equations will be able to describe not just limited aspects of it, 
but all aspects.
219
 In this context, some mathematical structure would be equivalent to our 
universe, with each physical entity corresponding to a part of mathematical structure and vice 
versa. Tegmark suggests that a mathematical structure has physical existence if ‘any self-
aware substructure (SAS) within it subjectively perceives itself as living in a physically real 
world.’220 Since we do not yet have a TOE, the mathematical structure isomorphic to our 
universe has not yet been found, assuming it exists. If, though, our universe really is a 
mathematical structure, with each person representing an SAS, this means that the structure 
has both physical and mathematical existence. This, in turn, raises questions about all other 
possible mathematical structures and whether they are likewise given physical expression. If 
not, he argues, there would be a ‘fundamental, unexplained ontological asymmetry built into 
the very heart of reality, splitting mathematical structures into two classes: those with and 
without physical existence.’221 
 
To escape this dilemma, Tegmark proposes the Level IV multiverse in which all 
mathematical structures exist physically as well. This would include universes with other 
mathematical structures and therefore with different fundamental equations of physics and 
different constants of nature. Unlike Level I universes, which are spatially connected, or even 
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Level II and III universes which at least have the same fundamental equations of physics 
(though develop clear demarcations caused by inflation and decoherence, respectively), the 
Level IV universes are completely disconnected. They exist outside of space and time, and 
seem virtually impossible to describe. The best we can do, Tegmark admits, is ‘to think of 
them abstractly, as static sculptures that represent the mathematical structure of the physical 
laws that govern them.’222  
 
In a basic sense, Tegmark’s view of mathematics and Platonism (and its implications for 
multiverse speculation) is reasonable. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Plato associates 
true reality with the intelligible realm of the Forms, whereas the sensible world is only 
derivative and illusory. The Forms of the intelligible realm are eternal, perfect, unchanging, 
and exist outside of space and time. This concept is often illustrated with the mathematical 
example of the triangle, whose ideal version is more real than approximate earthly versions. 
For Plato, mathematics inspires us not just to understand our own world more clearly, but to 
look beyond and above it, and to begin to ascend to the intelligible realm.
223
 Our ability to 
abstract numerical quantities from sensible things provides a basis for Plato’s belief in 
intelligible Forms underlying physical reality: ‘the qualities of number appear to lead to the 
apprehension of truth.’224 Thus, mathematics serves as an intermediary between the physical 
realm and intelligible realm of true being and goodness. In the Republic, Socrates 
recommends that the education of philosophers should include a broad range of mathematical 
disciplines, including arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and harmonic theory.
225
 Even basic 
arithmetic and calculation satisfy our need to bring order and coherence to the diversity of the 
physical cosmos, ultimately moving us to contemplate the divine unity and perfection of the 
intelligible realm. This is the Platonic context in which Tegmark perceives mathematics to 
reflect the underlying reality of the world. 
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On a more fundamental level, though, Tegmark’s invocation of Platonism to describe the 
Level IV multiverse is highly idiosyncratic and problematic.
226
 His understanding of 
Platonism rests on two significant misapprehensions. First, mathematics does not occupy 
quite the same exalted position in Plato’s epistemological hierarchy as it does in Tegmark’s 
vision in which mathematical knowledge is the most fundamental kind of knowledge or with 
his expectation that we will eventually find a TOE, from which all other knowledge can be 
derived. In the classification of knowledge outlined in the Republic, mathematical knowledge 
relates to the Forms, since mathematical objects encourage us to contemplate unchanging and 
stable objects and thereby prepare us for an encounter with the eternal realm. But 
mathematicians understand that the objects with which they work are merely ‘shadows and 
images’,227 when what they really seek is the kind of true reality only accessible by reason 
(noesis), a purer, more perfect knowledge of the Forms. By engaging in the dialectical 
process of reasoning, we can gain direct insight of the Forms, without relying on the 
subordinate field of mathematics (or any other arts and sciences) ‘whose assumptions are 
arbitrary starting points.’228 The primacy of mathematics in Tegmark’s scheme is therefore 
not representative of the epistemology of Plato, for whom mathematics was less valuable and 
indeed less scientific than reasoning, which provides direct knowledge of the Forms.    
 
Second, Tegmark’s description of the Forms as existing physically seems to contradict the 
basic premise of Platonic metaphysics. In the Level IV multiverse, every mathematical 
structure corresponds to a parallel universe, opening up the full realm of possibility. Tegmark 
sees this hypothesis as a form of radical Platonism because it asserts that ‘the mathematical 
structures in Plato’s realm of ideas… exist “out there” in a physical sense’.229 As discussed, 
the Forms exist in an intelligible, eternal realm, which is perfectly real precisely because it is 
not physical. It is difficult to see how Tegmark’s conferral of physical existence upon the 
Forms might be reconciled with any conventional reading of the Forms as depicted 
throughout Plato’s dialogues. To complicate matters still further, Tegmark adds that the Level 
IV universes do not occupy the same space, but somehow exist outside of space and time, and 
most of them are not even observed. In some inexplicable way, then, it seems that all possible 
universes enjoy physical existence within a kind of Platonic realm beyond space and time. As 
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such, Tegmark fails to provide the kind of participatory account of the relationship between 
the sensible and intelligible realms that is of such paramount importance to Plato’s 
metaphysics. 
 
2.4.2 Participation in the Timaeus  
 
Ironically, Tegmark’s desire to identify his cosmological theories with a Platonic account of 
the relationship between mathematics and physical reality has produced an unconventional 
variant of Platonism. For that reason, it would be worthwhile to reconsider his work in light 
of the Timaeus, which articulates a participatory cosmological vision in which mathematics 
serves to reconcile the sensible and intelligible realms. In Tegmark’s Level IV model, 
mathematical structures exist physically, while mathematics represents the highest form of 
knowledge. In the Timaeus, by contrast, the mathematical infrastructure of the cosmos is 
separate from the physical universe, while mathematics, through cosmological patterns of 
participation, plays a mediating role that can help focus our attention beyond the physical. 
These distinctions will be consequential for Tegmark’s own multiverse hierarchy and its 
mathematical foundation. 
 
As detailed earlier in this chapter, Plato’s Timaeus depicts a beautiful and orderly universe 
that is the handiwork of divine rationality and intelligence. Strikingly, the dialogue’s 
cosmology is infused with mathematical language, detailing the ratios, proportions, and 
harmonies according to which the universe is ordered. The Demiurge, imitating an eternal 
and unchanging model, imposes mathematical order on a preexistent chaos to produce the 
ordered cosmos, which is a ‘created copy’ of its original.230 By contrast to Tegmark’s curious 
conflation of mathematical and physical structure, in the Timaeus the mathematical 
infrastructure of the cosmos has its own being and intelligibility, distinct from the physical 
universe. In this creation account, the universe is patterned on and participates in eternal 
mathematical patterns of number, geometry, and astronomy. Not only do these mathematical 
patterns provide the model for the world’s generation, but imitation of them draws us closer 
to eternity. 
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Of further relevance to the centrality of mathematics, the creative activity of the Demiurge is 
inherently mathematical. With reference to the Forms, the Demiurge fashions the four 
elements (earth, water, fire, air) from two types of right-angled triangles (isosceles and 
scalene, or unequal-sided).
231
 The precise size and composition of each of the subsequent 
geometrical solids is determined by divine intelligence working according to mathematical 
necessity: ‘And the ratios of their numbers, motions, and other properties, everywhere God, 
as far as necessity allowed or gave consent, has exactly perfected and harmonized in due 
proportion.’232 The Demiurge constructs the world’s body out of the four elements, 
‘harmonized by proportion’.233 The world’s soul is created out of a harmoniously 
proportionate and complex mixture of the Forms, the physical world, and a third and 
intermediate kind of being.
234
 This mixture is then divided up into composites according to 
astonishingly precise and complex ratios, which also form the basis for the motions of the 
soul’s outer and inner circles, the latter of which encompasses the carefully measured orbits 
of the sun, the moon, and the other planets.
235
 The soul is brought into union with the world, 
‘interfused everywhere from the center to the circumference of heaven’, bringing about a 
‘divine beginning of never-ceasing and rational life enduring throughout all time.’236  
 
Mathematics does not simply provide the principles according to which the physical universe 
is generated, but also mediates between the sensible and intelligible realms through 
cosmological patterns of participation.
237
 The dialogue’s famous participatory observation 
that time is a ‘moving image of eternity’238 is itself expressed in mathematical terms. The 
eternal living being, on which our cosmos is based, rests in ‘unity’, while time is also based 
on eternity, but moves ‘according to number’.239 Time imitates and participates in eternity 
and revolves according to numerical law.
240
 In this sense, mathematics represents a bridge 
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between time and eternity, or the sensible and intelligible realms. Similarly, animals in the 
natural world ‘participate in number’ by learning arithmetic from the movements of the sun 
and the earth associated with light and darkness, as well as changing seasons.
241
 Just as 
animals participate in eternity through number, so humans have been afforded sight through 
which to observe the astronomical patterns that provide intimations of the world’s intelligible 
source: ‘But now the sight of day and night, and the months and the revolutions of the years 
have created number and have given us a conception of time, and the power of inquiring 
about the nature of the universe.’242 Musical harmony and rhythm may also encourage us to 
identify and imitate the numerical structure of the cosmos and thereby help to correct any 
discord within our souls.
243
 
 
This metaphysical and participatory reading of the Timaeus provides a useful corrective to 
Tegmark’s misappropriation of Platonism. While eschewing the paramount epistemological 
status attributed to mathematics by Tegmark, Plato accords mathematics with high 
metaphysical and indeed moral status. Numerical law provides the model for the creation of a 
cosmos that is maximally beautiful and good. At the same time, numerical law—as an image 
and hence participation of the eternal model of the cosmos—mediates between the sensible 
and intelligible realms. The differences between Tegmark’s Platonism and the Platonic 
participatory metaphysics described in this chapter are outlined in the table on the following 
page. 
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Tegmark’s Level IV Platonism Participatory Metaphysics in the 
Timaeus 
Mathematics is the highest form of 
knowledge; all other knowledge will prove to 
be subordinate to a mathematical TOE 
Mathematics plays an important mediating 
role, but is subordinate to reason through 
which intelligible realm is apprehended 
Mathematical existence and physical 
existence are equivalent; all mathematical 
structures exist physically 
Mathematics provides the model for the 
physical cosmos, but this cosmos is distinct 
from its non-physical, intelligible source 
Level IV multiverse exists outside of space 
and time 
Physical cosmos distinct from intelligible 
realm, which exists outside of space and time 
Level IV universes are completely 
disconnected 
The physical cosmos is manifold, but its 
many parts share in a single intelligible 
source  
Level IV universes have different 
fundamental equations of physics 
Mathematical structure is consistent across 
cosmos – also implied by basic participant of 
the Receptacle and activity of the Demiurge 
 
 
2.4.3 Implications for Tegmark’s Multiverse Hierarchy 
 
Based on the differences outlined above, Tegmark’s (supposedly Platonic) Level IV 
multiverse model appears to be less compatible with Platonic participatory metaphysics than 
his Level I, II, and III models. After all, the three preceding models in his multiverse 
hierarchy allow for progressively more cosmic diversity, but they all share the same 
fundamental equations of physics, they are not completely disconnected, and they are not 
wholly beyond space and time. In each case, the participatory metaphysics of the Timaeus 
could be more easily applied such that the physical cosmos is understood to be patterned on 
an eternal (and consistent, underlying) mathematical model and that mathematics itself might 
play a mediating role in focusing our attention beyond different cosmic realms to 
apprehension of the eternal realm. In particular, the participatory role of the Receptacle—
through which all Forms pass as participated perfections—and the participatory role of the 
Demiurge—who arranges and proportions all things to closely resemble the goodness of the 
Forms—both strongly imply a cosmos grounded in a common mathematical structure and 
framework, rather than disconnected realms with different fundamental mathematical laws. 
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In this way, participatory metaphysics can provide a more fruitful ground for engagement 
with Tegmark’s multiverse hierarchy than other theological approaches taken to date. Instead 
of focusing on the logical conundrums inherent in the Level IV model as representative of all 
multiverse theories, which can then be easily dismissed,
244
 it is more constructive to 
acknowledge the useful aspects of Tegmark’s Platonism, while also identifying its 
drawbacks, and then to apply a properly metaphysical account of Platonism to his other, less 
contentious, models. Thus, we might concur with his insight that there is a deeper 
mathematical structure and reality underlying our physical universe. But we might note that 
this does not suggest equivalence between mathematical and physical reality that somehow 
takes shape in disconnected realms beyond space and time. We might then note that the 
participatory vision in the Timaeus suggests a diverse yet interconnected cosmos that operates 
according to consistent mathematical principles and which is more compatible with Level I, 
II, or III multiverse models. Ultimately, Tegmark’s own Platonism complicates and 
undermines his most controversial multiverse model, while a participatory reading of 
Platonism can enrich the other levels of his hierarchy and thereby advance the theology and 
science dialogue by drawing attention away from unproductive disputes over the more 
provocative elements of Level IV. 
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2.4 Verity Harte on Mereology  
 
Having considered contemporary theological and scientific accounts of the relevance of 
Plato’s thought to multiverse theory, I will now turn to a major recent philosophical 
contribution to the understanding of Plato’s metaphysics of structure, and assess how it might 
provide useful resources for illuminating some of the conceptual issues arising in multiverse 
discourse. Verity Harte, a British specialist in ancient philosophy and metaphysics currently 
based at Yale, has produced the first sustained examination of the issue of composition in 
Platonic metaphysics.   
 
I will propose a participatory reading of her account of Plato’s metaphysics of structure and I 
will suggest that such a reading would provide fruitful points of contact for multiverse 
theories. To that end, I will initially provide a brief overview of Harte’s project. I will then 
argue that her project is implicitly participatory in its concepts and language, with specific 
reference to her reading of the Timaeus. Finally, I will argue that this participatory reception 
of Harte’s rich discussion of composition in Plato is of particular value to questions about 
part-whole relations that often arise within the context of inflationary multiverse theories. 
 
2.4.1 Harte on Plato’s Metaphysics of Structure 
 
Harte’s Plato on Parts and Wholes is an authoritative and influential recent examination of 
Plato’s treatment of the relation between a whole and its parts.245 Since ‘mereology’ refers to 
any theory of parthood or composition, her project might be thought of as mereologiocal in 
nature.
246
 Within mereology, questions about part-whole relations (with important 
metaphysical implications) can rapidly proliferate: should we focus on the relation between 
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one part and the whole, or on the relation between many parts and the whole? Is a whole the 
sum of its parts, or somehow greater than the sum? How might it be possible for abstract 
objects to have parts? As she notes, though, Plato does not set out to develop a formal 
mereological system with axioms to govern part-whole relations: ‘Plato is doing metaphysics, 
not logic.’247 
 
Nevertheless, Harte’s central argument is that—at the heart of Plato’s discussions of 
composition—is the ‘mystery’ of the ‘one-many dimension’—that is, how one thing (a 
whole) can be made up of many things (its parts).
248
 To identify one thing (a whole) with 
many things (its parts) seems to threaten the ‘fundamental distinction’ between the two, since 
‘something(s) is/are both one thing—singularly quantified—and many things—plurally 
quantified.’249 If a whole of parts is both one and many, it might be said to represent both a 
(complex) individual and a collection. If, on the other hand, composition amounts to a many-
one relation, it seems important to maintain that the whole is an individual (hence the 
emphasis on the one), rather than a collection. For Harte, this latter concern is central to 
Plato’s metaphysics of structure, which she believes offers an account of wholes as complex 
individuals. 
 
While Harte considers composition and structure in dialogues such as the Parmenides and 
Sophist, for the purposes of this section it will be sufficient to focus on her reading of the 
Timaeus. She observes that the dialogue offers ‘almost an embarrassment of riches’ for a 
study of the composition of complex wholes, with its ‘layering of structures within 
structures’.250 On her reading, the Timaean cosmos is a ‘whole of wholes, a structure of 
structures’.251 This is because the first part of Plato’s creation account is concerned with the 
structure of the cosmos as a whole, while the second part is concerned with the structure of its 
parts (the elements). In this sense, the second creation story (concerned with parts) is itself 
part of the larger whole of the first creation story (itself concerned with the whole). The 
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layering of the cosmos is thus reflected in the layering of the account of its creation: structure 
is synonymous with substance. 
 
In the first creation story, Timaeus describes the body of the cosmos as a structure, which 
consists of four elements standing in proportionate relation to each other, in a manner that 
Harte refers to as ‘structure-laden’.252 This means that the elements can only be understood in 
the context of the structure they compose: parts owing their meaning to the whole to which 
they belong. In the second creation story, the construction of the elements themselves is 
described in terms of likeness to geometrical structures. Given this emphasis on geometrical 
proportion within the body of the cosmos and within the components of the body of the 
cosmos, Harte suggests that there is a ‘parallel’ between the macro- and micro-structure of 
the body of the cosmos, such that geometrical structure is found within the body of the 
cosmos and within the four elements of which it is composed.
253
 In this way, in Harte’s 
memorable expression, ‘structure may be said to go all the way down.’254 
 
For Harte, then, the Timaean cosmos is mathematical in nature and the dialogue tells the 
story of the ‘mathematicization of structure’.255 This structure, patterned on an intelligible 
source and shaped by the activity of divine intelligence, is inherently good—or, as she puts it, 
‘normative’.256 Mathematical concepts such as harmony, proportion, and measure are not 
only bywords for structure, but also normative terms of value expressing the inherent 
goodness and coherence of the cosmos. Thus, Plato’s metaphysics of structure is based on the 
‘irreducibility, intelligibility, and normativity of structure.’257  To illustrate this point, Harte 
refers to the role of musical harmony in the Timaeus, which ends with the injunction to bring 
the revolutions of the human soul into line with the harmonious revolutions of the world soul, 
whose parts were ordered and proportioned according to intervals on the musical scale. 
According to Plato, to learn ‘the harmonies and revolutions of the universe’ is to attain truth 
and the ‘best life which the gods have set before mankind’.258 As such, Platonic structure is 
not just a metaphysical concern, but laden with ethical and epistemological dimensions. 
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In light of her analysis of composition in Plato’s works, and in the Timaeus in particular, 
Harte believes that the emergent picture is of wholes as ‘contentful structures’.259 Wholes are 
not collections of things with ‘structure’ that can be detached and understood separately from 
their parts. Instead, structure is fundamental to the composition of the whole such that wholes 
are instances of structures: ‘In Plato’s conception of wholes, structure is no less essential to 
the parts of such a whole than to the whole itself. The parts of such a whole are structure-
laden; that is, the identity of the parts is determined only in the context of the whole they 
compose.’260 This is a top-down approach to composition, in which parts can be understood 
as such only in reference to the whole: ‘Wholes come first; and parts—and the things that are 
parts—only thereafter.’261 The strong claim that the identity of parts is tied to the whole of 
which they are part implies ‘some sort of metaphysical dependence of the parts on the 
whole.’262 This dependence raises a number of problematic questions (will parts exist only for 
so long as the whole exists?), and Harte acknowledges that the implications require further 
clarification.  
 
2.4.2 Harte and Participatory Metaphysics 
 
Although Harte briefly refers to participation in the context of her discussion of the 
Parmenides, her specific focus is on mereological theories of composition and parthood 
understood in isolation from participation. In particular, she has a good sense of what might 
be thought of as ‘horizontal’ participation (discussed below), but not necessarily of vertical or 
transcendental participation. Yet her deeply metaphysical interpretation of Platonic part-
whole relations can be brought into line with the participatory approach detailed in general 
terms in Chapter 1 and in the specific context of the discussion of the Timaeus earlier in this 
chapter.  
 
In general terms, participation is inherently concerned with inter-relation. To claim that 
things participate in a common intelligible (or divine) source is to imply that they come forth 
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from that source in a state of relation.
263
 Things are related to their common origin, but their 
identity also entails a second kind of relation in terms of their ordering among themselves. To 
use an example of relevance to the Timaeus, this ordering might be akin to the proportionate 
harmonies of a piece of music, with each part of the arrangement standing in relation to the 
other parts, adding up to a melodic whole, outside of which the parts would lose their 
identity. Like Harte’s notion that parts can only be understood as part of the ‘contentful 
structure’ of the whole, the participatory vision holds that each part of creation participates in 
and stands in relation to its origin, owes its identity and meaning to its origin, and stands in 
proportion and relation to all other parts of creation. If parts are ‘structure-laden’ for Harte, 
then all parts in the participatory scheme are infused with a broader meaning and 
intelligibility. 
 
The primacy of relation of parts in Harte’s theory can also be related to what might be called 
the ‘intra-finite’ (or horizontal) aspect of participation, or the participation of things in one 
another. While the main focus of this thesis is the participation of finite things in an infinite 
source, there is a related and secondary sense in which finite things share participatory 
relations among themselves. For example, each creature comes into being and receives its 
being from other creatures, thereby sharing bonds of participation as parts of a participatory 
structure that originates in God. Each creature is therefore in some sense metaphysically 
dependent on other creatures, as well as on the whole participatory structure that can be 
traced back to its transcendent source. This sense of intra-finite participation is given 
expression in Harte’s insistence that parts stand in relation to each other, owe their identity to 
their status as parts, and have some sort of metaphysical dependence on each other, as well as 
the whole of which they are part.
264
 Harte is keenly attentive to this aspect of participation, 
but has less to say about vertical or transcendental participation (that is, the participation of 
sensible things in the intelligible realm), so in the following section I will put her work to use 
within this more Platonic context. 
 
In the specific context of her reading of the Timaeus, Harte’s theory and language are 
distinctly participatory. Whereas Rubenstein identifies the many-layered mixing of the 
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dialogue as an instance of ‘the multiple’, Harte goes one step further by providing the kind of 
sustained metaphysical analysis that Rubenstein herself concludes is necessary in the context 
of engagement with multiverse thought (though does not provide herself, as discussed 
earlier). Harte’s view of the Timaean cosmos as a structure of structures, with the different 
parts of the cosmos standing in precise relation to each other and the overall whole as 
‘structure-laden’, can be brought into contact a participatory reading. Just as Harte is not 
content to speak of parts only in themselves, so Plato explains how the Demiurge constructs 
the physical universe as a participation of the Form of the Living Being, which includes all 
other Forms as its parts. Just as Harte argues that structure is good and intelligible, so the 
participation of the cosmos in its eternal source under the direction of divine intelligence and 
necessity ensures that it is good and beautiful, both as a whole and in terms of each of its 
parts. 
 
In addition, Harte’s account of the Receptacle is distinctly participatory. While admitting that 
the nature of the Receptacle is unclear and subject to diverse interpretation, she maintains that 
the imagery used by Plato characterise it as that in which ‘imitations of forms’ transpire.265 
She goes on to argue that the Demiurge imposes geometrical configurations upon the 
Receptacle, providing the means for the instantiation of the forms of the elements. This 
geometric construction allows for the Receptacle’s eventual ‘reception’ of forms.266 Whether 
Harte’s geometric account of the relation between Forms and the Receptacle is accurate, it is 
striking that her depiction of the Receptacle as that upon which contentful structure is 
imposed invariably employs participatory terms such as imitation, reception, and traces. For 
Harte, it has an inextricably participatory role as the medium in which participated 
perfections of Forms are proportioned and arranged to form a good and beautiful cosmos that 
reflects its eternal model. 
 
2.4.3 Inflationary Multiverse Theory 
 
Having considered Harte’s reading of Plato’s metaphysics of structure, and highlighted 
aspects of its implicit participatory character, it would now be instructive to demonstrate the 
relevance of this mereological-participatory account to a contemporary multiverse theory. 
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Given Harte’s focus on part-whole relations, Tegmark’s Level II post-inflationary bubble 
multiverse, with its different parts originating from a common source, might seem apt. 
 
It will be remembered from Chapter 1.1.3 that Level II of Tegmark’s hierarchy refers to an 
infinite set of distinct Level I multiverses, or bubbles. According to Tegmark, the model is 
predicted by most popular models of inflation, the rapid expansion of the universe. In this 
model, space generally stretches rapidly and forever, but some regions stop stretching and 
form distinct bubbles. Infinitely many of these bubbles may be created, each becoming an 
infinite embryonic Level I multiverse, with different laws of physics, particles, and 
dimensionality brought about by quantum fluctuations during inflation: ‘So the Level II 
multiverse is likely to be more diverse than the Level I multiverse, containing domains where 
not only the initial conditions differ, but also the physical constants.’267 The Level II 
multiverse would appear to address the question of fine-tuning, since the model provides for 
the possibility of other universes in which the physical constants are inconsistent with human 
life. As such, the fact of our presence in a universe conducive to life becomes merely 
coincidental, following from the selection effect that we must find ourselves living in a part 
of the cosmos that is habitable. In the Level II model, there just happen to be (possibly 
infinitely) many other parts (or bubble universes), all with their own finely-tuned parameters 
that if changed modestly would result in qualitatively different universes. 
 
According to Andrei Linde’s chaotic inflationary multiverse theory (which may also be 
considered a version of a Level II multiverse), the inflationary phase of the universe’s 
expansion lasts forever throughout most of the universe. Since different parts of the universe 
expand exponentially rapidly, most of its parts are inflating, potentially producing infinitely 
many parts or regions beyond our cosmic horizon: ‘Inflation of such domains creates huge 
homogeneous islands out of the initial chaos, each one being much greater than the size of the 
observable part of the Universe.’268 The process of the division of the universe into different 
parts may also be explained by quantum fluctuations, which cause energy and matter density 
to differ in different parts of space, producing changes in the rate of inflationary expansion. 
Cosmic regions with higher rates of inflation lead to the production of new inflationary 
domains which expand even faster, as inflation continues forever: ‘This means that the 
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Universe becomes divided into exponentially large parts with different dimensionality.’269 
Linde believes that the process of eternal inflation almost necessarily implies the existence of 
a multiverse, comprising infinitely many bubbles whose properties vary, though he admits 
that to understand this idea, we need to ‘compare infinities, which may lead to 
ambiguities.’270 
 
As such, the Level II multiverse, as described by Tegmark and Linde, provides a fertile 
ground for consideration of part-whole relations and participation.
271
 The different parts of 
the multiverse are enormous and may have vastly different properties, but they share a 
common origin and fundamental connection (even if ultimately inaccessible to us). To adopt 
Harte’s compositional language, we might think of the different parts of this post-inflationary 
landscape as ‘structure-laden’, with the parts being what they are only within the context of 
the cosmic whole they comprise and out of which they originated. By her own admission, her 
claim that parts exist only for so long as the whole exists is contentious as applied to 
perishable objects,
272
 but perhaps within the context of an eternal inflationary multiverse 
there need not be such a problem of tying the identity of the different parts to the eternal 
whole of which they are part. The implied existence of infinitely many other universes with 
different physical constants indicates that our own universe, even with its statistically 
improbable degree of fine tuning, gets its character (or its form, what it adds up to) only in 
the context of the cosmic whole of which it is (or could be) part. There is a kind of 
metaphysical dependence of our own part of the multiverse on the whole multiverse, since 
without the process of eternal inflation giving rise to all possibilities there would be no such 
multiverse at all. 
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We might also consider how a participatory view of Harte’s theory of composition would 
bear upon the Level II multiverse. The division of the multiverse into an infinite number of 
exponentially large parts with different values is a vivid instance of cosmic multiplicity 
arising from a common source, or at least a single cosmic process or canvas. This might call 
to mind the participatory notion of inter-relation introduced in the previous section and on 
which Harte is acutely observational. However, where a Platonic (or Christian) participatory 
metaphysics could deepen her account, we might introduce the issue of participation in a 
transcendent source by suggesting that different parts of creation share a common origin in 
participation in God (or some eternal source). This would mean that different inflationary 
bubbles would emerge (or, to use more participatory language, come forth) already related, 
drawing their being and identity from their common intelligible origin. They would also, in a 
more horizontal sense, owe their identity and share in degrees of relation to each other, as 
Harte suggests. In this way, it is possible to apply a deeper, more ‘vertical’ (or transcendent) 
Platonic participatory approach to her emphasis on ‘horizontal’ or inter-relations between 
parts. 
 
It is particularly confounding that Harte elects not to pursue a more vertical sense of 
participation, especially in light of her attribution to Plato’s metaphysics of what she calls a 
‘holist’ conception.273 This means that, instead of working from the bottom up, he proceeds 
from the top down; that is, the identity of a part of the cosmos is defined only within the 
context of the whole of which it is part. In his metaphysics, according to Harte, wholes come 
first, and parts only thereafter. It is clearly possible to situate this insight within his deeper 
metaphysical framework and to observe that the ‘whole’ of the cosmos indeed comes first 
and originates from an intelligible source before the constituent parts are evident within. 
 
Ultimately, the combination of Harte’s discussion of composition with a deeper conceptual 
Platonic framework of vertical participation suggests new ways of thinking and pertinent 
questions for multiverse theorists. For example, cosmologists are often inclined to examine 
the different constituent parts of the universe—or potential different realms of the 
multiverse—with reference to internal features such as physical constants. This is an 
understandable inclination given that it is more problematic to consider the ‘whole’ of the 
universe (or multiverse) as we cannot experience it or measure it from the outside, a dilemma 
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that sometimes causes cosmology as a scientific area of study to be viewed skeptically. Yet, 
in light of the foregoing discussion, it might be worthwhile for multiverse theorists to pay 
special attention to any multiverse model as a whole, rather than its constituent parts. This 
suggests a new ontological approach not just for philosophers, but for scientists who study 
multiverses and the associated issue of whole-part relations. As Harte argues, Plato’s 
metaphysics places structure as a fundamental item, resisting the notion that parts can be 
easily identified outside of the context of such structures. 
 
Such a focus on the structure or the ‘whole’ of the cosmos may seem alien to place at the 
heart of a philosophical or indeed scientific system, but Plato’s metaphysics of composition 
(outlined by Harte) along with his participatory metaphysics strongly indicate that this is a 
valuable approach. As applied to the Level II multiverse, it would not start with the post-
inflationary bubbles or any internal characteristics of the bubbles. Rather, a Platonic 
participatory approach might recognise that a multiverses are more akin to ‘contentful 
structures whose parts exist and may be identified only in the context of (some) whole of 
which they are (or could be) part.
274
 Further, to complete the participatory picture we might 
consider that, just as all parts of the Timaean cosmos stand in proportionate harmony to each 
other, measured to reflect and participate in the goodness of their eternal model, so we might 
think of the different Level II bubbles as coming forth from the same source and owing a 
kind of metaphysical dependence on the cosmic whole of which they are part. 
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2.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, I explored the issue of cosmic multiplicity, which is so central both to Plato’s 
creation account in the Timaeus and to modern multiverse models, which describe the 
formation and development of (perhaps infinitely) many different parts of an unimaginably 
vast cosmic ensemble. The central point of this chapter is that the multiplicity of the universe 
(or multiverse) is not just a concern for scientific or philosophical accounts of mixture and 
composition, but is inherent in Plato’s participatory vision of the manifold parts of the 
cosmos participating in their perfect and eternal source. To demonstrate this, I engaged with a 
diverse range of contemporary thinkers, encompassing new theological, scientific, and 
philosophical thought, including in relation to Plato and his connection to the multiverse 
hypothesis (or, in Harte’s case, part-whole relations). In each case, I illustrated that a closer 
attention to the participatory aspect of Platonic metaphysics would not only clarify and 
strengthen the discussions of each thinker, but also raise new ways of thinking about specific 
multiverse theories or ideas.  
 
Initially, in response to Rubenstein’s compelling exploration of multiverse thought, I 
demonstrated that her postmodernist account of Plato’s cosmology neglected to account for 
its critical participatory dimension. I argued that, for Plato, cosmic multiplicity is not a matter 
of an ambiguous and loosely articulated postmodern mixing of different perspectives.
275
 
Rather, the multiplicity in the Platonic cosmos lends itself to a participatory understanding of 
the many parts of creation sharing in a common and intelligible source. I applied this 
participatory view to the connected multiverse of Mersini-Houghton, whose own use of 
participatory language and concepts suggests that scientists engaged in this work are 
inescapably operating within the participatory tradition. 
 
Next, I presented a participatory critique of Tegmark’s highly dubious version of Platonism 
and how he thinks it relates to his Level IV multiverse. On Tegmark’s reading, mathematics 
is the highest form of knowledge, whereas it is more properly seen in the Timeaus as serving 
an important mediating role in bridging the sensible and intelligible realms. In light of his 
failure to attend closely to Platonic participatory metaphysics, I concluded that Tegmark’s 
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account of Platonism complicates his Level IV model and would in fact be more tenable in 
the context of the other, less controversial, levels in his multiverse hierarchy. 
 
Finally, I assessed Harte’s mereological account of composition in Plato. Although she also 
employs implicitly participatory language, and has a useful sense of what might be thought of 
as ‘horizontal’ participation, I proposed that a stronger form of ‘vertical’ participation in a 
transcendent source, informed by Plato’s account of the many parts of the cosmos 
participating in an eternal model, would be helpful in terms of considering Level II post-
inflationary bubbles. As such, I drew on an underdeveloped strand of participatory thinking 
in her work to highlight new ways in which theologians and scientists might approach parts 
and wholes within a multiverse context. 
 
Multiplicity is an integral characteristic of multiverse thought, provoking speculation about 
immense cosmic realms with many parts and features. The parts of a multiverse may be many 
in number, but they are also generally considered to be many in variety, with a radical 
diversity of different features. As such, it would now be instructive to consider the extent to 
which metaphysical participation might be valuable in accounting for or illuminating the 
extraordinary cosmic diversity evident in multiverse models. 
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Chapter Three: Diversity (Aquinas) 
 
In this chapter, I will bring the participatory thought of Aquinas into contact with the notion 
of cosmic diversity as it has been detailed in multiverse theory. As this chapter will indicate, 
Aquinas is a monumental figure in the history of participatory thought, articulating and 
significantly developing the Platonic tradition. Aquinas’s conception of creation’s 
participation in God is evident throughout his thought, which is marked by distinctly 
participatory language. As part of this approach, he understands diversity to be an integral 
characteristic of the cosmos, expressing the diversity of ways in which all parts of creation 
participate in God, the source of existence on which all of creation is utterly dependent. 
 
Prior to considering the multiverse reflections of three contemporary thinkers, I will provide a 
detailed outline of Aquinas’s enormously rich participatory metaphysics. I will refer to five 
key participatory texts, with a particular focus on Book I of Summa Contra Gentiles and the 
first article of Summa Theologiae I.44, in both of which he describes God’s relationship with 
creation. 
 
In the next three sections, I will apply Aquinas’s participatory insights to the work of three 
scientifically and theologically-minded multiverse theorists. First, I will engage with Robin 
Collins, who is a prominent philosophical advocate of the plausibility of multiverse theory. I 
will suggest that he overlooks the importance of diversity in Thomistic metaphysics in his 
treatment of the multiverse hypothesis. I will then apply this Thomistic notion of diversity to 
the string theory landscape proposal, a multiverse theory in which diversity is central. Next, I 
will consider Don Page’s multiverse thought, which (in common with Collins) is 
insufficiently metaphysical and which (also like Collins) regards string theory as expressing 
the beauty of cosmic multiplicity. I will demonstrate that Aquinas’s metaphysical notion of 
beauty, an important aspect of his participatory thought, would strengthen Page’s own 
concepts of God and creation. Finally, I will provide a response to multiverse theorist 
Bernard Carr’s image of the cosmic uroborus. I will propose that Aquinas’s theological circle 
of being more adequately conveys the unity and purpose of a cosmos that shares in God’s 
existence than Carr’s strictly cosmological model. 
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3.1   Thomistic Participation: General Overview 
 
In this section, I will provide a general overview of the purpose and nature of Aquinas’s 
participatory metaphysics, which he develops to explain the relationship between the 
diversity of creation and the unity of God’s perfect being, or the many and the one. 
 
After introductory comments, I will trace the development of his participatory thought with 
reference to five key texts, considered in chronological order. First, I will examine the three 
modes of participation outlined by Aquinas in his exposition on Boethius’s De 
Hebdomadibus, with particular focus on the third mode of causal participation, which 
expresses the God-creation relationship. Second, I will focus on his explication in Book I of 
Summa Contra Gentiles of the causal mode of participation governing God’s relationship 
with creation. Third, I will discuss the role of participation in Aquinas’s doctrine of creation, 
as expressed in the first article of Summa Theologiae I.44. Fourth and fifth, I will assess his 
notions of participation and reception in De Spiritualibus Creaturis and De Substantiis 
Separatis, respectively. This will provide a representative illustration of Aquinas’s vision of 
the participatory structure of the cosmos, while also serving as a useful basis from which to 
engage with multiverse theories in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
For Aquinas, as for Plato, participation represents an attempt to solve the fundamental 
metaphysical problem of the one and the many. This problem calls for an explanation to the 
paradox that many and varied beings exist within the cosmos, yet also seem to share in 
existence and together embody a community or commonality of beings, often referred to as 
reality. In other words, there is an immense multiplicity and diversity of beings and at the 
same time some kind of bond of unity among them. As such, reality appears to be both one 
and many. As discussed in the previous chapter, Plato interprets this common attribute as 
unity or goodness, deriving from an intelligible source (the absolute One or the Good) that 
exists beyond being. Aquinas, though, is not just concerned with the intelligibility of beings, 
but the reason for the existence of beings at all.
276
 In his vision, the unity among created 
beings arises from their diverse participations in the perfection of God, who is the ultimate 
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source and act of existence. Thus, in W. Norris Clarke’s excellent formulation, Thomistic 
participation is ‘a structure or order of relationship between beings such that they share in 
various degrees of fullness in some positive property or perfection common to them all, as 
received from the same source: all finite beings participate in existence from God.’277 
Participation in Aquinas, then, is deeply concerned with creation and its motive and purpose, 
and may in that sense be distinguished from the Platonic emphasis on the intelligibility and 
identity of things. 
 
To understand the metaphysical foundation on which Aquinas develops participation as a 
way of reconciling the one and the many, it is crucial to appreciate his distinction between 
essence and existence.
278
 Whereas Plato frequently describes participation in terms of 
essences, Aquinas focuses on the act of existence as paramount. The question of what 
something is (its essence) thereby becomes subordinate to the question of why something is 
(its existence). To consider what something is, is not the same (and in fact not as 
fundamental) as affirming that it exists in a given way. The essence (or the ‘what’) of a thing 
is distinct from the fact of its existence. For example, the essence of a flower that exists and 
the essence of one that does not exist are equivalent; the flower’s existence is therefore 
distinct from what kind of a thing it is. There must be something different between these 
essences or ideas of flowers, and the real flowers that share in the common act of existence. 
As Aquinas suggests, the question of a thing’s essence ‘follows on the question of its 
existence.’279 Existence, then, is prior to essence, and is that which allows essence to be. 
Aquinas uses the Latin esse (to be) to give expression to this act of being.  
 
In the early sections of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas describes the manner in which all 
created beings are composed of essence and existence, the first of which is the particular 
manner or mode in which a thing exists, and the second of which is the act by which a thing 
actually exists. If the essence and existence of a thing are different, its existence must be 
caused either by its own essential principles, or by some exterior agent. Since a thing (or its 
essential principles) cannot be the sufficient cause of its own existence, Aquinas argues that 
its existence must be caused by God. By contrast, God, as the first efficient cause, cannot be 
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caused by another, and ‘therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from 
His essence.’280 In God alone, essence and existence are synonymous, and this is what 
accounts for the difference between creator and creation.
281
  
 
For Aquinas, the link between the essence-existence distinction and participation is vital. He 
fully integrates this distinction in his participatory metaphysical scheme. All essence-
existence composites (that is, all created beings whose cause of existence is external) 
participate in existence. Each being receives existence through participation in the perfect 
existence of God. The essence of each being describes the manner in which it receives its 
existence. In this sense, the cosmos consists of diverse and limited participations of all beings 
in the central perfection of existence. The question of why we exist (as well as the particular 
form in which this is expressed) finds its answer in the participatory structure of essence and 
existence in the universe: ‘just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by 
participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation.’282 
In fact, our existence can be thought of in participatory terms as a gift from, or act of sharing 
by, God. Existence itself is a gift received from the fullness of God’s existence, according to 
the diverse limitations and capacities of the recipients. The unity of existence (the ‘oneness’ 
of reality) in the diverse participations of limited beings (the ‘manyness’ of reality) follows 
from the fullness of God’s existence that is freely and generously shared throughout creation. 
 
In this sense, Thomistic participation seeks to reconcile the one and the many with a 
metaphysical structure by which God, the ultimate source of all being, shares the fullness of 
his existence with many other created beings, according to their own limited degrees (or 
essences). As a consequence, our very existence (or ‘act of being’) is wholly dependent upon 
the principle from which it is produced. Creation is therefore ‘a kind of relation’283 and 
participation expresses the radical dependence of the created act of being (finite existence) on 
God (the central perfection of existence). It is by virtue of God’s being that all others come to 
be a particular mode. The sharing of God’s existence among diverse creaturely participants 
illustrates how divine unity can produce temporal diversity, and the metaphysical dependence 
of the many on the one. This view of the creature participating in the creator, entailing the 
radical dependence of all things on God, will be the aspect of Aquinas’s participatory thought 
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upon which this chapter focuses. However, it is not the only kind of participation described 
by Aquinas, and it would therefore be useful initially to consider his early threefold 
classification of participation. 
 
In light of this background, I will now consider five texts from different periods in Aquinas’s 
career to provide a sense of the development of his treatment of metaphysical participation. 
By examining the texts in chronological order, it will be shown that participation comes to 
occupy a central place in his thought. Although the idea of participation, in the sense of 
created effects produced by a first cause, is present early in his writing, it is systematically 
expressed in the Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae, and continues to be 
developed thereafter. While he clearly inherits participatory ways of thought from Plato, he 
develops his own vision of participation to express the dependence of creation on God as its 
perfect first cause. 
 
3.1 In De Hebdomadibus 
 
In his commentary on Boethius’s early sixth-century text De Hebdomadibus, Aquinas defines 
participation and provides a threefold classification of different modes of participation. 
Although there is considerable uncertainty regarding the date of his commentary,
284
 it is 
worth focusing on this text as a starting point for assessing the development of Aquinas’s 
participatory thought, since it likely represents his first systematic reflection on the subject.  
 
Boethius is concerned with the relationship between participation and substantiality. In spite 
of the short length of the discussion, and its somewhat unsatisfactory conclusion, this is a 
question of profound importance to the Christian participatory account of the distinction 
between creator and creation. Ostensibly, there might seem to be conflict between 
participation (the idea that something can be explained by something else) and substantiality 
(the idea that something is inherently and self-sufficiently intelligible). To illustrate this 
apparent conflict, Boethius considers the question of whether things are good by participation 
or by substance. If things are good by participation, ‘they are in no wise good in 
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themselves.’285 Yet if things are good by substance, they would be good in themselves and 
therefore all things would be equivalent to God, which he dismisses as an ‘impious’ notion.286 
Instead, he proposes that things are good ‘simply because their existence has derived from the 
will of the good.’287 Since this is a kind of received being, things can be good while 
remaining distinct from the first good (God) from which they are derived.  
 
In his commentary on Boethius’s text, Aquinas seeks to demonstrate that participation and 
substantiality need not be opposites. He begins his discussion of participation with an 
etymological definition: ‘For “to participate” is, as it were, “to grasp a part.”’288 He explains 
that participation is when something receives ‘in a particular way that which belongs to 
another in a universal way.’289 In this sense, something can be said to participate in a given 
perfection or quality when it possesses that perfection or quality in a partial or specific 
manner. Since the subject is not identical to the perfection in which it participates, it is 
possible for other subjects to participate in the same perfection in different ways. 
 
With this preliminary definition in mind, Aquinas proceeds to outline three different modes 
of participation. First, he describes what is often called ‘logical’ participation, which 
describes the relationship between species, genus, and individual. He refers to the way in 
which humans are said to participate in animal because humans do not possess the 
‘intelligible structure’ of animal in its ‘total commonality’.290 In a similar way, he notes that 
Socrates ‘participates’ in human. Thus, there is a participatory relationship between the 
individual and species (Socrates and man) and between species and genus (man and animal). 
Socrates, while sharing in what it means to be a man in his own particular way, is not 
identical with the ‘commonality’ of all other men, just as humans, while sharing in some 
common nature of animal, do not embody the full extent of animal. Socrates is not strictly 
identical to human, and human is not strictly identical to animal, and this distinction enables 
participation to be applied to the logical relations of species, genus, and individual. Given his 
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focus on defining relations between different categories, Aquinas does not seem to be 
granting ontological weight to this first mode of logical participation. 
 
Second, Aquinas describes the participatory relationship between subject and accident, and 
matter and form. He notes that subject may participate in accident, and matter in form, 
‘because a substantial form, or an accidental one, which is common by virtue of its own 
intelligible structure, is determined to this or that subject.’291 In this mode of participation, the 
subject receives (and thus participates in) an accidental or substantial form in its own partial 
and particular way. This means that a form can be shared in by many different subjects, 
though in each matter-form composite, the participated perfection is restricted according to 
the way in which it is received. This second mode of participation is often called 
‘ontological’ participation, since it is concerned with real composition, whereas the first 
mode refers only to logical explanation. 
 
Here, it is worth noting that Boethius uses the term ‘participation’ in the sense of this second 
mode of participation, whereby a subject is said to participate in an accident. He refers to 
qualities such as whiteness, heaviness, and rotundity, all of which are accidental (or 
additional) properties that are not the same as the ‘particular substance’ of a subject.292 This 
view of participation is the basis for his assumption that participation and substantiality are in 
conflict. Since, as he believes, to participate is to share in accidental properties, the term 
cannot be applied to the substantial being of a subject. Thus, participation involves the 
accidental characteristics of a participant, and not its substance. In response, Aquinas applies 
participation to the being of the substance, such that things are good by participation and 
have being by participation.
293
 This implies the essence-existence distinction noted earlier 
and discussed further below. 
 
Third, and of particular relevance to this chapter, Aquinas describes what might be called 
‘causal’ participation, whereby an effect participates in its cause, especially when the effect is 
not equal to the power of its cause. He illustrates this mode of participation with the image of 
the air participating in the sun, ‘because it does not receive that light with the brilliance it has 
                                                          
291
 Aquinas, On the Hebdomads of Boethius, 2.78-80. 
292
 Boethius, De Hebdomadibus, 101-105. 
293
 ‘And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; [Plato] called God the absolute good, from 
whom all things are called good by way of participation.’ ST I.6.4. 
99 
 
in the sun.’294 By this analogy he means that the sunlight is less present in the air than it is in 
the sun itself, so we might say that the air receives (or shares in) the light in a diminished or 
partial way, whereas it would be fully and perfectly present in the sun. This is consistent with 
Aquinas’s initial definition of participation whereby something (the air) receives in a 
particular way that which belongs (the light) to another (the sun) in a universal way. 
 
Although this third mode of causal participation is not considered any further in Aquinas’s 
commentary on Boethius, it is extremely significant for his doctrine of creation. Just as the air 
receives sunlight to a lesser degree than the sun itself, created beings participate in esse in the 
way in which an effect participates in a higher order cause. Created beings receive (and 
participate in) esse, the act of existence, from the fullness of God’s being. The effect (or 
created being) receives its being in a partial and limited manner, not in the full and 
undiminished way of its cause. At the same time, the effect resembles and bears a likeness to 
its cause, proceeding from the cause according to some intelligible pattern. 
 
With this causal mode of participation, informed by the essence-existence distinction, 
Aquinas can relate the simplicity and unity of God with the diversity and complexity of 
creation. Unlike God, in whom essence and existence coincide, all created beings receive 
their existence by participation in God, so that their essence and existence are distinct.
295
 
Created beings share in or participate in existence from God, not according to Boethius’s 
unsatisfactory model, but in a fundamental pattern of metaphysical causality in which 
participation expresses the dependence of all things on God, such that the existence of the 
cause accounts for the existence (and nature) of all its effects. This is not so much a case of 
Platonic formal causality, but a sharing of God’s fullness of being throughout the created 
order, or a ‘communication of being’.296  
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3.1.2 Summa Contra Gentiles 
 
In his Summa Contra Gentiles, likely composed shortly after his commentary on Boethius’s 
De Hebdomadibus,
297
 Aquinas continues to define and develop his participatory metaphysics, 
particularly in terms of the third mode of causal participation governing the relationship 
between God and creation. The text is rich with participatory language and gives deeper 
expression and explication to some of the participatory insights in his relatively brief critique 
of Boethius. While there are dozens of chapters within the four books of the text that address 
participation, it will be sufficient for the purposes of this section to consider some 
representative examples from Book One, in which he considers the sense in which an effect 
might be said to participate in its cause, and the implications for this mode of causal 
participation for the relationship between God and creation. 
 
In Book One, Chapter 29, Aquinas considers the likeness of creatures to God in a manner that 
follows clearly from the third mode of causal participation. As noted earlier, an effect can be 
said to participate in its cause in the sense that it shares some similarity with the cause that 
produced it. This similarity expresses the relationship between cause and effect such that the 
nature of the former can be known with reference to the latter. Aquinas applies this causal 
participatory framework to the relationship between God and creation, which is an instance of 
an effect participating in a higher order cause. He explains that, even the case of effects that 
fall short of their causes, ‘some likeness must be found between them’ since causes produce 
similar effects.
298
 As such, the form of an effect will be found in some measure in a 
transcending cause (such as God), but ‘according to another mode and another way.’299 
Whereas Aquinas uses sunlight to illustrate causal participation in his commentary on 
Boethius, in this chapter he alludes to the heat generated by the sun, which bears some 
likeness among sublunary bodies to the active power of the sun itself, although not in the 
same way. The sun is therefore somewhat like the things in which it produces effects, but also 
unlike these things, which only possess heat in a limited way: ‘So, too, God gave things all 
their perfections and thereby is both like and unlike all of them.’300 
                                                          
297
 Wippel dates its composition to 1259-1264/65, which is in line with the general scholarly consensus.  
298
 SCG I.29.2. 
299
 SCG I.29.2. The notion of a cause producing a similar effect is also made in Book Two: ‘For every agent that 
produces an effect in participation of its own form intends to produce its own likeness in that effect. Thus, to 
produce the creature in participation of His own goodness was becoming to God’s will, for by its likeness to 
Him the creature might show forth His goodness.’ SCG II.35.8. 
300
 SCG I.29.2. 
101 
 
 
Aquinas refers to the limited reception of participated perfections as ‘diminished 
participation’.301 The effect receives (or participates in) a perfection that is found perfectly in 
God. It has, albeit in a partial and diminished way, ‘what belongs to God’ and is thereby like 
God.
302
 While we might say that an effect is like its cause (or a creature is like God), the 
converse is not true, since the perfection belongs to God, not the creature. God is not like the 
creature, just as we do not suppose that a woman is like her image on a computer screen. In 
this way, the likeness each creature bears of God is deficient, falling short of what belongs to 
God, though sufficiently similar for the intelligible connection between God and creature to 
be identified. Aquinas’s notion of diminished participation not only expresses the deficient 
way in which creation bears a likeness to its cause, but also the way in which creation is as 
diverse and manifold as its cause is unified and simple. The (divine) cause is one, but the 
(creaturely) effects it produces are many.
303
 
 
Later in Book One, Aquinas continues to explore the way in which the causal participatory 
relationship between God and creation results in a created order of enormous diversity and 
multiplicity. The things made by God, the created participants, receive ‘in a divided and 
particular way that which in Him is found in a simple and universal way.’304 To the extent 
that a participant might share in divine goodness or beauty, it is not according to the same 
‘mode of being’ as God,305 but only according to the particular mode of the participant, and 
so the participated perfection is only ‘possessed in a partial way’.306 Given the vast inequality 
between creation and God, it is only possible for creation, in its totality, to bear a likeness to 
God through radical diversity. It is precisely because created things are imperfect 
representations of divine being that there are many different such representations, or 
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participants.
307
 Creation, then, is inescapably diverse and varied, and this is a natural 
consequence of the kind of causal participatory relationship that it shares with God. 
 
3.1.3 Summa Theologiae 
 
In his Summa Theologiae, composed between 1265 and 1268, Aquinas reiterates and refines 
many of the participatory ideas outlined in his Summa Contra Gentiles. In particular, he 
presents in I.44.1 what might be considered his participatory account of creation. The concept 
of participation is fundamental to his account of the relationship between God and creation, 
as well as the inherent diversity of creation by virtue of the diverse participations of created 
beings in God’s being.  
 
Aquinas’s participatory view of creation follows from his understanding of God as ‘self-
subsisting being’, the first cause of all being which subsists by itself and is thereby 
distinguished from all other beings. To illustrate this, he refers back to an earlier section of 
the Summa in which he presents three arguments for the coincidence of essence and existence 
in God.
308
 First, if the essence and existence of a thing are different, its existence must be 
caused by its own essential principles or some exterior agent. Since God is the ‘first efficient 
cause’, his existence cannot be caused by another, and so His essence and existence cannot be 
different. Second, he argues that existence (which makes every form or nature actual) may be 
compared to essence as actuality is to potentiality. Since in God there is no potentiality, it 
follows that his essence and existence are equivalent. Third, he makes the participatory claim 
that something aflame ‘has’ fire but is not itself fire and is on fire by participation. Likewise, 
we ‘have’ existence from God, but we are not existence itself, and we exist by participation. 
Since God cannot be participated being, He must be his own existence and not just His own 
essence. 
 
In addition to being self-subsisting, God is also one. Again, he refers back to an earlier 
section in which a threefold argument for God’s oneness is presented.309 First, God’s essence 
belongs to God alone, and cannot be communicated to many. There cannot be many Gods in 
the same way that what makes a man a particular man is only communicable to one. Second, 
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the perfections of all things are in God, whereas if many Gods existed they would be different 
and thus not each able to contain all such perfections. Third, the unity of creation suggests the 
prior existence of one ordering being, since ‘many are reduced into one order by one better 
than by many’.310 This first and most perfect cause, which reduces all diverse things into one 
order, is God. 
 
Having established the self-subsistence and unity of God, Aquinas outlines his argument that 
all of creation is dependent upon and participates in God: 
 
It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is 
found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs 
essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire… all beings apart from God are not their 
own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which 
are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, 
are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.
311
 
 
While stated concisely, this is a complex piece of reasoning, expressing Aquinas’s 
fundamental participatory conviction. For the purposes of this introductory section, it will be 
useful to make three general observations. First, this passage contains what might be thought 
of as Aquinas’s participation principle. If a perfection or characteristic is found in any created 
thing, it cannot be explained by reference to the thing itself. Instead, it must be caused in it by 
that to which it belongs essentially, and which is the perfection itself, without any need for 
further explanation. In Aquinas’s somewhat abstruse example, the cause of the characteristic 
of being aflame is not to be found within the iron, but with reference to fire itself: the iron has 
fire, but is not itself fire. By this principle, all created things have being by participation in 
God, who is being.
312
 This principle applies not only to participation in existence, but all 
other perfections, such as beauty. Thus, when beauty is found in a created thing, its beauty 
cannot be explained by the thing itself, but must be caused in it by beauty itself, which is 
God, whose beauty does not require any explanation. The created thing has beauty from God, 
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and may participate in and embody beauty in its own limited way according to its own 
essence. 
 
Second, Aquinas’s argument illustrates the way in which the perfect unity of self-subsisting 
divine being produces many created beings. If God is the cause of all things, it follows that 
such things are different and distinct from God and may therefore be defined as not God. If 
God is the very act of being and all other beings are only beings by participation, this might 
be thought to imply a negation of being as it relates to creation.
313
 Yet this would be to 
overlook the positive force of Aquinas’s participatory account of creation. His conception of 
a self-subsisting, perfectly simple God entails the existence of other created beings who must 
necessarily be distinct from being itself. This distinction, or division, between the multiplicity 
of created being and the unity of being itself is a matter of participation: created being 
participates in being received from God. The ostensibly ‘negative’ sense in which created 
being is necessarily not its own being is therefore subordinate to the fundamental and positive 
participatory insight that beings have being (and perfections and qualities) from God. 
 
Third, Aquinas’s creation argument establishes the centrality of participation in terms of 
creation. He suggests not only that all beings apart from God are not their own being, but also 
that they are beings by participation. Although he moves quickly from the first idea that 
things are not identical with their being to the second idea that they participate in divine 
being, upon reflection it can be seen that the former implies the latter. As distinct from God 
and without their own being, all created things clearly share something in common: 
participation in God’s being. This participatory condition distinguishes beings from God, but 
it also distinguishes beings from each other, since this common source of being is 
participated in diverse ways. 
 
3.1.4 De Spiritualibus Creaturis 
 
In Article 1 of this text, composed between 1267 and 1268, Aquinas—in the course of 
rejecting matter-form composition of purely spiritual creatures—provides additional insight 
into the nature of participation and reception. He proceeds from the basis that God, as the 
‘first being’ and ‘infinite act’, contains the entire fullness of being, which is not limited to any 
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specific nature.
314
 God’s existence is thus not an existence that is received by some nature 
which is not its own existence, otherwise it would be limited to that nature. As such, God is 
identical with his own existence, which cannot be said of any other being. To illustrate that 
this existence is also self-subsisting and one, Aquinas notes that it would be incoherent for a 
perfection such as whiteness to exist as many separate whitenesses, and that only one 
‘whiteness’ can be apart from every subject and recipient. 
 
As a consequence, every created being, as distinct from God, is not its own existence but ‘has 
an existence that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted.’315 
This means that a participated perfection is received in a limited way, according to the nature 
of that which receives it. In terms of participation, Aquinas highlights the consequent 
distinction between the nature of the thing that participates in existence and the participated 
existence itself. He makes an analogy between the relation of act to potency and the relation 
of the participated existence and the nature (or specific thing) participating in it. Again, this 
underlines the point that there is a distinction between essence and existence in created 
beings, whereby the essence of each being receives and limits acts of existence in which the 
being participates.  
 
3.1.5 De Substantiis Separatis 
 
In Chapter VIII of this text, composed after 1271, Aquinas responds to Avicebron, an 11
th
 
century Jewish philosopher inspired by Neoplatonism. According to Avicebron’s doctrine of 
the universality of matter, all created things are composed of matter and form, including 
angels. Aquinas, though, contends that spiritual substances are immaterial, though they are 
still distinct from God, in whose perfect existence they share. In every other being other than 
the First Being, there is both the act of existence and the specific mode that receives this 
existence.
316
 Anything that participates in being from the First Being does so in ‘a particular 
way, according to a certain determinate mode of being.’317 He adds that spiritual substances 
participate in God’s existence according to their own essence, so that their being is ‘not 
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infinite but finite.’318 All created beings, including spiritual beings, can only participate in 
God’s being in the way that their own limited essences will allow. The finitude of created 
essences ensures that creaturely participation will itself be necessarily finite and partial. 
 
3.1.6 Summary 
 
As this section indicates, Aquinas’s metaphysical work is shot through with participatory 
themes. His central belief is that creation is not self-standing, but exists by virtue of 
participation in God. Creation participates in God and only exists in relation to God. 
Everything exists by sharing in God’s existence, just as we might say that things are warm 
not because of any warmth that is proper to them, but because they participate in the sun’s 
warming light. Participation defines and governs the diverse ways in which different beings 
in a complex cosmic order can share in God’s existence, which is graciously and freely 
donated, and which is the only thing holding everything else in existence. 
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3.2  Robin Collins on Diversity 
 
In this section, I will examine the American philosopher of religion Robin Collins’s work on 
the compatibility of theism with multiverse thought. While this project represents a welcome 
alternative to the unease with which theologians often discuss multiverse thought, I will argue 
that his analytical approach overlooks the metaphysical aspects of the scientific and 
theological questions with which he is concerned. In addition to his engagement with 
multiverse theories, Collins has also argued for the plausibility of multiple incarnations in the 
context of a universe with extraterrestrial intelligent life. I will highlight his tentative 
treatment of diversity in Thomistic metaphysics in this argument, and I will argue that this 
vision of a diverse creation should be considered more extensively in terms of engagement 
with the multiverse hypothesis. Finally, I will suggest that the diversity inherent in Thomistic 
participatory metaphysics can be brought into mutual constructive interaction with multiverse 
thought, with specific reference to the diversity of environments entailed in string theory. 
 
3.2.1 Collins on Multiverses and the Incarnation 
 
In recent years, Collins has emerged as one of the leading proponents of constructive 
theological engagement with the multiverse hypothesis. In Bernard Carr’s multiverse volume, 
which is mostly given over to scientific discussions in which theology is largely viewed as 
irrelevant or simply false, Collins takes an explicitly theological approach to the multiverse 
hypothesis. Among these contributors and many others, the multiverse hypothesis is often 
advanced as an alternative to a divinely designed single universe. Against this consensus, 
Collins argues that not only is the multiverse hypothesis compatible with theism, but that 
contemporary physics and cosmology could be understood to suggest a theistic explanation of 
the universe (or multiverse). As such, he contends that theists might be inclined to prefer a 
multiverse over a single universe. 
 
Collins assumes a standard ‘Anselmian’ conception of God, whereby God is defined as ‘the 
greatest possible being’, although he allows that even a minimal hypothesis of God as some 
sort of highly powerful and intelligent agent, responsible for the existence of the universe, 
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would be sufficient for his argument.
319
 Given this basic idea of God of as infinitely powerful 
and creative, he believes that it would make sense for creation to reflect these attributes such 
that ‘physical reality might be larger than one universe.’320 To the extent that Western 
theology has not stressed the idea that the universe is infinite, he insists that this is due to 
historical factors (such as the influence of Aristotelian metaphysics) rather than anything 
intrinsically connected to the idea of God as infinitely creative. Like many other historians of 
multiverse thought, he identifies Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno as key figures in the 
emergence of the ‘positive suggestion’ that space is infinite, ‘with perhaps an infinity of 
worlds.’321 He believes that this  theological justification for a multiverse scenario has been 
strengthened by recent developments in cosmology and particle physics, which have shown 
that the visible part of the universe is vastly larger than previously assumed: ‘Thus, it makes 
sense that this trend will continue and physical reality will be found to be much larger than a 
single universe.’322 
 
Furthermore, Collins argues that an infinitely creative God might create many universes via 
‘some sort of universe generator’, since this would be ‘somewhat more elegant and 
ingenious’ than creating such universes ex nihilo.323 To the potential objection that this would 
be an inefficient way to proceed, he offers the conception of God as an artist with a creation 
motive of expressing infinite creativity and ingenuity, rather than an engineer narrowly 
concerned with efficiency.
324
 With this analogy of God as creative artist, Collins is (perhaps 
intentionally) echoing the Thomistic depiction of creation as artificiatum divinae artis, or an 
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artistic product of divine workmanship.
325
 Yet invoking a universe generator as an 
explanation of fine-tuning does not avoid the suggestion of design, since such a process 
would still need to be designed in such a way as to provide for the creation of life-sustaining 
domains. At this point, Collins appeals to the beauty and elegance of the laws of nature as an 
explanation for the fine-tuning disclosed by modern physics. Given his classical conception 
of God as the greatest possible being, and hence with a perfect aesthetic sense of creativity 
and ingenuity, he concludes that it is unsurprising that we inhabit a cosmos of ‘great subtlety 
and beauty at the fundamental level.’326 Instead of negating the need for God, then, the 
multiverse hypothesis is more explicable in Collins’s model of an infinitely creative artist 
whose creation motive is expressed in the immensity, beauty, and rationality of the cosmos. 
 
Although Collins describes the way in which an infinitely creative God might produce an 
infinite and intelligible cosmos, he does not explicitly address the diversity of the cosmos that 
is so central to multiverse theories, nor how this diversity might follow from the nature of 
God. This is a particularly curious oversight in light of his consideration of cosmic diversity 
in the context of a related question regarding extraterrestrial intelligence and the incarnation. 
In Klaas J. Kraay’s recent collection of theological essays on multiverse thought, Collins 
argues for the plausibility of an ‘enormous number of races’ of embodied conscious agents 
that are causally isolated from humans in different parts of the universe.
327
 God is perfectly 
good, and wishes to create a reality that realises value. If the existence of humans positively 
contributes to the value of reality, then presumably other conscious agents would add value, 
and so Collins concludes that the best of all possible realities would contain an ‘infinite 
number’ of such races.328 Given the possibility of so many other races, it is highly likely that 
a very large number of them would be fallen while highly unlikely that ours would be the 
only one in which God became incarnate. Through the dubious mechanism of the Bayes’s 
theorem of the probability calculus, Collins estimates that the probability for the human race 
being the only one in which God became incarnate is ‘about one in a million’, suggesting a 
vast number of other incarnations.
329
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Apart from his analytical arguments, it is noteworthy that Collins also includes a reference to 
a distinctly participatory passage on the diversity of creation from Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologiae, though he does not specify the part of the text from which he quotes: 
 
For [God] brought things into being in order that His goodness might be 
communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness 
could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and 
diverse creatures… For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is 
manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine 
goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.
330
 
 
This participatory account of the diversity of creation not only merits further consideration in 
the immediate context of Collins’s argument for multiple incarnations, but it would also be 
extremely valuable to his theological case for the multiverse hypothesis, particularly in light 
of the diversity and complexity inherent in multiverse theories. Ironically, the Thomistic 
metaphysics of diversity identified by Collins in his essay on incarnations would strengthen 
his argument in his essay on multiverses, in which the relationship between God and creation 
is considered in a relatively basic manner. His effort to reconcile God and the multiverse 
would be assisted with a closer attention to Aquinas’s participatory metaphysics, specifically 
as it relates to cosmic diversity, which will be the focus of the next section. 
 
3.2.2 Aquinas on Cosmic Diversity 
 
As illustrated by the creation argument in the Summa Theologiae (I.44) and discussed earlier 
in Chapter 3.1.3, Aquinas holds that all created beings are beings by participation. The 
diversity of creation is a consequence of the diverse participation of beings in God, the First 
Being who possesses being most perfectly. Participation therefore assumes the primacy and 
perfection of the One, from which the diversity of all other (less perfect) beings is derived. 
Given Collins’s oblique reference to Thomistic metaphysical diversity, which he elects 
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neither to examine closely nor to apply to his multiverse thesis, it would be worth focusing on 
Aquinas’s claim that reality is diverse by virtue of diverse participation in divine being. This 
vision of cosmic diversity will then be applied to specific multiverse theories in 
contemporary cosmology in the following section. 
 
For Aquinas, for beings to be distinguished from God as self-subsisting being implies 
multiplication of created being. Paradoxically, it is precisely in what things share in 
common—their participation in divine being—that they may be distinguished from each 
other as diverse parts of creation. Diversity is part of the metaphysical structure of the cosmos 
because of each thing’s diverse participation in being. The whole universe (or, perhaps, 
multiverse) can be seen as diverse and limited participations in God’s perfect existence. Each 
being shares in God’s being according to its own limited capacity or essence.331 As such, 
each being is distinct from God in its own diverse way, and may be thought to stand in its 
own relation to God, according to the extent to which it exemplifies the perfection of God’s 
being.
332
 Diversity, then, is a fundamental characteristic of the created order, reflecting the 
diverse participation of many beings in the same perfect source of existence, on which all of 
creation depends.  
 
In addition, the diversity of creation is inherent in the specific mode of causal participation 
described earlier in this chapter. Each created effect participates in its cause, but only in a 
limited and imperfect fashion, ‘by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and 
defective’.333 This mode of causal participation, by which effects bear a partial likeness to the 
cause by which they were produced, shows that the perfection, simplicity, and unity of God 
can only be represented by way of diversity and multiplicity in creation. The diminished or 
deficient way in which creatures participate in God represents a divided representation of 
what is undivided in God. In basic terms, creation is diverse while God is unified and simple. 
Creation is thus a riotous composition of diverse participants, each sharing in the fullness of 
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God’s being and distinct from one another according to the degree to which they approximate 
this perfect being.
334
 
 
While the diverse way in which finite beings share in the infinite fullness of being might be 
regarded as indicative of a cosmos that is unruly and disordered and therefore accidental or 
unintentional, it should be remembered that Thomistic participation expresses the 
‘multiplicity of an intelligible order.’335 In negative terms, we might think that participation 
expresses the diminished way in which divine similitude is present in created being. The 
more positive corollary is that the diversity and multiplicity of creation is an intentional and 
inherent consequence of this metaphysical structure. As First Being, God brings into being a 
diverse creation with many participants who occupy their own place according to their own 
being, of which God has full knowledge. This being so, creation should not just be thought of 
in terms of deficient effects that fall short of the perfection of the cause, but as diverse by 
necessity, since imperfect effects may only represent God’s perfection in a multitude of 
diverse ways. Aquinas explains that created effects do not imitate God perfectly, but only to 
the extent that they are able. This imitation may be defective, but that is ‘precisely because 
what is simple and one, can only be represented by diverse things.’336 This sense of the 
intentionality and intelligibility of cosmic diversity fits well with Collins’s conception of God 
as the purposive creator of a vast and complex multiverse ensemble.
337
 
 
In addition to ascribing purpose and intention to God’s infinitely creative power, Collins also 
describes God as an artist, seeking to maximise value and goodness in creation. In light of 
Aquinas’s participatory metaphysics, we might add that the intelligible diversity in creation is 
suggestive of a work of art: ‘by His wisdom He is the cause of diverse things as known by 
Him, even as an artificer, by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.’338 
Creation, as the product of divine workmanship, embodies the perfection of its cause, albeit 
in the distinct and diverse participations of its constituent parts. Indeed, Collins’s observation 
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that an artist ‘with infinite power and materials available would not necessarily care much 
about efficiency’339 is consistent with the kind of cosmic diversity in multiverse thought that 
might seem wasteful or inefficient but is, properly understood, the only way in which 
imperfect beings might represent a diminished likeness of what is simple and one in God. 
 
3.2.3 String Theory Landscape 
 
Having considered Collins’s argument for the compatibility of God and the multiverse, which 
would be strengthened by reference to the diversity in Thomistic participatory metaphysics 
that he mentions elsewhere but does not apply to the multiverse, I will now suggest some 
ways in which this notion of diversity might be aligned with a multiverse theory in which 
diversity is paramount, specifically the string theory landscape proposal. This has been the 
subject of significant scientific attention in recent years, with its development prompting 
particle physicists to take an interest in the multiverse proposal. Given that string theory 
implies an immensely diverse landscape of different universes, perhaps as many as 10
500
, it 
will be a suitable model to bring into interaction with the notion of cosmic diversity in 
Collins and Aquinas.
340
 
 
It will be remembered from Chapter 1 that Tegmark’s multiverse hierarchy constitutes a four-
level order of theories of physics, ‘allowing progressively greater diversity’.341 So the Level 
II multiverse will be more diverse than the Level I multiverse, since it not only includes 
domains with different initial conditions, but also physical constants and dimensionality. 
Tegmark believes that string theory may offer a ‘specific realization’ of the Level II 
multiverse.
342
 In string theory, which is viewed by physicists such as Stephen Hawking to be 
the closest account to an accurate description of the universe, the fundamental objects that 
give rise to elementary particles are one-dimensional strings, not the point-like particles of 
elementary physics. String theory suggests that there are actually ten or eleven dimensions, 
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with some of the higher dimensions ‘compactified’ and thus beyond direct human experience. 
As detailed in Chapter 1, this compactification leads Tegmark to propose four sub-levels of 
increasing diversity: IIa with the same effective laws but different post-inflationary bubbles; 
IIb with different laws according to supergravity (a type of quantum theory concerning the 
interactions of elementary particles); IIc with different ‘fluxes’ (magnetic fields) that stabilise 
extra dimensions; and IId with different compactifications and dimensionality, different 
symmetries, and different elementary particles. 
 
According to Leonard Susskind’s influential string landscape model, there is likely to be an 
immense number of string theory vacuum states, each associated with a different universe 
within a large multiverse. He believes that the radical cosmic diversity entailed in string 
theory is, if anything, currently underestimated, as he expects the actual number of string 
vacua to be ‘astronomical, measured not in millions or billions but in googles or 
googleplexes.’343 He concludes that string theory provides a natural explanation of the fine-
tuning of our own universe, which becomes much less surprising in the context of such an 
immense diversity of other universes across the landscape.
344
 Moreover, he maintains that 
string theory provides a framework in which the anthropic principle can be studied in a 
‘rigorous way’, with quantitative information able to be extracted in terms of determining the 
number of vacua with given properties, such as the cosmological constant.
345
 Against string 
theory critics, he maintains that string theory has provided a robust testing ground for 
important cosmological ideas, including some of his other radical theories concerning the 
status of information in black holes.
346
 
 
At this point, we might observe three ways in which the diversity of string theory might be 
regarded as a modern scientific expression of the cosmic diversity that is central to Aquinas’s 
participatory creation account. First, Aquinas’s notion that what is simple and one in God can 
only be represented by diverse being in creation is given powerful scientific articulation by 
the immense scale of the many universes associated with string theory landscape. If the 
fullness of God’s being can only be expressed in diverse participations, then this would be 
especially true of a landscape in which the scope for such participations is exponentially 
higher. Such an expansive landscape might provide an even stronger intimation of divine 
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plenitude. As string theory proponent Brian Greene notes, each elementary particle in the 
cosmos may consist of a single string. The particles are distinguished because their respective 
strings undergo different vibrational patterns. Different elementary particles may thus be seen 
as different ‘notes’ on a fundamental string. To extend the musical imagery, he explains that 
the universe, composed of an enormous number of vibrating strings is ‘akin to a cosmic 
symphony’.347 This symphonic metaphor might remind us of Aquinas’s description of 
creation as an artistic product of divine workmanship, an outpouring of the fullness of God 
into a variety of created things (or strings), each reflecting God’s fullness in its own way.348 
 
Second, the string theory landscape, in its tremendous diversity, represents the many ways in 
which created being might imitate and participate in God. Given the necessity for imperfect 
created things to participate in the perfection of God in diverse ways, it seems that creation is 
like a vast distribution or communication of the fullness of God’s perfection. In Susskind’s 
account of the string theory landscape, the outlines of creation are strikingly varied and 
characterised in ways that would be applicable to the geography of our own world (while 
acknowledging that these approximations may break down given the complexity of the 
landscape and the speculative nature of the string theory enterprise). Some parts of the string 
landscape are, he explains, flat plains, while in others we encounter hills and valleys, domain 
walls, and mountain passes, such that ‘the landscape in field space is reflected in a 
complicated terrain in real space.’349 While these are technical physics terms with specific 
meanings, they can also be taken to convey the sense in which string theory explores the 
diverse ways in which the cosmos bears a likeness to the fullness of God. The many parts of 
creation, whether in the hills and valleys of our own planet or their complicated 
manifestations in the space of string theory landscape, seek to resemble the perfection of God 
through their diverse forms and movements. 
 
Third, the ordered diversity in creation—akin to the symphony described by Greene or the 
work of art described by Collins and Aquinas—represents the intention and goodness of its 
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cause. If creation amounts to a diverse string landscape of vacua corresponding to different 
domains, this does not suggest that it is unintelligible or contrary to any sense of divine 
purpose or control. In fact, the notion of an ordered whole, consisting of many distinct but 
interconnected parts, is central to Aquinas’s participatory creation account. The diversity of 
creation is intentional and is not merely indicative of a brute multiplicity. Since it is caused 
by one simple and perfect effect, or First Being, the diversity of creation should be seen in the 
context of unity and order. Here it might be noted that string theory, despite its diversity, 
offers a unifying framework in which to understand physical events and processes in the 
universe, since strings leave traces of their patterns of vibration. The task, as Greene 
observes, is for physicists to extract the information of a structure that is already there, and 
whose many and diverse patterns might be thought to more fully reflect the perfection of 
God. 
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3.3  Don Page on Beauty 
 
In this section, I will assess the Canadian theoretical physicist Don Page’s support of a 
theistic account of the multiverse hypothesis, with a particular focus on his view that string 
theory represents a beautiful and elegant account of cosmic diversity. Since his notions of 
God and creation are broadly similar to Robin Collins, this will follow logically from, and in 
many ways build on, the issues considered in the previous section, particularly in relation to 
string theory. Page, a quantum cosmologist, former doctoral student of Stephen Hawking, and 
evangelical Christian, strongly suspects that what we think of as the universe is in fact part of 
a larger multiverse, whose different parts are governed by different laws of physics. After 
considering Page’s notion of beauty in the context of multiverse theory, I will then examine 
Aquinas’s metaphysical notion of beauty, which is an important part of his participatory 
thought. I will propose that an account of beauty and order informed by Thomistic 
participatory metaphysics would strengthen Page’s own concepts of God and creation, while 
also providing a rejoinder to criticisms of multiverse thought made on aesthetic grounds, 
which I will discuss in the last section. 
 
3.3.1 Page on Beauty and Elegance in Multiverse Theories 
 
Initially, Page identifies parallels between the theological response to Darwinian evolution 
and initial theological appraisals of contemporary multiverse theories. Just as some pre-
Darwinian Christians assumed that humans could be understood apart from the rest of 
creation as separately and individually designed, he argues that it would be equally mistaken 
for contemporary believers to interpret the fine-tuning of the laws of physics as evidence of 
separate and individual design by God, and thereby as evidence for God’s existence. Like 
Collins, Page prefers to view the multiverse not as an alternative to God as an explanation of 
cosmic design, but as indicative of ‘an even more grand design of the universe’.350 This is 
because the basic physical laws and initial conditions responsible for a multiverse would have 
to be ‘special’ to produce any life at all, and particularly the kind of intelligent human life 
capable of observing and understanding its own cosmic habitat.
351
 Page also echoes Collins’s 
claim that since God is infinitely creative, it follows that God’s creation would be ‘much 
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larger than the single visible part of the universe or multiverse that we can observe 
directly.’352 
 
Like Bernard Carr’s notion of an ‘outward journey’ (from a geocentric to heliocentric to 
galactocentric to multiverse view), Page regards the multiverse hypothesis as a ‘natural 
extension of… accepting a reality beyond one’s immediate conscious perception’.353 This 
openness to a diversity of cosmic realms is consistent with his sympathy for the ‘many 
worlds’ interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which all possible outcomes of a quantum 
event give rise to new universes. After all, if we can postulate conscious beings in other 
totally disconnected spacetimes such as other branches of a quantum state, it is not a 
fundamentally different step to begin to think about other beings in different parts of a 
multiverse with different physical constants. He suggests that we might even imagine beings 
in ‘entirely different universes’ with no relation to ours, not connected by any single 
underlying set of physical laws.
354
 While this thought experiment might bring to mind 
Tegmark’s Level IV multiverse, Page specifically dismisses this theory as ‘too general to be 
plausible’, too chaotic, and unable to account for the order we observe in our own universe.355  
 
Since Level III multiverses (the many-worlds interpretation) do not necessarily give rise to 
varying constants of physics and Level IV multiverses are too general and chaotic, Page 
identifies the need for more ‘elegant’ multiverse theories that explain cosmic order and arise 
out of specific laws of nature.
356
 He believes that God might prefer string/M-theory, a variant 
of a Level II multiverse, which he sees as ‘an elegant physical theory… that would lead to a 
multiverse that nevertheless has been created providentially by God with the purpose of 
having life and us somewhere within it.’357 As discussed in the previous section, string theory 
implies an immense (though likely not infinite) multiverse of around 10
500
 different vacua or 
sets of constants. In Page’s estimation, this would be sufficient for the physical constants we 
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observe to occur somewhere, perhaps once per 10
200
 vacua or so.
358
 String theory not only 
appears to strongly suggest a multiverse, but one that includes the physical parameters that 
allow the kind of life that exists in our part of the universe.
359
 In a somewhat anthropocentric 
move, he thinks that the beauty and elegance of the theory suggest a divine designer acting 
with the deliberate intent to provide the conditions for human life. 
 
With his support for a multiverse interpretation of string theory, Page places a high priority 
on the elegance and beauty of such a model, by which he means the elegance of the principles 
by which God would create a vast multiverse and the apparently elegant structure of our own 
laws of nature. Against theological critics who fear that a multiverse would provide an 
alternative to divine design of the physical constants, he insists that God could have designed 
the whole multiverse, ‘choosing elegant laws of nature by which to create the entire thing.’360 
The enormous diversity of the string landscape is not evidence of extravagance or 
wastefulness, but of an infinitely creative and powerful God who may create many universes 
if this is consistent with His nature and purposes. On Page’s account, God might prefer 
elegance in the principles by which a vast multiverse is created, rather than a paucity of 
universes, or a single universe. This emphasis on ‘economy of principles rather than economy 
of materials’361 fits with Collins’s model of God as infinitely creative and powerful, and 
operating according to an intentional plan, which is a promising model to begin to bring into 
contact with multiverse thought. Yet, as with Collins’s tentative account of cosmic diversity, 
Page only hints at the motive and purpose underlying multiverse creation, without developing 
a sustained or metaphysical account of the principles according to which God might create a 
multiverse. 
 
3.3.2 Aquinas on Beauty 
 
The beauty and elegance and coherence of the universe play an important role in Aquinas’s 
account of creation. His vision of a cosmos of ordered beauty also follows directly from the 
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discussion of cosmic diversity in the previous section. As discussed, the diversity and 
multiplicity in created things is an inherent and intentional characteristic of creation: it is only 
through such diversity that creation might represent the fullness of God’s being. In addition, 
God’s intellect, which understands many things, cannot be adequately represented by only 
one thing, and so it expresses itself more perfectly ‘if it produces many creatures of all grades 
than if it had produced only one.’362 Collectively, all parts of this diverse creation are very 
good and establish together a good order of the universe, ‘which is the ultimate and noblest 
perfection in things.’363 So God’s perfectly unified and simple goodness may only be 
expressed in creation in a diverse manner. It is precisely in this cosmic diversity, with its 
interconnected parts standing in their own relation to God, that an ordered—and beautiful and 
elegant—whole might be established. 
 
Participation is central to Aquinas’s idea of creation as a diverse likeness of God’s goodness 
and beauty. Without diversity in things, the ‘highest beauty’ would be taken away from 
things, since things are beautiful to the extent that they participate in and move closer to 
God.
364
 As Aquinas explains (with not entirely unproblematic language of ‘distance’ from 
God discussed in the previous section), the nearer things are to God, the more they participate 
in God’s likeness, and vice versa. He argues that those that are ‘nearest’ to God ‘most closely 
approach the likeness of God’ while things that are more distant are not always moved in the 
same way.
365
 Having outlined this participatory structure of being, with a diversity of things 
which differ in degrees of participation in God’s perfect beauty, he observes that ‘beauty is 
evident in this order.
366
  
 
Of particular importance in helping to secure the beauty of order in creation, we might recall 
Aquinas’s notion of causal participation (discussed earlier in this chapter). It is not just that 
the eternal beauty of the First Cause of creation might be apprehended at least partially in the 
beauty and order of created effects. It is also that, while God can produce all natural effects, it 
is not superfluous for some effects to be produced by certain other causes. As a consequence 
of the fullness of God’s existence, His likeness is communicated to things, ‘not only so that 
they might exist, but also that they might be causes for other things… By this, in fact, the 
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beauty of order in created things is evident.’367 In this way, God enables created things to 
attain the divine likeness in two ways, either through the First Cause, or through secondary 
causes which participate in and communicate His likeness. This underlines the role of 
interrelation in a participatory account of beauty. Things are beautiful not just by virtue of 
their participation in God’s beauty, but also by their essential relation to one another, as 
common participants in God’s beauty, who might communicate that beauty to one another, 
and who collectively represent a beautiful, ordered whole. 
 
In his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas defines three characteristics of beauty.
368
 First, he 
specifies integrity or perfection. This relates to the similitude of God’s unity and simplicity in 
the wholeness and completeness of created things, which receives its highest expression in 
the Son, ‘who has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father.’ Second, he 
specifies proportion or harmony. Although proportion was typically thought to apply only to 
composite material things, and thus not spiritual or divine beings, Aquinas shows how it 
might usefully be applied to God. Though perfectly simple and unified, God is also triune, 
with a harmony or interrelation between the Three Persons of the Trinity. Thus, he notes that 
the Son is the image of the Father.
369
 
 
Third, and most significantly, Aquinas identifies brightness or clarity as a condition of 
beauty. In an additional point whose metaphysical import might not be clear to modern 
readers, he notes that beautiful things ‘have a bright colour.’370 This brightness refers to the 
light that shines forth from the beauty of God’s being, which is the most perfect and full 
mode of being that may be contemplated. In this sense, God’s perfect existence, in which all 
things participate in diverse and limited ways, shines forth with perfect brightness and clarity 
throughout the cosmos. In God, this radiant beauty is ‘the unlimited splendor of pure 
existence beyond all form, pure light too dazzling for us to contemplate directly.’371 With the 
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previously considered notion of diminished participation in mind, we might think of God as 
the full light of existence, while created things shine only to the limited extent to which they 
participate in this fullness of brightness. To return to another analogy discussed earlier, 
Aquinas explains that ‘whatever is found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by 
that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire.’372 In the same way, we 
might consider that the light within us is caused by participation in God, the fullness of light. 
The light within us is a reflected light from that which is perfect light itself.   
 
3.3.3 Multiverse Applications 
 
Having considered the participatory basis of Aquinas’s notions of beauty and order in 
creation, we might now seek to enhance and extend Page’s somewhat limited conception of 
God as the loving and purposeful creator of the multiverse, which possibly takes the form of 
a string landscape with enormous diversity. 
 
First, Page depicts God as preferring string theory as a principle for the creation of a vast 
multiverse, with the deliberate intention of giving rise to life. As seen in this section and the 
previous section, Aquinas’s participatory creation account holds that the diversity and order 
and beauty in creation are fully under divine control, and indeed manifestations of God’s own 
goodness and beauty. God’s intellect contains many things, such that the fullness of His 
intellect can be represented only by way of many diverse effects. God preconceives and 
causes each diverse part of creation, and through His wisdom brings about its order and 
beauty. The diversity of the cosmos, including the diversity implied in the string landscape, is 
fully intended by its divine cause, as it proceeds from a common source and is thereby 
inherently within the unity of an order. As such, Page’s model of God as the intentional 
designer of a vast and diverse cosmos can be deepened with reference to Thomistic 
participatory metaphysics. However, Page’s conception of God as the designer of a diverse 
multiverse perhaps neglects the more strongly providential account of God’s relationship 
with creation found in Aquinas. It would be truer to a participatory reading of Aquinas to 
view the diversity of string landscapes as following directly from God’s donation of being, as 
opposed to Page’s account in which the multiverse is seen more anthropocentrically as a sort 
of winning lottery ticket (among very many issued by God) allowing human life to exist. 
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Second, Page is evidently impressed by the immense multiverse or landscape of different 
physical constants that apparently arise from string theory. He repeatedly refers to the 
‘elegance’ of the principles (that is, string theory) by which God might create a vast 
multiverse. Here, we can apply a participatory reading of Aquinas to supplement Page’s 
approach. While Page focuses on the beauty of the mechanism, Aquinas is concerned with 
the beauty of being itself. Thus, we might highlight Aquinas’s view that being itself is not 
just diverse, but also beautiful, as it is conferred by the goodness and beauty of God. The 
beauty of things in themselves is an image, or a form of reflected beauty, of the fullness of 
God’s being, which is perfectly bright or clear. God’s existence, in which all created things 
participate in diverse ways and at different ontological ‘distances’, shines forth throughout 
creation, and would therefore also be said to shine forth in the dazzling multitude of vacua 
that give rise to many universes with different constants, of the kind suggested by string 
theory. These universes might be radically different, but they share a common origin and owe 
whatever light or harmony or completeness they have to the fullness of light in which they 
participate. 
 
Third, Page’s idea of the beauty and elegance of string theory, deepened by Aquinas’s 
account of beauty in creation, might provide a useful rejoinder to criticisms of multiverse 
theory made on the basis of aesthetics. For example, Keith Ward (focusing primarily on 
Tegmark’s Level IV multiverse) thinks that the extravagance of the multiverse hypothesis 
‘does not have much to offer in the way of economy, simplicity, or plausibility.’373 He views 
God as the ‘simpler and more rational hypothesis’ compared to what he sees as the 
arbitrariness and profligacy of the multiverse.
374
 Likewise, Rodney Holder maintains that the 
multiverse is ‘distinctly non-simple and uneconomical in comparison with theism.’375 He also 
argues that, given a large enough number of potential universes, it seems highly likely that a 
significant proportion will, in his view, be empty, wasteful, and aesthetically unappealing.
376
 
He analogises those who defend multiverses on aesthetic grounds with those who are 
untroubled by the apparently excessive waste, death, and destruction inherent in biological 
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evolution that are sometimes explained away as ‘God’s mechanism for producing intelligent 
life.’377  
 
In response, we might note that these perspectives assume that the vast diversity of creation 
(such as that implied in string landscape) is an aberration, an unintended, ugly, and 
inexplicable by-product of the generation of many different cosmic realms. In fact, Aquinas 
reminds us that it is metaphysically impossible for one single creature or part to represent the 
full beauty and goodness of God. This perfect beauty cannot be expressed in creation except 
in a diverse manner, and perhaps this will prove to be evident in the context of a tremendous 
diversity of cosmic realms. Such an expanded view of creation need not entail waste and a 
lack of beauty or meaning or order, but rather an intentional distribution of God’s light that 
shines forth among the many interrelated parts of an elegant and ordered whole. 
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3.4  Bernard Carr on Unity 
 
In this section, I will critically evaluate the multiverse thought of Bernard Carr, professor of 
mathematics and astronomy at Queen Mary University of London, a former doctoral student 
and colleague of Stephen Hawking, and one of the leading multiverse advocates in 
contemporary cosmology. Specifically, I will provide a Thomistic participatory response to 
his image of the cosmic uroborus, in which he associates the historic trajectory of scientific 
progress toward a progressively more expansive cosmos (perhaps culminating in the 
multiverse hypothesis) with the apparent unity and interconnectedness of the cosmos. In 
contrast to many of his multiverse cosmologist colleagues, Carr allows for the significance of 
human consciousness and acknowledges the theological import of multiverse theories. 
However, I will argue that he offers a narrow, self-contained vision of immanence and a 
somewhat vague and metaphysically weak conception of unity, and thereby fails to provide 
the kind of fundamental account of the multiverse he desires. I will propose that the circular 
imagery of Carr’s uroborus calls to mind (but is comparatively inadequate in comparison to) 
Aquinas’s theological circle of being, which describes the journey to a transcendent source of 
being. In this vision, the connection of the cosmos to God is expressed in a circular 
movement of creatures who have received being from God and ultimately return to God, who 
stands as both source and final end. I will conclude that this circular movement suggests that 
the purpose of the multiverse can be seen in terms of gift, giving unity and meaning to the 
cosmos in a way that eludes strictly cosmological accounts such as Carr’s. 
 
3.4.1 Carr on the Cosmic Uroborus  
 
Carr situates recent developments in cosmology and particle physics that increase the 
plausibility of the multiverse hypothesis within the ‘tide of history’ of scientific progress.378 
He observes that, throughout the history of Western science, our understanding of the size, 
scope, and nature of the universe has progressively shifted, as scientific progress has 
extended outwards to ever larger cosmic scales and inwards to ever smaller atomic and 
subatomic scales. In a provocative claim to which he gives expression in his image of the 
uroborus, this ‘triumph’ of scientific progress on both the outer and inner fronts is said to 
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have ‘revealed a unity about the universe which makes it clear that everything is connected in 
a way which would have seemed inconceivable a few decades ago.’379 He further contends 
that the multiverse proposal is ‘just the culmination’ of scientific attempts to understand the 
physics of the largest and smallest scales.
380
 
 
In terms of what he refers to as the ‘outward journey’, Carr describes the gradual shift from 
the geocentric view of early humans, to the heliocentric view suggested in the sixteenth 
century by Copernicus (and anticipated by Nicholas of Cusa), to the galactocentric view 
occasioned by Galileo’s telescopic observations, to the cosmocentric view of the early 
twentieth century, establishing the ‘Big Bang’ picture in which the universe began in a state 
of great compression approximately 14 billion years ago and has since been rapidly 
expanding, with other galaxies moving further away from us. More recently, Carr believes 
that we have moved to the multiverse view, in which studies of background radiation have 
strengthened the case for inflation, which suggests that our cosmic domain is one part of a 
much larger multiverse, and provides the basis for the most basic multiverse models, such as 
Tegmark’s Level I model of an infinite space, as well as the post-inflation bubbles of Level 
II. 
 
In terms of the ‘inward journey’, he describes changes of perspective brought about by 
atomic theory in the eighteenth century, subatomic theory in the early twentieth century, and 
quantum theory shortly thereafter. In his view, this journey has revealed that everything in the 
cosmos comprises a few fundamental particles interacting through four forces (gravity, 
electromagnetism, the weak force and the strong force), some or all of whose interactions 
might ultimately be unified, perhaps with string theory or M-theory (as discussed earlier). 
Just as he contends that the history of cosmology has been a sequence of expanding our 
conception of the cosmos, he defines the history of physics as a sequence by which physics 
has attempted to unify the four known forces of nature.
381
 
 
Together, the outward and inward journeys in science have disclosed what Carr believes to be 
a cosmic unity in which microphysical and macrophysical domains are inextricably 
connected. To illustrate this unity, as well as the evolution of our understanding of this 
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structure, he uses the image of the uroborus, an ancient Greek symbol of a snake eating its 
own tail:
382
 
 
Fig. 1.1 Carr’s image of the cosmic uroborus383 
 
This image is a complex (and in some ways contentious and vaguely articulated) model of 
reality that is difficult to interpret, with many components and assumptions on which so 
much rests. To the extent that it reflects Carr’s views, it is worth highlighting three important 
aspects. First, it represents a closed, internal, self-sufficient circle of reality, without any 
reference to a transcendent source or meaning. The images inside the snake represent 
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different types of structure in the universe, moving from objects at the micro level (such as 
atoms and quarks) on the right-hand side, to successively larger objects at the macro level 
(such as stars, galaxies, and the universe itself) on the left-hand side. The horizontal lines 
illustrate the connections between microphysical and macrophysical structures. So the 
electric line, for example, connects an atom to a planet because the structure of solid object is 
determined by atomic forces, which are electrical in origin. As a result of these different 
kinds of structural relations, Carr envisions a cosmos of unity and interconnectedness, though 
it should be said that this account is metaphysically modest and attenuated in comparison 
with other scientific models of interconnectivity.
384
 Given his evident interest in theology and 
metaphysics, it is surprising that he gives priority to an image of such modest theological or 
metaphysical import. 
 
Second, the top of the image, with the head of the snake eating its own tail, is intended to 
convey the notion that the universe was originally compressed to a point of infinite density, 
such that even the expansive universe (or multiverse) of modern cosmology comes forth from 
its exponentially smaller origin.
385
 The top of the image links both inward and outward 
journeys to ‘higher dimensions’, since string theory on the microscopic side implies the 
existence of many additional ‘compactified’ dimensions, while some versions of M-theory on 
the macroscopic side suggest that ‘the universe could be a 4-dimensional “brane” in a higher-
dimensional “bulk.”’386 Here it seems that Carr makes a rather nebulous and swift transition 
from the closed circle of the uroborus to the potential existence of higher dimensions, 
particularly in light of the fact that there are significant multiverse models which do not 
include such extra dimensions. Although the uroborus is meant to be a succinct encapsulation 
of the apparent unity and interconnectedness of the cosmos, some of its key and most striking 
aspects (such as the reference to multiverses and M-theory) merit further explanation. 
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Third, Carr’s image incorporates an historical aspect. In addition to symbolising the different 
yet fundamentally related levels of structure in the cosmos, the image of the uroborus reflects 
the historical development of human knowledge at the micro and macro levels, as indicated 
by the circular arrows surrounding the snake. So primitive humans were aware of a fairly 
limited range of basic structures such as animals and mountains, eighteenth century humans 
had a broader conception ranging from bacteria to the solar system, while twentieth century 
humans had an even wider understanding of reality at the atomic and cosmic levels. Since the 
image shows the systematic expansion of progressively greater levels of awareness, Carr 
regards it as a symbol of the ‘blossoming’ of human consciousness.387 
 
With his idea of the cosmic uroborus, then, Carr provides an entirely closed and cosmological 
model of the interconnectedness of the largest and smallest levels of reality. Unlike many 
multiverse proponents who associate our progressively expanding notion of the cosmos with 
a correspondingly diminished status for humanity, he believes that the human mind—and the 
story of its continual blossoming in the course of evolution—is fundamental to the cosmos, 
whose unity and beauty points to some form of guiding intelligence. While he acknowledges 
that the existence of a multiverse (the latest scientific paradigm shift which may represent the 
apex of the outward journey), would have ‘obvious religious implications’, his volume is 
largely restricted to ‘the materialistic issues which are the focus of cosmology.’388 As such, it 
would be worthwhile to provide a theological response to his image of the cosmic uroborus 
and his promising yet metaphysically limited ideas of cosmic unity and interconnectedness 
within the context of multiverse thought, which will be the focus of the next section. 
 
3.4.2 Aquinas on the Circle of Being 
 
Carr’s cosmic uroborus, in contrast to its historic use as a symbol of eternal return, is a 
strictly physical and temporal model of internal unity and interconnectedness. It does not 
make reference to a transcendent source or meaning, as is the case with Aquinas’s 
metaphysically richer circle of being. As such, and to provide a more fundamental basis for 
the idea of cosmic unity, we might consider Aquinas’s participatory creation account, which 
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employs the concept of circularity in such a way as to ground the unity and meaning of the 
cosmos in relation to its transcendent source. In this model, God as origin and end is 
connected to creation by a circular movement whereby creatures produced by Him ultimately 
return to Him. Aquinas describes this motion in distinctively participatory terms, such that a 
creature seeking to bear a true likeness to its source is moved to return to God in its own way 
to attain its own perfection: 
 
An effect is most perfect when it returns to its source; thus, the circle is the most 
perfect of all figures, and circular motion the most perfect of all motions, because in 
their case a return is made to the starting point. It is therefore necessary that creatures 
return to their principle in order that the universe of creatures may attain its ultimate 
perfection. Now, each and every creature returns to its source so far as it bears a 
likeness to its source, according to its being and its nature, wherein it enjoys a certain 
perfection.
389
 
 
Whereas Carr’s model is an immanent story of production, whereby the vastness of creation 
comes forth from a point of infinite density, Aquinas’s circle connects the production of 
creation to its transcendent source, in which it participates and to which it is ordered to 
return: ‘God acts for an end inasmuch as He produces an effect so that it may participate in 
His end.’390 God intends to produce His likeness and goodness in creation, which thereby 
reflects the ‘way in which the transcendent is manifested by that which is transcended.’391 
This reference to a transcendent source, whose likeness is mediated in the participatory 
movements of created beings who long to return to their origin, is absent from Carr’s entirely 
cosmological and self-contained uroborus. 
 
Here, it would be worthwhile to consider the two components of Aquinas’s circle of being: 
the journey outward from God and the return, which joins an act of creation to one of ethics 
and redemption. Early on in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas encapsulates this circle of being 
with his designation of God as ‘the beginning and end’ of all things.392 In fact, the structure 
of the work itself reflects the circular movement in which all creatures return to their 
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origin.
393
 Since the goal of sacred doctrine is to convey knowledge of God as the beginning 
and end of all things, God is considered first (Prima Pars), then man’s movement towards 
God (Secunda Pars), and finally Christ, whose incarnation leads us to God (Tertia Pars). 
Aquinas structures his work according to this circle of being because it constitutes the basic 
metaphysical structure of the universe whose unity is expressed in the procession and return 
of created beings to the fullness of being itself.
394
  
 
Just as Carr’s uroborus encompasses outward and inward journeys, so we might divide 
Aquinas’s circle of being into two parts.395 As noted above, in the first part of the Summa he 
is concerned with discussing the characteristics of God (simplicity, goodness, perfection, 
infinity, and so on) and the nature of the Trinity. He then turns to the nature of creation, 
which he defines as ‘the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God.’396 
Following Clarke, we might regard this emanation as the ‘journey of the many (all finite 
beings), projected outward from the One, their Infinite Source, by creation.’397 In the context 
of this dynamic sense of creation, finite beings receive being from God and come into being 
as diverse participants in the fullness of God’s being. This is the ‘outward’ journey by which 
all beings share in God’s being and thus share something in common with each other, 
producing a unity and interconnectedness throughout creation.
398
 
 
In the second and third parts of the Summa, we find what might be thought of as the return 
movement of creatures toward God, which is clearly distinct from and provides a more 
metaphysical foundation to Carr’s idiosyncratic (and non-theological) uroborus. Here, each 
diverse participant of creation is drawn towards its own good, which is implicitly a search for 
God, who is the source of all goodness. As an effect produced by the First Cause, each 
participant desires to know something of its cause, and perfect happiness may only be 
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achieved through the intellect reaching the ‘very essence’ of the First Cause, and ‘thus it will 
have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man’s 
happiness consists’.399 With this journey back to God, the principle of being by which the 
‘ultimate perfection’ of rational creatures can be found,400 God can be viewed as ‘both the 
Alpha and the Omega, the Beginning and the End, at once the Source and the Goal of the 
restless dynamism of all of nature, of all finite beings.’401 In the third part, Aquinas explains 
that the circular movement is only completed through Christ, ‘the perfect Mediator of God 
and men, inasmuch as, by His death, He reconciled the human race to God.’402 
 
Having described Aquinas’s circular movement of emanation and return to God, we might 
now reflect on how it improves upon and adds metaphysical depth to Carr’s account in two 
important ways, related to the special status of humans and the role of science. In terms of the 
former, Aquinas’s account provides a metaphysical basis for the special status of humanity in 
the cosmos. Contrary to multiverse theorists who believe that a (perhaps infinitely) more 
expansive cosmos provides conclusive evidence of the insignificance of humanity, Carr 
insists on the connection between the evolution of mind and the expansion of our cosmic 
horizon. Yet while he believes that scientific activity has expanded the ‘macroscopic frontier’ 
as far as possible, his cosmological account necessarily precludes any consideration of 
whether humans might come to know not just the size and scope of the cosmos, but also its 
ultimate source and end. On this point, Aquinas agrees with Carr on the centrality of humans, 
but argues that we play a unique role by virtue of our participatory relationship with God. As 
rational creatures, we attain our last end by knowing and loving God, but this is not possible 
for other creatures. Only humans can freely and consciously choose to love and achieve 
direct union with God, thereby returning to the fullness of being from which they originated: 
‘such a return to God cannot be made except by the act of the intellect and will, because God 
Himself has no other operation in His own regard than these. The greatest perfection of the 
universe therefore demanded the existence of some intellectual creatures.’403 
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For Aquinas, though, non-human creatures may also be returned to God as a consequence of 
the ‘marvelous connection of things’, a cosmic interconnectivity grounded in a transcendent 
source and therefore distinct from Carr’s closed circle of being.404 On Aquinas’s account, 
humans are microcosms, in which the highest and lowest levels of creation are united. Since 
we contain within us what Carr would call microscopic and macroscopic aspects of creation 
(such that we are related, for example, to both atoms and planets), we can (so to speak) bring 
the physical cosmos with us on our journey back to God. We may ‘touch’ and share in lower 
levels of being and thereby help such non-human beings to complete their own journeys 
home: ‘Hence, in order that the imitation of God, in this mode of containing, might not be 
lacking to creatures, intellectual creatures were made which contain corporeal creatures’.405 
This Thomistic notion of humans as microcosms of creation places additional emphasis on 
Carr’s account of our cosmic significance. It is not just that we can use our intellect to 
investigate the cosmos; as mediators between God and the cosmos, we can ensure that the 
cosmos completes its circular movement of being and returns to its source. 
 
Second, in terms of the role of science, Aquinas’s circle of being with humans as mediators 
between the diversity of the physical cosmos and the simplicity of God gives new meaning to 
the importance of scientific progress, which Carr details in his ‘outward journey’ from early 
geocentric assumptions to modern multiverse models, but does not ground in any 
transcendent source. Science might be thought of as a systematic way of taking up the 
cosmos into our consciousness. By examining the origin and nature of the universe (or 
multiverse) in which we participate and which emanates from God, we are also coming to 
know God: ‘Hence, from reflection upon God’s works we are able to infer His wisdom, since, 
by a certain communication of His likeness, it is spread abroad in the things He has made.’406 
In this sense, the cosmic uroborus (or circle of being) represents not just (as Carr avers) the 
blossoming of human consciousness as we attain ever greater knowledge of the physical 
cosmos, but the union of human consciousness with its divine origin and end: ‘If 
[consideration of God’s creation is] so alluring to the minds of men, the fountainhead of 
God’s own goodness, compared with the rivulets of goodness found in creatures, will draw 
the enkindled minds of men wholly to Itself.’407 
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This kind of participatory perspective applied to Carr’s uroborus thereby deepens the value of 
our scientific search for (and place in) the multiverse, which is properly seen as a freely given 
gift from God. Such a model more powerfully conveys the unity and purpose of a cosmos 
with a transcendent creator than Carr’s strictly cosmological vision. While Carr stands out 
among scientific multiverse theorists in terms of acknowledging the importance of humanity 
in the cosmos and arguing for the compatibility of God and the multiverse, his approach is at 
once theologically timid and conceptually ambiguous. With attention to Aquinas’s 
participatory creation account, his notions of cosmic unity and interconnectedness can rest on 
firmer metaphysical foundations. 
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3.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, I considered how Aquinas’s metaphysical participation might illuminate the 
idea of cosmic diversity that is paramount in multiverse thought. According to Aquinas, 
creation is marked by riotous diversity because this is the only way in which created beings 
can participate in and bear witness to the fullness of God’s perfect unity and simplicity. The 
key point of this chapter is that such a participatory outlook is not only consistent with the 
kind of vast cosmic diversity described in multiverse theory, but that it metaphysically 
accounts for the intelligibility and beauty of this diversity. To illustrate this insight, I 
evaluated the work of two theologically-minded scientists and one philosopher of religion 
who is receptive to the multiverse proposal, and in each case I highlighted ways in which 
Thomistic participation might enrich their treatments of cosmic diversity.  
 
I began with Robin Collins, who is an important thinker working at the intersection of 
theology and scientific multiverse theory. Although he is mindful of the importance of 
diversity in Thomistic metaphysics, he does not bring this consideration to the multiverse 
proposal. As such, I explained that diversity is fundamental to Aquinas’s creation account, 
since it reflects the only way in which diverse beings can approach the perfectly simple God. 
I proceeded to apply his participatory metaphysics to the string theory landscape proposal in 
which the notion of vast diversity is central. In this way, I illustrated that string theory can be 
seen as an example of a multiverse model that gives powerful scientific expression to 
Aquinas’s insistence on cosmic diversity and intelligibility.  
 
I then turned to Don Page’s theistic account of the multiverse proposal, which shares with 
Collins an interest in string theory as an elegant model, as well as an insufficiently 
metaphysical approach to this sense of beauty and elegance. I argued that Aquinas’s 
metaphysical notion of beauty would strengthen Page’s somewhat basic account of God’s 
creative activity. For Aquinas, beauty is evident in the participatory scheme of creation, with 
diverse beings participating in God’s own beauty and goodness in their own ways. I 
suggested that Aquinas’s participatory account of the beauty of the cosmos might supplement 
Page’s more narrow conception of the beauty of the selection mechanism that gives rise to a 
diversity of cosmic realms in string theory. 
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Finally, I critiqued Bernard Carr’s image of the cosmic uroborus on the basis that it is 
theologically deficient and conceptually confusing. As an alternative and richer metaphysical 
model, I offered Aquinas’s theological circle of being, which expresses the coming forth and 
return of creatures to God. This circular image more adequately conveys the unity and 
purpose of a cosmos grounded in a transcendent creator than Carr’s narrow and self-
referential cosmological vision. I argued that we can do more justice to his emphasis on 
cosmic unity and interconnectedness, as well as the special status of human consciousness, 
with closer attention to Aquinas’s depiction of a diverse cosmos that owes its existence to and 
is ordered towards a transcendent source. 
 
In addition to offering the prospect of enormous multiplicity and diversity, the multiverse 
hypothesis naturally lends itself to contemplation of cosmic infinity. Tegmark’s Level I 
multiverse might be thought of as an infinite bubble, while he describes the Level II 
multiverse as an infinite set of Level I bubbles. Just as the idea of cosmic infinity is 
contentious in modern multiverse debates, it has often been a theological point of dispute in 
relation to God’s infinity. In the following chapter I will examine the remarkable 
participatory thought of a late medieval figure who explores both kinds of infinity with a 
distinctively speculative, enigmatic, and provocative style. 
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Chapter Four: Infinity (Nicholas of Cusa) 
 
In this chapter, I will consider the notion of cosmic infinity in relation to the participatory 
thought of the late medieval astronomer-theologian Nicholas of Cusa. Since infinity is such a 
crucial part of both Cusa’s work and the conceptual framework of a considerable proportion 
of multiverse theory, he represents a compelling figure with which to conclude the central 
passage of this thesis. In spite of the fact that he is widely cited in discussions about the 
historical antecedents of modern multiverse thought, his unique participatory insights have 
not formed the basis of any previous theological approach to the multiverse hypothesis. 
 
Initially, I will provide a general overview of Cusa’s speculative work concerning 
metaphysical participation, with particular reference to the development of his participatory 
thought in his most consequential work, De Docta Ignorantia. I will discuss the ways in 
which, for Cusa, participation occupies a fundamental role in bridging the gap between finite 
creaturely beings and the infinite God. 
 
In the following three sections, I will draw on Cusa’s provocative participatory insights to 
respond to the concerns of a diverse range of thinkers in the theology and science dialogue. 
First, I will respond to Rodney Holder’s critique of the notion of cosmic infinity, which he 
develops with reference to Cusa. I will argue that Holder neglects the participatory character 
of Cusa’s metaphysical system, in which the universe is an image whose infinity is of an 
imitative nature. This approach can help to provide valuable metaphysical resources to 
respond to some of Holder’s misgivings about multiverse theory. Second, I will provide a 
critique of Catherine Keller’s postmodern reading of Cusa, which overlooks the core 
cosmological and participatory insights of his work. Finally, I will evaluate David 
Albertson’s recent study of Cusa’s mathematical theology, consider its strengths and 
weaknesses, and demonstrate its relevance to Tegmark’s controversial version of 
mathematical multiverse thought.  
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4.1 De Docta Ignorantia 
 
Completed in early 1440, De Docta Ignorantia is Cusa’s most significant and influential 
work, offering a systematic yet idiosyncratic synthesis of theological, philosophical, 
cosmological, and mathematical speculation. The threefold structure of the work (with Book 
One on God, Book Two on the universe, and Book Three on Christ) reflects the unfolding of 
creation from God and its ultimate return to God. For Cusa, God is the Absolute Maximum, 
the universe is a contracted (restricted) maximum, or created image of God, and Christ unites 
the two as at once divine and human, or absolute and contracted. As Absolute Maximum, 
God is perfectly simple and infinite, transcending all human understanding. In De Docta 
Ignorantia, Cusa identifies participation as the way to bridge the gap between the infinite 
simplicity of God and the diversity of creation.  
 
Book One 
 
In Book One, Cusa uses the hypothetical mathematical concept of an infinite line to introduce 
the idea of God, including participation of finite beings in the infinite God.
408
 Through a 
series of ‘speculative’ mathematical considerations, he argues that an infinite line is the 
essence of a finite line, as well as the measure of all finite lines that participate in it in 
different ways. He then suggests that these considerations about the infinite line can be 
‘applied symbolically’ to what he refers to as the Maximum, or God.409 He identifies three 
participatory insights about the God-creation relationship that may be illustrated by reflection 
on the infinite line. First, just as the infinite line is the essence of all lines, so the infinite 
essence of God is the essence of all finite essences. Second, just as every ‘part’ of an infinite 
line is the infinite line, so in God everything is God. Third, just as the infinite line is the 
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measure of all lines, so God is the measure of all things. It would be worthwhile to discuss 
each of these points in turn. 
 
In terms of the first point—that God is the essence of all essences—it is striking that Cusa 
variously refers to God as ‘the Essence of all essences’,410 ‘the Essence of all things’,411 ‘the 
Being of all being’,412 ‘the Being of things’,413 and ‘the Form of being’.414 With these 
designations, Cusa seeks neither to deny the finite essences of things nor to conflate them 
with God’s own essence.415 Rather, he believes that all finite beings are ultimately dependent 
on God for their being. While finite things have their own form and being, only God—as the 
Being of all being—has perfect being that is not derived from or dependent on any other 
being. To depict God as the Being of all being is not to deny the distinction between God and 
creation, but to express the absolute dependence of all finite being on its infinite source to 
which it owes its existence and without which it would not exist.
416
 
 
To illustrate this point, Cusa draws on the symbolism of the infinite line to express creaturely 
participation in God. As noted above, he explains that there is only one essence of all lines, 
which is participated in in different ways. In a similar way, all finite beings participate in 
different ways in Being, which is God. In light of this, he offers the following argument 
based on the somewhat abstruse (and thus characteristically Cusan) notion of the removal and 
negation of participation: 
 
If from all beings participation is removed, there remains most simple Being itself, 
which is the Essence (essentia) of all things. And we see such Being only in most 
learned ignorance; for when I remove from my mind all the things which participate 
in Being, it seems that nothing remains.
417
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This argument should be seen not as a problematic reduction of finite being to God’s being, 
but merely as a participatory restatement of the dependence of the finite multiplicity of 
creation on its absolute and undivided source. To remove creaturely participation in Being is 
to remove the existence of all finite things that participate in Being. This leaves only God as 
Being itself, which is not being (in the finite sense), but the underived and undifferentiated 
Being of all beings. Since this perfect Being cannot be expressed in positive terms, Cusa 
(echoing Dionysius) concludes that our ‘understanding of God draws near to nothing rather 
than to something.’418 Ironically, although the argument is advanced in obscure and negative 
terms, it amounts to an extremely powerful affirmation of the centrality of participation. To 
remove participation is to remove creation itself, leaving only God.
419
  
  
In Cusa’s second participatory insight, he claims that just as every ‘part’ of an infinite line is 
the infinite line, so in God everything is God. In God, all things of ‘past, present, and future’ 
are ‘ever and eternally’ God in such a way that God is ‘all of them together and none of them 
in particular’.420 Again, this is not to suggest that God is all things, but that in God all things 
are God. The word ‘in’ signifies participation, and not conflation or direct identification. 
Cusa, who develops this further in his theology of creation in Book Two (to be discussed 
below), describes this as the ‘enfolding’ of all things in God. He refers to God as ‘the 
enfolding of all things’.421 In His simplicity, God ‘enfolds the totality of all things’422 and His 
‘infinite foresight enfolds not only the things which will occur but also the things which will 
not occur but can occur’.423 In this way, all things are ‘enfolded’ in God, and the act of 
creation involves the ‘unfolding’ of all things from God. In terms of causation, we might say 
that the effect is enfolded in the cause, rather than thinking of effect and cause as 
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synonymous. Yet Cusa insists that the ‘infinite Oneness’ in which all things are 
‘incompositely enfolded in simplicity’ remains beyond human understanding.424 
 
Cusa’s third participatory application of his mathematical considerations is that just as the 
infinite line is the measure of all lines, so God is the measure of all things. Again, he 
illustrates this point with the symbolism of the infinite line, whereby a finite straight line is 
said to participate in it more simply and immediately than a curved line, whose participation 
would be more ‘mediate and remote’.425 By analogous reasoning, he notes that substances 
participate more immediately in God than accidents, which participate ‘not through 
themselves but through the medium of substances’.426 Just as an infinite line is the measure of 
a straight line and of a curved line, so God is the measure of all things, which participate in 
Him in different ways. To claim that finite things participate in God is to suggest not only 
that they owe their existence to God, but also that they are excellent to the extent that they 
participate in God. Similarly, an accident depends on the substance in which it participates 
and is said to be more excellent the more it participates in the substance. 
 
In Book One, then, Cusa uses mathematical illustrations and imagery to convey the 
participatory notions that God is the essence of all things, that all things exist in God, and that 
God is the measure of all things. In his metaphysical system, all finite things participate in 
God, to whom they owe their existence and who sustains them within the created order. As 
the measure of all things, God has carefully ordered all finite things in the cosmos to 
participate in Him in various ways, which He alone knows precisely and immediately, and by 
which each thing achieves its degree of perfection.  
 
Book Two 
 
Having considered the maximum absolutum (God) in Book One, Cusa turns to the maximum 
contractum (the universe) in Book Two. He begins with additional participatory insights into 
the nature of creation (or created being), which derives from and participates in God ‘in a 
way that is not understandable.’427 This finite being, which participates in God’s being, is not 
understandable because ultimately God’s being is not understandable to the human intellect, a 
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point Cusa illustrates with the analogy that the being of an accident is not understandable if 
the substance in which it participates is not understood. Without understanding the absolute 
necessity from which it derives, it seems that creation is somewhere in between God and 
nothing; that is, it seems neither to be (since it descends from Being), nor not to be (otherwise 
it would be nothing), nor to be a composite of being and nothing. God’s being is not 
understandable and so neither is creation, whose mysterious nature can be summarised in 
similarly contradictory terms: ‘it cannot be called one, because it descends from Oneness, nor 
can it be called many, since its being derives from the One; nor can it be called both one and 
many conjunctively.’428 Cusa’s task is to clarify how we might understand that God is the 
Form of being and yet not ‘mingled’ with creation.429 He restates this familiar metaphysical 
dilemma of the one and the many in participatory terms by asking how it is possible for ‘the 
one, infinite Form’ to be ‘participated in in different ways by different created things’.430 
 
Cusa proposes that creation is a ‘reflection’ or an ‘image’ of God.431 This might call to mind 
the image of a face in a mirror, though Cusa means to suggest not a reflection ‘received 
positively in some other thing but a reflection which is contingently different.’432 So the 
reflection of God is distinct from God, just as the image of the face in the mirror is not itself 
the reality of that face. To stress this distinction, he invokes the relationship between a 
craftsman and his artifact. The artifact depends entirely upon the craftsman’s idea for its 
existence and does not therefore have any being other than dependent being. Unlike the 
analogy of the face in the mirror, which might suggest that creation is a mirror image of God, 
the craftsman example underlines that creation is distinct from God and more properly seen 
as a work of God, as a product of divine craftsmanship. This product might help us to 
understand God, but our understanding will fall radically short of the absolute perfection of 
God, from which the product is derived and in which it participates. 
 
Moreover, participation describes not only the relationship between God and creation, but the 
way in which creation receives its goodness and perfection from God. In a crucial passage, 
Cusa explains that all things can be images of the ‘one, infinite Form’ and exist differently in 
our contingent realm because ‘the Infinite Form is received only finitely, so that every 
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created thing is, as it were, a finite infinity or a created god, so that it exists in the way in 
which this can best occur.’433 To claim that each being is a ‘created god’ is to underline that 
God imparts being and perfection to all things in a manner in which as much being and 
perfection could be received. In this way, all things are ‘something as much like God as 
possible’,434 and as perfect as they could possibly be, even if less perfect in comparison to 
some other created thing that might exist according to a different degree of participation. 
Thus, God’s being is received and participated in such a way that it cannot be received 
otherwise by the recipient, who finds satisfaction in its own perfection as a ‘divine gift from 
the Maximum’.435 
 
On Cusa’s participatory account, created being is perfect in its own terms, and God is of 
course absolutely perfect, and the two realms thereby share a kind of perfection in common, 
though not as a matter of equal resemblance (as in the mirror analogy), but with creation as 
an image or participant in the divine being from which it descends and on which it is utterly 
dependent. This depiction of the manner in which finite beings receive the Infinite Form 
(which, in spite of his speculations, he concedes is fundamentally mysterious) is particularly 
rich with participatory language of imparting and reception, as well as the idea that 
participation is a gift, freely and graciously given ‘without difference and envy’ by a loving 
God.
436
 As a consequence of this gift, in which God imparts as much being and perfection as 
possible, each being is something like a ‘created god’, yet always distinct from divine 
perfection.
437
 
 
With this participatory foundation of creation established, Cusa introduces his concept of 
enfolding and unfolding, which expresses his fundamental metaphysical point that creation is 
not identical with God, but represents an image of, or participation in, God. The infinite God 
is present in the finite universe and at the same time wholly distinct. In spite of this gulf, Cusa 
conceives the relationship between God and creation as a relationship between enfolding 
(complicatio) and unfolding (explicatio). The infinite God is the enfolding of all things, while 
the world is unfolding: ‘God is the enfolding of all things in that all things are in Him; and He 
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is the unfolding of all things in that He is in all things.’438 Our contingent realm gives 
expression in multiplicity to what is enfolded in perfect unity and simplicity in God. Indeed, 
earlier in Book One he describes God as enfolding all things in His simplicity and oneness,
439
 
as well as all things which will occur and which could occur.
440
 
 
In Book Two, Cusa offers several analogies from our finite world to illustrate the notions of 
enfolding and unfolding: oneness enfolds number, rest enfolds motion, the present enfolds 
time, identity enfolds difference, equality enfolds inequality, and simplicity enfolds 
divisions.
441
 By analogy, God as infinite oneness enfolds all things and contradictions: he 
enfolds the totality of creation within his simplicity and perfection. From this perspective—
and as described earlier in Cusa’s second participatory point in Book One—all things exist in 
God as God, without divisions or distinctions: ‘If you consider a thing as it is in God, it is 
God and Oneness.’442 As enfolded in God, things exist as God in the most perfect way, and 
not as the finite beings of (unfolded) creation: ‘in the Maximum they are most truly the 
Maximum, though not in accordance with their finitude; rather, they are Maximum Oneness 
in an enfolded way.’443 
 
In addition to enfolding, Cusa suggests that we can also view created being as unfolded from 
God. From this perspective, things exist as distinct from God in their own finite ways as part 
of our contingent and sensible order. Rather than existing in God as God, they exist as 
themselves in God. So while they remain in some sense in God as unfolded beings, they are 
distinct from God and exist in God only by virtue of creaturely participation. At the same 
time, God remains present in unfolded creation, since this creation continues to receive its 
being from its infinite source. God is the unfolding of all things and the world is unfolded 
from God without being God. Again, Cusa uses the language of negation and removal to 
express the dependence of the unfolded world on God: ‘If you consider things in their 
independence from God, they are nothing… For take away God from the creation and 
nothing remains.’444 While Cusa maintains that we cannot truly understand how God is 
unfolded through the multiplicity of creation, he returns to the analogy of creation as image 
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and suggests that ‘insofar as He is the unfolding, in all things He is that which they are, just 
as in an image the reality itself (veritas) is present.’445 As different images might relate to an 
original, God’s ‘face’ appears ‘differently and manifoldly’ throughout creation in the diverse 
participations of finite beings. This face gives creation its existence and identity, while 
‘remaining incomprehensibly above all the senses and every mind’.446 
 
As such, creation is an image (or the ‘face’) of God, but not a true image in the sense that, 
while it might be indicative of God, it does not resemble or reflect the reality of God. It is 
only a ‘contracted Maximum’, a finite or ‘concrete’ realm that owes its existence to the 
Absolute Maximum, to which it bears a likeness and imitates as much as it can.
447
 Just as the 
Absolute Maximum, is—in Cusa’s provocative language—that which all things are, so the 
universe, as contracted maximum, is contractedly that which all things are. Contraction 
signifies restriction, such that the characteristics of the contracted universe fall 
disproportionately short of the corresponding absolute qualities in God. Thus, oneness is 
contracted through plurality, infinity through finitude, simplicity through composition, and so 
on.
448
 From this notion of contraction, Cusa infers that God is the ‘Absolute Quiddity’ (or 
absolute essence) of the universe, existing in it in such a way that He is in all particulars 
because He is ‘present absolutely in that which is contractedly all things.’449 In other words, 
God is the ultimate essence in which all things are enfolded, so that (for example) Absolute 
Oneness is free of all plurality in God. To name God as Absolute Quiddity is another way to 
express the absolute dependence of creation on God, since each part of creation owes its 
existence to God.
450
 So oneness is given its own contracted status in creation as number.  
 
To illustrate the idea of God as Absolute Quiddity, Cusa uses the example of the sun and the 
moon. God is not present in them in the ordinary sense of the term, but He is ‘absolutely’ that 
which they are: He imparts being to the sun and the moon, without which they would not 
exist. While each part of creation receives being from the Absolute Quiddity of God, it also 
exists in its own unique way within the contracted quiddity of the universe. Whereas God’s 
being is absolute and undifferentiated and thus not identical with any finite being, the 
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universe, as contracted being, exists in plurality and difference: ‘Therefore, God, who is one, 
is in the one universe. But the universe is contractedly in all things.’451 This contracted being, 
which constitutes the diversity and multiplicity of creation, participates in the absolute being 
of God. In this sense, Cusa suggests that we can begin to understand how, through the 
mediation of the universe, God is in all things and all things are in God. 
 
Whereas Cusa’s outlook in Book One and Book Two is, respectively, mathematical and 
metaphysical, Book Three represents a mystical turn toward Christ as the Maximum at once 
absolute and contracted (maximum simul contractum et absolutum). The mathematical and 
metaphysical disquisitions of the preceding books help prepare the mind for its ascent to faith 
in Christ. In this sense, Book Three prefigures the more devotional tone of his subsequent 
work, particularly De Visione Dei, to be discussed below. Yet there remains a participatory 
basis to this joyful ascent. Cusa argues that no finite thing can ‘participate precisely’ in the 
‘degree of contraction’ of another thing. This means that any given thing is comparatively 
greater or lesser than anything else: ‘Therefore, all contracted things exist between a 
maximum and a minimum, so that there can be posited a greater and a lesser degree of 
contraction than [that of] any given thing.’452 Since finite things cannot become infinite or 
maximum in the unqualified sense, there must be an Absolute Maximum beyond all 
comparative relation and within which all finite possibilities are contained, which is God. 
Further, there must be a way the Absolute Maximum can unite itself to the contracted 
maximum, and this is achieved through Jesus, who is God and man, as the ‘contracted 
maximum individual’.453 
 
4.2 De Sapientia 
 
De Sapientia, composed in 1450, reiterates Cusa’s insight that knowledge is found in 
recognition of our ignorance. While this work is of a more epistemological nature than De 
Docta Ignorantia, it also further develops his participatory metaphysics, with an emphasis on 
the paradox that participation is at once an integral and inadequate way of approaching God. 
As detailed in De Docta Ignorantia and reaffirmed in De Sapientia, a contracted universe of 
diversity and multiplicity is the best expression of God’s absolute oneness, which is given 
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finite expression among a variety of participants. Yet, as Cusa explains in this text, creaturely 
participation represents a limited way of reaching God, who remains fundamentally 
transcendent and beyond creaturely understanding. 
 
With strikingly participatory language, Cusa argues in Book One that the infinite wisdom of 
God is in all forms, like ‘the truth in the image, the example in the thing exemplified, the 
form in the figure, the precision in the assimilation.’454 God, in His infinite goodness, 
communicates being to all things, which is received in many different ways since ‘non-
multiplicable infinity is better explicated in a variety of recipients.’455 This means that the 
reception of God’s being in diverse ways among diverse recipients is the best possible one, 
though it cannot be received exactly as it is. Instead, every finite thing partakes in divine 
being and wisdom insofar as it can. Here, Cusa describes a hierarchy of participation, 
according to which participants receive wisdom in a progressively more meaningful way, 
ascending from mineral being, to vegetable life, to higher sensible life, to imaginative power, 
to rational power, and finally to intellectual life, the latter of which is nearest the image of 
wisdom. In spite of the elevated status of intellectual life in terms of partaking in divine 
wisdom, Cusa cautions that this wisdom is ultimately not to be found in oratory or great 
books, ‘but in a withdrawal from these sensible things and in a turning to the most simple and 
infinite forms.’456 
 
In Book Two, Cusa associates the limited way in which we participate in God with his 
theology of negation. This is based on the idea that God alone represents ‘precision’ and that 
our knowledge of God is imprecise because only God is precision itself. Thus, he suggests 
that any answer to a question about God cannot be precise, since ‘precision is nothing other 
than what is one and infinite and this applies to God alone.’457 Every answer participates in 
‘the absolute answer which is infinitely precise’, but precision about divine being can only be 
reached in a limited fashion because it can only be participated in a limited fashion.
458
 As our 
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participation in God deepens or improves (perhaps according to the hierarchy mentioned 
above), so our comprehension of God improves, though it remains partial and incomplete. As 
a consequence of the various ways of participating in God, all of which nevertheless fall short 
of fully approaching God’s perfect truth, it is more truthful to restrict ourselves to negative 
statements and ‘in that way we are not led to a knowledge of what God is, but what He is 
not.’459  
 
Later in this Book, Cusa returns to two important participatory analogies introduced in De 
Docta Ignorantia. First, he compares the image and its original to creation and God. All 
images of a face are precise, right, and true only to the extent that they ‘partake of and 
imitate’ the living image of the original face. God, as absolute Exemplar, is similarly imitated 
by precision, rightness truth, justice, and goodness, but contains all such imitative things in a 
much more perfect way than the original face contains elements of its own image.
460
 Second, 
he revisits the symbol of the infinite line as the most precise exemplar of all geometric 
figures. Just as a finite straight line participates in an infinite line, so an individual person 
might be thought of as straightness, truth, measure and perfection existing in a ‘contracted’ 
and limited way, who might turn his attention to, and participate in, absolute straightness and 
truth: ‘Thus infinite truth is the precision of finite truth, and, being absolutely infinite, is also 
the precision, measure, truth, and perfection of everything that is finite.’461 
 
4.3 De Visione Dei 
 
Completed in late 1453 at the request of the monks of the Benedictine abbey at Tegernsee, De 
Visione Dei offers ‘an easy path unto mystical theology’ wherein we might ‘partake’ in 
everlasting bliss according to the measure granted us by God.
462
 As with Cusa’s earlier 
works, this text describes the participatory structure of reality and the ascent into the divine 
darkness of learned ignorance, beyond which lies the absolute infinity of God. In this 
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instance, though, his primary concern (in line with his move in Book Three of De Docta 
Ignorantia) is to bypass philosophical considerations of the paradoxes of learned ignorance to 
the practical matter of partaking in Christ, who is the final and entirely perfect image of God. 
The mystery of divine presence is not to be illuminated in abstract metaphysical concepts, but 
in recognition of the likeness of Jesus to the divine nature, whose presence is therefore more 
immediate and accessible than might be expected. While many of Cusa’s recurring 
participatory ideas, including the crucial enfolding/unfolding concept, are present in De 
Visione Dei, it is a more personal, devotional, and mystical text, directed to participation in 
the final perfection of the image of God.  
 
In De Visione Dei, the act of seeing—both God’s seeing of creation and our seeing of God—
is accorded profound metaphysical significance. Cusa begins with reference to ‘the icon of 
God,’ which is a picture ‘setting forth the figure of an omnivoyant’ and by which he proposes 
to uplift the recipient by a devotional exercise to mystical theology.
463
 He goes on to declare 
that we exist by virtue of God’s sight. This is described in participatory language, with God’s 
glance associated with supreme goodness that ‘cannot fail to communicate itself to all able to 
receive it.’464 Without God’s glance, which is His being, we would not be able to receive 
being and we would therefore not exist: ‘since Thy look is Thy being, I am because Thou 
dost look at me, and if Thou didst turn Thy glance from me I should cease to be.’465 From our 
perspective, if we do not ‘see’ God, we would not receive God’s being, since our very being 
is God’ seeing.466 God communicates being to all able to receive it, and we exist to the extent 
that we are able to participate in it. This capacity for reception and participation, which 
should be cultivated whenever possible, is none other than ‘likeness’.467 We will be able to 
approach the goodness of God according to our degree of participation in God’s likeness. 
 
On this point, Cusa insists that any creaturely attempt to set forth a likeness of God would be 
inadequate. Any such likeness or resemblance or concept would not exceed the ‘wall of 
Paradise’ beyond which the infinite mystery of God exists. This wall, to which Cusa refers 
throughout De Visione Dei, separates God from all that can be possibly said or thought about 
the ‘Absolute Ground.’ Since God cannot be attained or comprehended or named or directly 
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beheld, anyone wishing to approach God must ascend above every limit and end and finite 
thing, and thereby into a realm that is ‘undefined and confused’.468 Here, our intellect may 
only operate according to ‘ignorance and obscurity’, a kind of instructed or learned ignorance 
that is ultimately the only way to approach the infinite God.
469
 
 
Given the inadequacy of human models of the divine, Cusa concludes the text with the claim 
that Jesus is ‘the most approximate image’ of God, as well as the greatest possible union of 
the divine nature and the human nature.
470
 In Jesus, human intelligence is united with divine 
intelligence, just as a most perfect image is indicative of the truth of its pattern. Cusa claims 
that humans only understand things by a likeness, even to the extent that we only understand 
a stone as an idea or a likeness, and not as in its proper cause or nature.
471
 In this way, the 
appeal to Jesus as the most perfect likeness of God, as the finite image of the absolute idea of 
all things, also serves to highlight the importance of participation not just as the ground of 
being and existence, but also of knowledge. We comprehend by participatory concepts, 
which might help us to move closer to the infinite God in whose being we participate in our 
own limited ways. 
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4.2  Rodney Holder on Infinity 
 
In this section, I will examine the British cosmologist-theologian Rodney Holder’s critique of 
multiverse thought. In particular, I will focus on his view of infinity in Cusa’s cosmology, 
which he presents as a noteworthy historical precursor to contemporary multiverse models. 
Holder’s reading of Cusan infinity is worth examining because it is indicative of a wider set 
of misapprehensions in contemporary theological treatments of Cusa’s relevance to 
multiverse thought. This is particularly evident in Holder’s understanding of Cusan infinity, 
which fails to attend closely to Cusa’s participatory metaphysics and instead tends towards 
univocity; that is, he directly conflates Cusa’s notion of divine infinity with cosmic infinity. 
This conflation, among other considerations, leads him to conceive of multiverse thought in 
terms of actual infinities, the paradoxes of which he believes undermine the plausibility of 
multiverse models. Yet Cusa offers a more complex (and, as a consequence of his mystical 
approach, in some ways confounding) metaphysical vision of contracted infinity in which the 
universe is understood to be an unbounded copy of God’s infinity. Cusa’s mysticism calls for 
an orientation towards infinity, with the recognition that the universe is potentially infinite, as 
opposed to Holder’s emphasis on actual infinities (though even actual cosmic infinities 
would not be the same as God’s infinite simplicity). I will propose that this participatory 
account of Cusan cosmology provides the resources to negotiate Holder’s conceptual 
problems with multiverse thought. 
 
4.2.1 Holder on Multiverse and Infinities 
 
Holder is a prominent theological critic of the multiverse hypothesis, which he sees as the 
only viable alternative to divine design, yet significantly less plausible by comparison. His 
examination of the multiverse hypothesis, God, the, Multiverse, and Everything, represents 
one of the most constructive and systematic theological engagements with multiverse thought 
in recent years. In general, he believes that the idea of multiverses is fraught with scientific 
and philosophical problems, including lack of testability and observability, lack of simplicity, 
lack of order and predictability inherent in many multiverse models, the lack of an 
explanation for the apparent fine-tuning of the generating principle in question (such as 
inflation), the prevalence of fake universes (as in universes that contain computer simulations 
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of other universes), and the way in which multiverses provide a ‘catch-all’ type of 
explanation that could discourage scientific enquiry.
472
  
 
In his critiques of the multiverse proposal, Holder pays significant attention to the paradoxes 
of infinity. As part of this, he repeatedly cites Nicholas of Cusa as an example of an 
important figure in Christian theology who welcomes the notion of cosmic infinity. Given 
that medieval thinkers are often neglected in the contemporary theology and science 
dialogue, this reappraisal of Cusan cosmology is apposite, particularly in light of its 
resonance with themes in multiverse thought. However, Holder’s assessment of Cusa’s role 
in the development of multiverse thought is mistaken in both historical and philosophical 
terms. In terms of history, he incorrectly alleges that Cusa’s view of the infinite universe 
anticipates Giordano Bruno’s and, in terms of philosophy, he offers a reading that is 
insufficiently attentive to Cusa’s participatory metaphysics, and conflates the distinct notions 
of divine and cosmic infinity. While this section will focus primarily on Holder, this twofold 
misreading of Cusa is persistent in theological receptions of the multiverse proposal, and I 
will consider other representative examples. I will go on to argue that highlighting the 
importance of Cusa’s participatory metaphysics will provide a corrective to these 
misapprehensions and address many of the points of contention raised by Holder and other 
multiverse critics. 
 
In the contemporary theology and science dialogue, the Cusan interplay between divine and 
cosmic infinity is often highlighted by theologians who wish to suggest that Christian 
theology could be said to have anticipated and perhaps influenced the gradual scientific turn 
to thinking in terms of many worlds or universes, or at least of a radically expanded view of 
the cosmos. For example, Holder follows Robin Collins (the philosopher discussed in 
Chapter 3.2) in conflating Cusa’s view of the infinite universe with Bruno’s subsequent 
thinking.
473
 Likewise, the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer conflates Cusa and Bruno 
as first movers in the introduction of the ‘heretical’ doctrine of the infinity of the universe: 
‘The classical cosmos was finite, like the created world of the Middle Ages… modern 
physics is not as sure as it was about the infinity of the universe, but it has not gone back to 
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the earlier conceptions of its finitude.’474 Although Cusa’s cosmological vision represents a 
break from the prevailing finite conception of the universe in the late medieval period, it is 
distinct from Bruno’s claim that the infinity of the universe is absolute, and that this cosmic 
infinity can be identified with God’s infinity. As will be discussed in the following section, 
Cusa presents his own subtly different idea of contracted infinity. 
 
Other theologians have similarly misplaced Cusa’s historical role, going so far as to credit 
Cusa with anticipating Copernicus’s replacement of geocentrism with heliocentrism, or 
Einstein’s relativity theory. Stenger claims that Cusa ‘set the stage for what became known as 
the Copernican revolution.’475 Rubenstein identifies Cusa not only as the first Christian 
theologian to ‘genuinely’ abandon the spatially limited Aristotelian cosmos, but also as a 
‘surprising forerunner’ of modern cosmology who supposedly anticipates the logic of 
Einstein’s theory of special relativity.476 While Cusa’s model of the universe is more 
expansive than those of his theological antecedents, it would be mistaken to identify it as a 
forerunner to Copernicus. Aside from the fact that Cusa’s cosmology does not 
unambiguously reject geocentrism,
477
 it is important to remember that his cosmology is 
presented in the form of a mystical, prayerful vision—not a systematic and complete 
scientific theory based on empirical evidence, but an enigmatic and in many ways obscure 
metaphysic of ‘learned ignorance’. This metaphysical outlook might provide the resources to 
illuminate multiverse theories, but it should not be supposed to have helped bring about 
subsequent scientific developments.  
 
Of greater significance than the question of Cusa’s historical role is Holder’s imprecise 
rendering of Cusa’s view of the infinite universe. This follows from a lack of emphasis on the 
participatory nature of Cusa’s metaphysics, which is also evident in other theological 
multiverse assessments. Holder claims that Cusa postulates an ‘infinite universe’, which he 
finds ‘interesting’ since the notion of infinity is newly relevant in recent disputes within the 
philosophy of cosmology.
478
 He adds that Cusa sees the infinite universe as ‘especially 
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befitting the perfection of the Creator.’479 In the closest he comes to acknowledging the 
participatory aspect of Cusa’s thought, with attention to infusion of divine being and 
imitation on the part of created being, he notes that Cusa’s view of the infinite cosmos is 
based on ‘the idea that God infuses the world with as much of his own perfection as is 
possible while still making the world different from himself. The geometric symbol of God as 
infinite sphere is transferred to the world as concretely imaging God.’480 As Holder observes, 
this univocal approach, which identifies God too closely with the world, finds an interesting 
modern scientific echo in the work of cosmologists such as Lawrence Krauss, who ‘are happy 
enough with a concept of God that simply identifies God with the universe or with the laws 
of nature.’481  
 
In addition, Holder’s somewhat narrow interpretation of Cusan infinity is similar to Collins’s 
argument for the compatibility of the multiverse hypothesis with theism, which is advanced 
in Cusan terms and cited by Holder as a modern philosophical case for the compatibility of 
God and the multiverse.
482
 According to Collins, since God is infinite and infinitely creative, 
‘it makes sense that creation would reflect these attributes, and hence that physical reality 
might be much larger than one universe.’483 He believes that the Cusan notion of an infinite 
universe is newly relevant and compelling in light of recent inflationary multiverse models, 
as well as the general cosmological trajectory towards a progressively more expansive view 
of the cosmos. He also thinks that the kind of universe-generating mechanism associated with 
some inflationary models would represent an elegant way for an infinitely creative God to 
create an infinite universe. 
 
Since Holder interprets Cusa’s notion of an infinite universe in such a strict, univocal sense, it 
is not surprising that he is inclined to identify ‘paradoxes of infinity’ as one of the problems 
of multiverse thought.
484
 Following his claim that Cusa postulates an infinite universe, he 
notes that the problem of the existence of actual infinities in nature is in dispute in recent 
cosmological debates, observing that cosmologists (such as George Ellis) and philosophers 
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(such as William Lane Craig) ‘have questioned whether an infinite number of physical 
things… can actually exist.’485 On this point, Holder considers the mathematician David 
Hilbert’s paradox of the hotel with infinitely many rooms. In this hotel, even if all the rooms 
were full, it would still be possible to accommodate infinitely many more guests by asking 
the guest in Room 1 to move to Room 2, the guest in Room 2 to move to Room 4, the guest 
in Room 3 to move to Room 6, and so on, leaving the even numbered rooms full, but all the 
odd numbered rooms free. This suggests that infinities can be added to but never completed. 
In fact, Hilbert concludes that the infinite is ‘nowhere to be found in reality, no matter what 
experiences, observations, and knowledge are appealed to.’486 For Holder, Hilbert and 
likeminded critics, infinity is not specifiable or physically realisable and, in the case of 
multiverses, is indicative of a corrupted model. If, as Holder believes, Cusa endorses an 
unambiguously infinite universe, then such a vision (and any multiverse models based on 
infinity) would founder on the incoherence of the concept of physically realisable infinity. 
 
4.2.2 Cusa on Contracted Infinity 
 
Contrary to Holder’s emphasis on actual infinities in nature, Cusa’s universe is potentially 
infinite—not strictly infinite or strictly finite, but boundless in its infinitude of space and 
quantity, tending always towards its infinite divine source. His vision is not of realised 
infinities, but of an orientation towards, or a constant desire and restlessness for, infinity. 
Cusa identifies within the boundlessness of creation the infinity of the creator, such that the 
potential (or contracted) infinity of the universe is imitative in nature. In his participatory 
vision, God’s infinity is the archetype of the imitative boundlessness and endlessness of the 
universe. The absolute infinity of God is not equivalent to the (restricted or contracted) 
infinity of the universe, but stands as an archetype of perfect infinity that is received only 
partially throughout creation. The universe is infinite not in the strict sense in which Holder 
and others seem to interpret Cusa, but in its status as an image that is drawn in its endlessness 
to imitation of its source. 
 
Before examining Cusa’s concept of privative infinity, it should be kept in mind that the 
claim itself is, as his most authoritative recent translator Jasper Hopkins admits, ‘difficult to 
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interpret’ and the subject of ‘a number of statements, which, on the surface, appear 
contradictory.’487 If, as Hopkins contends, Cusa discusses contracted infinity in vague (or 
even misleading and nonsensical) terms, we might be tempted to dismiss the idea as confused 
or muddled. Alternatively, we might consider two (more sympathetic) explanations for its 
obscurity. First, Cusa offers his speculations in a spirit of prayer and devotion, which 
inherently defies the conceptual clarity often sought in other disciplines such as philosophy or 
science. As discussed previously, this style is exemplified in Book III of De Docta 
Ignorantia, as well as in De Visione Dei. Second, Cusa’s work is defined by the impulse to go 
further, to explore the limits of thought, and to seek to transcend such limits. The scientific 
search for a multiverse might be seen as a modern instance of this unbounded desire to 
expand our cosmic horizons. This attitude is given deeper metaphysical meaning in Cusa’s 
exploration of infinity. He seeks not only to expand our (finite) horizons, but to ascend from 
the finite to the infinite, from our intelligible realm to that which lies beyond. This emphasis 
on infinity, while perhaps more amenable to non-theological critics than the prayerful 
character of his work, likewise results in paradoxical and enigmatic statements. 
 
To illustrate what Cusa means by the contracted infinity of the universe, it would be useful to 
consider what he is and is not claiming about the universe itself, before proceeding to 
consider the universe in relation to God. With regard to the universe, there seem to be three 
possibilities: first, that the universe is strictly finite; second, that the universe has a finitude of 
number (or things) but unbounded space; or third, that the universe has an infinitude of 
number, which may be unbounded or realised (that is, potentially or actually infinite). In 
terms of the first possibility, given his emphasis on infinity (both cosmic and divine), it is 
clear that Cusa does not believe the cosmos is finite in any strict or conventional sense. 
Indeed, the first chapter of Book II of De Docta Ignorantia is concerned with inferring an 
‘infinite universe’.488 The second possibility is more promising, since Cusa suggests that the 
universe, with no ‘fixed circumference’ is not limited in space by anything outside of its 
boundaries.
489
 The universe is not limited by any other spatial thing, since it encompasses all 
spatial things. There is nothing outside of it which might fix its circumference, and to this 
extent it is spatially unbounded. 
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However, Cusa’s vision of a privatively infinite universe is not just limited to the idea that it 
is spatially unbounded. This leads to the third possibility of whether, in addition to being 
spatially unbounded, there exists an infinitude of quantity among things in the universe. 
Within this possibility, the true meaning of privative infinity rests on the distinction between 
whether this infinitude of quantity is itself unbounded (and thus potentially infinite) or 
realised (and thus actually infinite). In terms of quantities of things in the universe, Cusa 
maintains that it is not possible to reach either the absolute greatest or absolute smallest and 
thus ‘no transition is made to the infinite’.490 Although it is always possible to posit a greater 
and a lesser (whether in terms of quantity, virtue, or perfection) than any finite thing, this 
progression does not continue into infinity. Since each part of the infinite is infinite, it cannot 
contain ‘more’ or ‘less’, nor can ‘more’ or ‘less’ stand in comparative relation to the infinite. 
To illustrate this, Cusa observes that in ‘the infinite’ the number two would not be smaller 
than the number one hundred. As such, it seems that Cusa’s privative infinity of quantity, 
while unbounded insofar as we can always posit more or less, is only potentially infinite since 
it does not extend to an actual infinity. According to this third possibility, then, Cusa believes 
that the universe is not strictly infinite, but potentially (or privatively) infinite, existing ‘only 
in a contracted manner, so that it exists in the best way in which the condition of its nature 
allows.’491 
 
The privative infinity of the universe has a participatory character. Although it does not allow 
for a transition to actual infinity, it is suggestive of what Karl Jaspers refers to as ‘another 
kind of infinity of the finite world… the endlessness of the world… The infinity of the world 
is an image of God’s infinity—it is mere endlessness.’492 This is a kind of boundlessness 
characterised by incompleteness (in contrast to the perfection of God), befitting the restless 
search for infinity that defines Cusa’s work and was discussed earlier. Since the universe 
encompasses all things apart from God, it can be thought of as unbounded (both in terms of 
quantity and space) and therefore privatively (if not absolutely) infinite.
493
 In this sense, the 
absolute (or maximum) infinity of God is given expression in the contracted or restricted 
infinity of the universe. The universe, with its contracted infinity, imitates the absolute 
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infinity of God: ‘Because the cosmos is an image, it is infinite, but its infinity is of the 
imitative kind, which denotes endlessness, the possibility of always going further.’494 
 
This kind of privative or contracted infinity is distinct from the infinity of God, who is 
‘negatively infinite’ and includes ‘whatever there can at all possibly be.’495 Cusa explains that 
the infinite God had the power to create an infinite universe. God is infinite in the sense that 
He is ‘Infinite Actuality’, the actualisation of the infinite variety of possibilities.496 This is not 
possible outside God, and so everything except God is necessarily contracted. As such, the 
possibility of the universe (or any created thing) is contracted, such that it could not be 
absolute or ‘actually infinite’ or greater or other than it is.497 
 
Cusa’s universe, then, is neither strictly finite nor strictly infinite. In De Docta Ignorantia, it 
is variously (and, it might seem, mystifyingly and self-contradictorily) described as ‘neither 
finite nor infinite’,498 as ‘privatively infinite’,499 and as having ‘infinity contracted through 
finitude’.500 These terms are intended to signify that the universe is not infinite, but 
potentially (or privatively) infinite. His cosmology is concerned with an orientation toward 
infinity, an understanding that while there is no limit to the number of things within the 
universe, true infinitude of number is not actually realised. In contrast to the ‘Infinite 
Actuality’ of God, the infinity of the universe is always incomplete, with its very endlessness 
embodying the partial way in which it receives and participates in God’s being: ‘For the 
Infinite Form is received only finitely, so that every created thing is, as it were, a finite 
infinity’.501  
 
4.2.3 Mathematical Infinity and Divine Infinity 
 
Cusa’s conception of the participatory relationship between mathematical infinity and divine 
infinity can help navigate some of the conceptual problems with multiverse theory that 
Holder identifies. In contrast to Holder, Cusa makes a sharper distinction between infinity as 
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a mathematical problem and infinity as an object of theological or metaphysical speculation. 
At the same time, he holds that mathematical infinity can serve as a metaphor or an 
intimation of God’s infinity. This participatory account might help to provide a 
counterweight to Holder’s view that any kind of infinite universe would be less 
‘comprehensible’ than a strictly finite universe to ‘humans made in the image of God’.502 
 
Holder, reflecting the general theological consensus of Cusa’s relevance for multiverse 
thought, adopts a univocal reading of Cusa’s metaphysics of the relation of creation to 
creator. Contrary to his claim that Cusa’s symbol of God as infinite sphere is directly 
‘transferred’ to the universe, it is more properly seen as an illustration of the participatory 
character of the universe. The (contracted) infinity of the universe is an image and imitation 
of God’s (absolute) infinity. As an image of infinity, the universe cannot be enclosed between 
a physical center and a circumference, which is why Cusa’s metaphor suggests that God 
alone, as infinite sphere, is the center and circumference of the universe. Although the 
universe is not strictly infinite, it cannot be seen as finite since it lacks boundaries and its 
qualities and quantities tend toward infinity. This boundlessness, which can also be seen as a 
kind of restlessness and incompleteness, points to and imitates the infinity of God. 
 
In response to Holder’s doubt that an infinite number of physical things can actually exist, 
and his observation that ‘an infinity can always be added to and is never complete’,503 we 
might note that Cusa, as demonstrated in the previous section, argues that the privative 
infinitude of quantity in the universe should be understood as a potential infinity, not an 
actual infinity. Unlike Holder, who is troubled by the idea of actually existing infinities in 
creation, Cusa depicts a creation that can be seen as a copy of God’s infinity, that might 
prompt us to seek to ascend to God’s infinity, but that does not itself contain or embody 
actually realised infinity. In fact, we might also note that even if there could be a realised 
infinity of things in the universe, this would still fall radically short of God’s infinity. 
Whether potential or realised, Cusa provides reason to believe that the infinitude of quantity 
in the universe is not the same as—and indeed subordinate to—God’s infinite perfection and 
simplicity. 
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While Holder’s theological critique of multiverse thought is based to a considerable extent on 
discussion of the paradoxes of mathematical infinities, Cusa employs mathematical 
symbolism as a way of approaching God’s infinity. His method is threefold: first, we must 
recognise that all mathematical figures are finite; second, we must apply these figures ‘in a 
transformed way’ to corresponding infinite mathematical figures; and third, we must apply 
the relations of these infinite figures to the simple Infinite, or God.
504
 In this sense, 
mathematical infinity comes to symbolise divine infinity, though it remains the case that 
divine infinity is beyond our full understanding. Mathematics provides a way for us to think 
‘more correctly’ about God as ‘we grope by means of a symbolism.’505 By comparison with 
Holder’s conflation of mathematical and divine infinity, Cusa offers a metaphysics that is at 
once more constructive and more confounding—constructive in the sense that he illustrates 
how we might proceed from knowledge of mathematical figures to knowledge of God, yet 
confounding in the sense that he also accepts the limits to this kind of analogical knowledge. 
 
Holder associates the infinity of God with the infinity of the universe, which in turn prompts 
him to focus on the implausibility of actual infinities in nature. Cusa, though, depicts a 
universe of contracted infinity, in which the infinitude of number is unbounded yet not 
actually realised. The universe is an image of, or participation in, God’s infinity, and is thus 
oriented towards infinity. This outlook is broadly consistent with Tegmark’s Level I 
multiverse model, which is also spatially infinite and whose components seem to be tending 
towards endlessness. Like Cusa’s cosmos, this model appears to be without centre or 
circumference, a multiverse whose ‘perspectival’ character is the subject of the next section. 
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4.3  Catherine Keller on Interrelation  
 
In this section, I will provide an alternative participatory reading of Cusa to the American 
theologian Catherine Keller’s reception of his cosmology and negative theology. Keller, a 
postmodernist and feminist theologian at Drew University, perceives in Cusa’s infinite 
universe an opportunity to develop a new theology of materiality and relationality. Initially, I 
will outline and evaluate her notion of a ‘multiverse of perspectives’, in which the 
entanglements of an immensely vast and crowded cosmos underline the need for political and 
social change in the material world. I will then argue that, rather than associating Cusa with 
interrelation and perspectivism (the view that truth is contingent on perspective), he is more 
properly seen as insisting on the importance of individuality and of transcending one’s own 
finite perspective. In fact, his primary concern is not with Keller’s postmodern multiplicity of 
entangled perspectives and their alleged bodily implications, but with the participatory goal 
of overcoming perspectival limits to ascend to the infinite God. Finally, I will propose that an 
emphasis on Cusa’s celebration of human uniqueness would be more consistent with the 
spirit of his work than Keller’s conscription of his cosmology to serve her own political ends. 
 
4.3.1 Keller on a Multiverse of Perspectives 
 
Keller’s Cloud of the Impossible: Negative Theology and Planetary Entanglement is an 
ambitious, expansive, and elegant project in which traditional philosophy of religion is 
brought into contact with contemporary debates in theology and science. As the subtitle 
indicates, Keller is concerned with the relationship between the apophatic and the 
relational—or, as she puts it, the nonknowable and the nonseperable.506 She seeks to 
demonstrate that the interconnectivity of our world—‘the manifold of social movements, the 
multiplicity of religious or spiritual identifications, the queering of identities, the tangled 
planetarity of human and nonhuman bodies’507—can be understood ‘apophatically entangled 
in and as theology.’508 By this she means that the negativity of apophatic entanglement 
ultimately gives way to material and relational differences and possibilities. Her text bears 
structural and stylistic similarities to Cusa’s work. In terms of structure, she follows the 
example of his metaphor of enfolding/unfolding (complicatio/explicatio), dividing her work 
                                                          
506
 Catherine Keller, Cloud of the Impossible: Negative Theology and Planetary Entanglement (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2015), p. 6. 
507
 Keller, Cloud of the Impossible, p. 5. 
508
 Keller, Cloud of the Impossible, p. 7. 
162 
 
in three parts: Complications, in which she offers a genealogy of negative theology with 
particular reference to Cusa; Explications, in which she draws widely on quantum physics, 
Alfred North Whitehead’s process theology, and Walt Whitman’s poetry; and Implications, 
in which she presents the political and ecological implications of her theology of apophatic 
entanglement. In terms of style, she often makes Cusan turns to lyricism, poeticism, and 
ambiguity, and is therefore often elusive and problematic to interpret. 
 
Keller acknowledges that her project depends upon Cusa’s negative theology, in which she 
identifies ‘perhaps for the first time in Christian thought, a theological cosmology of 
relation.’509 In this manner, her distinctly postmodern enterprise of deconstructive negation 
and affirmative interrelation rests on Cusa’s fifteenth century articulation of the constituent 
interdependence of the universe, as in his Anaxagorean idea that ‘all is in all and each is in 
each’. She believes that his idea of learned ignorance—the cloud of the impossible—offers 
‘not just an apophatic panentheism, but the holographic vision of a radically interrelated 
universe.’510 On this reading, Cusa’s negative theology does not simply amount to subjective 
mysticism, but provides a relational cosmology suggestive of outward expansion and 
consistent with our modern intuition of accelerating interconnection. She expresses this 
insight in the language of modern multiverse theory: ‘What unfolds in the cloud-space of the 
Cusan God is a multiverse of perspectives, proliferating holographically, irresolvable into any 
fixed proposition.’511 Her reference to holographic imagery implies that this ‘cloud-space’ 
defies easy comprehension. 
 
Crucially, Keller understands Cusa to be engaged in an ‘experiment in perspective’.512 The 
cloud of the impossible (or the practice of learned ignorance) provides a new perspective on 
the infinite and thereby on the perspective of finite creatures. Thus, negative theology comes 
to reveal the positive materiality and the infinite potentiality of the universe. To substantiate 
this claim, she highlights the significance of perspective in De Visione Dei, with particular 
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reference to Cusa’s use of the icon, the visible image of the invisible God, whose face seems 
to gaze upon the observer regardless of their perspective. The observer is thus being observed 
by the observed, and so the icon represents both God’s vision of us and our vision of God—a 
paradoxical interrelation of seeing and the seen, mirrored in the perspectival ambiguity of the 
title itself. She then considers the negative theology of De Docta Ignorantia, in which God is 
depicted as infinite and ineffable, most truly spoken of ‘through removal and negation’.513 To 
the limited extent that we can apply affirmative names to God, we can do so ‘only in relation 
to creatures’.514 With his insistence on relationality as necessary for describing God, Keller 
believes that Cusa ‘undoes any claims of theology to transcend its perspective, the 
sociocreaturely context of its relations.’515 
 
Indeed, Keller perceives throughout De Docta Ignorantia ‘a radical relationality’ with ‘the 
relativity of perspectivism… gestating in apopohatic theology all along.’516 She notes that a 
perspective is ultimately a view, one among many, which can only be defined and understood 
in relation to others. On this account, Cusa’s learned ignorance—on which his cosmology 
depends—is necessarily a perspectival enterprise, through which we recognise the extent to 
which our knowledge of a subject is limited by our perspectives. For Keller, the infinity of 
Cusa’s God (of which the universe is a boundless copy) underscores the finitude of our own 
perspectives (which are always relational) and also ‘enflames our relation to that very 
infinity.’517 She argues that this perspectivism opens an alternative ‘third way’ to the 
univocity and equivocity that preoccupy Aquinas, ‘that of a participatory ontology indebted 
to Thomas but radicalized, open-ended, and so precisely infinite.’518 
 
Curiously, Keller does not pursue this identification of the participatory character of Cusa’s 
metaphysics (or its theological antecedents), opting instead to view him as a key figure in the 
emergence of modern perspectivism. On this point, it is true that there are two important 
ways in which Cusa’s interest in the problem of perspective accords with modern concerns. 
First, his insight that perceptual knowledge is inescapably perspectival—that, for example, 
our experience of observing an icon depends on having a particular body which is itself 
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situated in a particular environment—finds similar expression in modern theories of 
embodied cognition.
519
 Second, his emphasis on the limits of human knowledge is consistent 
with the modern scientific worldview.
520
 Although Keller, reflecting a broad recent 
consensus, sees Cusa’s focus on the limits of knowledge as an anticipation of the 
epistemological turn (the shift away from classical and medieval metaphysical themes to 
issues related to human knowledge, exemplified in Descartes and Kant), she largely 
overlooks the Platonic and participatory outlook that is integral to his thinking. On this view, 
there is a gap between the sensible and intelligible realms, which can be bridged by 
participation. As will be discussed below, Cusa’s interest is not primarily in line with Keller’s 
celebration of the ‘impossible cloud’ of ‘possibly infinite perspectives’,521 but with the 
participatory imperative of transcending our limited perspectives and encountering God. 
 
Keller also highlights the importance of what she sees as Cusa’s perspectivism in the specific 
context of cosmology and multiverse thought.
522
 Here, she concurs with Mary-Jane 
Rubenstein’s assessment that Cusan cosmology opens up something like a ‘perspectival 
multiverse’.523 Keller sees this as consistent with her reading that Cusa’s negative theology 
gives rise to an affirmative cosmology—or, ‘in the excess that overflows from the negative 
infinite, a paradigm of radical relationality reveals itself.’524 She infers this ‘radical 
interrelation’ from the God-world relationship that Cusa explores through his metaphor of 
unfolding and enfolding in the first two books of De Docta Ignorantia. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, Cusa argues that if everything is enfolded in God and if God is also unfolded 
in everything, then the universe as a whole is present to each creature in the way that God is 
in each creature. According to Keller, this means that God is not just in a given creature, but 
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in a given creature with the whole universe attached. The universe is thereby contracted or 
mediated in each creature, such that the universe is what it is ‘only in the perspective of each 
and all of its creatures… each creature is its perspective on its universe.’525 
 
This is Cusa’s intuition of ‘each thing is in each thing’, with each thing representing an image 
of the collective whole and an image of all other things that are interrelated parts of the 
whole. For Keller, this vision of interrelation implies a boundless multiplicity of perspectives 
infusing the cosmos ‘not as a mere plurality of worlds but as an intertwined multiverse.’526 
Since each thing is in each thing, then God, who is unfolded in the universe, is also in each 
thing. God is therefore immediately present to each thing, including the universe as a whole, 
which can itself be seen as an image of God. Here, Keller approvingly cites Rubenstein’s 
analysis that Cusa is displacing the mirror image view of God and the universe by folding 
God into the universe which itself is God’s image: the universe does not reflect a distant God, 
but embodies God in its wholeness and in every one of its constituent parts.
527
 This is what 
Rubenstein memorably depicts as a ‘holographic’ multiverse, ‘not a static hierarchy under an 
extracosmic divinity, [but] a dynamic holography in which God is fully and equally present 
to everything in creation.’528 
 
Keller believes that this Cusan holographic multiverse of interrelation and entanglement has 
profound political and social implications. We live in a crowded, interconnected cosmos 
where each being is, as Cusa puts it, a ‘created god, a finite infinity’.529 It is this presence of 
(contracted) infinity throughout the cosmos that Keller believes makes possible ‘our potential 
to actualize’ a different, ‘more convivial’ world.530 Since God is unfolded in the universe, 
theology cannot unfold or disentangle itself from the material concerns of natural sciences, or 
politics, economics, and ecology. Keller proposes that this situation calls for something like a 
‘new materialism’ which would in turn signal a ‘new relationalism, rigorous in its attention to 
bodies [that are] sensuous, disabled, queer, vital.’531 While this call for a new materialism is 
expressed forcefully, elsewhere she is notably more circumspect about imposing upon Cusa 
her distinct form of identity politics. As Keller herself admits later in the text, in spite of the 
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postmodern edifice that she has constructed around him, Cusa ‘certainly fails to become a 
postmodern pluralist’ and instead ‘remains a premodern and Christocentric Christian.’532 This 
failure is not so much Cusa’s as Keller’s self-confessed anachronistic reading of Cusa. In 
particular, it follows from her surprising neglect of the participatory character of his 
metaphysical thought, which will now be considered as a counterweight to her excessive 
emphasis on interrelation and materiality. 
 
4.3.2 Cusa on Individuality 
 
As a corrective to Keller’s disproportionate emphasis on interrelation and perspectivism, it is 
also important to remember that Cusa’s metaphysics is concerned with securing individuality, 
as well as the more Neoplatonic project of overcoming perspectival finitude to experience the 
infinite. In both instances—affirming individuality and transcending finite limits—
participation is paramount, and this is precisely the aspect of Cusa’s thought to which Keller 
fails to attend.  
 
To a significant degree, Keller’s theory of planetary interdependence (the allegedly entangled 
web of our social, political, and environmental spheres) is informed by Cusa’s idea that all 
things are in all things. Yet this interrelation must be set in the equally important context of a 
cosmos in which each thing is different. All things are in all things, but all things are not 
identical, and we should not overlook the necessary particularity that obtains among each 
thing in the universe. This is because only God’s essence is ‘eternal and immutable’ whereas 
each thing in creation participates in this infinite essence in its own limited and unique 
way.
533
 To illustrate this point, Cusa uses a mathematical analogy of an infinite line, which is 
the essence of a finite line. In an infinite line, a line of two feet and a line of three feet do not 
differ, but considered apart as finite lines they are clearly different. This difference arises 
because they do not participate equally in the essence of the infinite line: ‘Hence, there is 
only one essence of all lines, and it is participated in in different ways.’534 Thus, participation 
explains the individuality of all things in the universe. Each thing participates in the essence 
of God, yet remains uniquely itself. 
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In the opening chapter of Book III of De Docta Ignorantia, Cusa elaborates on the necessary 
individuality of created things. He explains that absolute oneness and equality belong to God 
alone, whereas the many things in the universe cannot exist or agree in this kind of ‘supreme 
equality’, or they would cease to be many.535 As such, it is necessary that each thing in the 
universe differs from every other thing, and this individuality may be expressed in three 
different ways: ‘either (1) in genus, species, and number or (2) in species and number or (3) 
in number—so that each thing exists in its own number, weight, and measure.’536 This means 
that all things are distinguished by degree, with no two things exactly coinciding. Since a 
given thing cannot ‘participate precisely’ in God in the same way as any other thing, any 
given thing may be thought of as comparatively greater or lesser than anything else: ‘Hence, 
there is nothing in the universe which does not enjoy a certain singularity that cannot be 
found in any other thing, so that no thing excels all others in all respects or excels different 
things in equal measure.’537 There can never be precise equality between things, nor is it 
possible for a given thing to be entirely identical with any other thing at any given time. 
Again, Cusa turns to mathematical symbolism to underline his point, describing the way in 
which a square inscribed in a circle might pass from being smaller than the circle to larger 
than the circle without ever being equal to it.
538
 
 
In this way, even Cusa’s idea of all things in all things (which Keller invokes to stress the 
interrelation of things) comes to express the individuality of things by virtue of participation 
(which she overlooks). Each thing is the universe in its own limited form, as an image of or 
participation in the whole: ‘the universe is in each thing in one way, and each thing is in the 
universe in another way.’539 Since absolute identity between things is impossible, each thing 
is in each thing, but cannot actually be all things. Instead, each thing, as limited and 
particular, contracts all things within itself, just as God is in the universe in a contracted way. 
Each thing is therefore immediate to God, just as God is immediate to the universe as a 
whole. The icon referred to earlier is not just a device to illustrate the diversity of 
perspectives, but to express the idea that God sees each thing in its own way, and that each 
thing can participate in God in its own way. To highlight the significance of the individual in 
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Cusa’s cosmology is not necessarily to contradict Keller’s emphasis on interrelation, but to 
complicate her narrative of cosmic entanglement and to insist on the participatory possibility 
of the individual’s encounter with God rather than a (vaguely articulated) ‘network of social 
response to the crises of a planetary interdependence’.540 
 
In addition to her focus on interrelation, Keller places a strong emphasis on what she takes to 
be the perspectival and bodily implications of Cusa’s thought. She believes that Cusa’s 
infinite God unfolds in a multiverse of perspectives, calling for a new theology of 
embodiment that ‘cultivates a greater inter-creaturely solidarity’ and pays attention to what 
she perceives to be victimised by society, a political perspective that (as noted above) she 
concedes is un-Cusan.
541
 However, Cusa is not concerned with Keller’s postmodern 
celebration of the multiplicity of perspectives or bodies, nor is he concerned with 
contemporary accounts of alleged bodily differences and injustices that have recently given 
rise to ‘contextual, queer, ecological, postcolonial, counter-imperial theologies’.542 Rather, he 
believes that we should seek to overcome our perspectival and bodily limitations, and to 
participate in God in our own ways. In his conception of the God-world relationship, the gap 
between our finite, bodily realm and the infinite perfection of God can be bridged by 
participation—specifically, by a kind of participation unique to each creature such that ‘the 
one, infinite Form is participated in in different ways by different created things.’543 
Everything in existence is drawn to participate in God’s ‘brightness and blazing splendor’.544 
With a metaphor that complicates Keller’s emphasis on materiality, Cusa specifies that the 
‘distinguishing and penetrating participated brightness’ of God is contracted immaterially 
throughout the cosmos, in the life of intellectual beings.
545
 
 
Furthermore, Keller’s postmodern interest in an endless entanglement of perspectives and 
bodies sits uneasily with Cusa’s participatory account of mathematical knowledge as an 
image of divinity. He argues that spiritual matters are investigated not materially, but 
symbolically. All perceptible things—including bodies—are inherently unstable because of 
‘the material possibility abounding in them.’546 On the other hand, mathematics is more 
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abstract than material objects and therefore provides a more reliable and certain kind of 
knowledge. Mathematical objects are more fixed and stable than material objects, just as a 
purely mathematical triangle will be fixed and stable in comparison with a triangle perceived 
by the senses in the material realm. By turning our attention from the sensory to the non-
sensory realm, mathematics provides a foundation for transcending our bodily finitude and 
ascending to the infinite. In this sense, mathematics is a sort of metaphysical practice, with its 
figures and symbols becoming images or participations in God. With this view of the 
certainty of non-physical mathematical knowledge as a way of beginning to approach God, 
Cusa is clearly not operating according to the assumptions of Keller’s postmodern theory of 
embodiment and materiality. 
 
4.3.3 Human Uniqueness 
 
For Keller, Cusa offers a multiverse of perspectives, an infinite expanse in which 
entanglements of histories, bodies, and collectives call for a new materialism, aimed at 
overcoming perceived social and ecological injustices, such as economic inequality and 
climate change. This is Keller’s way of finding meaning in the context of an infinitely 
expanded cosmos and of moving from cloud to crowd—from the negative cloud of apophatic 
theology to the affirmative material possibilities afforded by our planetary entanglement. 
Keller’s perspectivism is forcefully (if at times vaguely) expressed and worthy of attention 
insofar as it might prompt us to increase our regard for social, political, and environmental 
concerns. Her sense of deepening planetary interdependence also seems timely, given the 
economic and technological changes that enable ever more commerce, communication, and 
migration between and within borders. Yet, as is clear from the foregoing, her use of the term 
‘multiverse’ is more meaningful in relation to these social and political issues rather than as 
the cosmological model discussed throughout this thesis. 
 
In response to Keller’s emphasis on individual perspective, we might note that Cusa offers a 
different account of human uniqueness, informed by participation, and closer attention to this 
would be more faithful to his cosmological vision than Keller’s unconventional reading. As a 
consequence of Cusa’s stress on individuality—with each thing differing from every other 
thing while mediating God and every other thing in a limited manner—each thing is perfect 
in its own way. Again, participation provides the basis for this account of human uniqueness. 
As outlined earlier, Cusa suggests that God’s ‘Infinite Form’ is received only finitely so that 
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each thing is a kind of ‘finite infinity or a created god, so that it exists in the way in which 
this can best occur.’547 Every created thing is therefore perfect in its own way, even though it 
may seem less perfect in comparison with other created things. God imparts being to each 
thing in creation, according to the manner in which His infinite being can be received by a 
given thing. The individuality and particularity of each thing means that God’s being is 
received in a way that it could not be received in any other way or to a greater or lesser 
degree by the given thing. In this participatory context, every being exists in the best way it 
can be, finding ‘satisfaction in its own perfection, which it has from the Divine Being 
freely.’548  
 
Unlike some modern cosmologists who believe that a multiverse would imply that humanity 
occupies an extremely insignificant role in the cosmos, or Keller who sees a perspectival 
multiverse as an opportunity for social renewal, Cusa sees each being in the infinite universe 
in its own unique greatness, as a copy of, or participant in, God’s infinity. In his cosmological 
scheme, we each share in the ground of our boundless cosmos, while remaining 
fundamentally ourselves. The expansion of the universe—whether contemplated by medieval 
theology or potentially disclosed by contemporary science—need not threaten and may in 
fact enhance our understanding of human uniqueness: ‘For the universe is in every individual, 
each of whom is, as it were, a copy of one of God’s words…with irreplaceable value, a 
unique essence, a role in life.’549 
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4.4  David Albertson on Mathematics 
 
In this section, I will consider the relevance of Cusa’s mathematical theology to Tegmark’s 
modern view of a mathematical universe in light of David Albertson’s recent landmark study 
of Cusa, Mathematical Theologies. Albertson, a professor of medieval and early modern 
Christianity at the University of Southern California, provides an ambitious and expansive 
account of the historical roots of Cusa’s mathematised view of the cosmos. By highlighting 
Cusa’s thoroughly mathematical perspective, he shows that medieval theology need not be 
incompatible with modern mathematisation and that religion therefore need not be in conflict 
with science. As such, Albertson’s project represents a new opportunity to bring Cusa’s 
mathematical theology into contact with Tegmark, who (as we have seen earlier) brings his 
own distinctive mathematical assumptions to the multiverse proposal. However, I will argue 
that Albertson’s survey, while broad in scope and rich in detail, overlooks the metaphysical 
purpose of mathematics in Cusa’s religious cosmology. Mathematics is not just a way to 
describe and understand the universe, but serves as a guide for metaphysical speculation and 
provides a symbolic basis for ascending to, and participating in, the infinite God who sustains 
the boundless cosmos. With this qualified endorsement of Albertson’s reading of Cusa in 
mind, I will provide a metaphysical response to Tegmark’s view that mathematical existence 
implies physical existence and that there exists some sort of transcendent multiverse 
structure. Cusa’s mathematical theology reminds us that mathematics is not an end in itself, 
but a way to approach (and not replace) God, just as Albertson shows that science need not be 
seen as a replacement for religion. 
 
4.4.1 Albertson on Cusa’s Mathematical Theology 
 
In Mathematical Theologies, Albertson highlights the importance of mathematics in Cusa’s 
thought, while also providing a compelling rejoinder to the decoupling in the modern mind of 
mathematics and theology (and, by implication, science and religion). This decoupling 
followed the seventeenth-century proliferation of mathematical laws occasioned by figures 
such as Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, and has continued apace in the information 
revolution of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
550
 Yet mathematics, with its intimations 
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of ideal objects and eternal truth, remains theological. The retrieval of this Pythagorean 
insight, and its profound influence on ancient and medieval Christian theology, lies at the 
heart of Albertson’s reconsideration of twelfth century French philosopher Thierry of 
Chartres and his significant influence on Cusa. By identifying the roots of Thierry’s 
Pythagoreanism in Cusa’s own distinctive mathematical theology, he suggests the possibility 
of continuity rather than conflict between the medieval and the modern, and science and 
religion. 
 
Albertson’s richly detailed genealogy is divided into three parts. First, he provides an 
expansive account of Pythagorean philosophy (not simply numerical rules, but the systematic 
application of mathematical concepts in philosophy and theology) from Plato to Augustine to 
Nicomachus to Boethius.
551
 He suggests that, through a series of historical accidents, 
Pythagorean thought fell into disuse for the next thousand years of Christian theology. 
Second, he identifies the reemergence of Christian mathematical theology in Thierry, not 
only in the notion of the arithmetical Trinity (whereby mathematics mirrors and proceeds 
from divine self-numeration), but, crucially, in Thierry’s modal theory (whereby theology 
grasps God’s enfolded simplicity and mathematics grasps God’s unfolded unity in numerical 
difference). In this system of reciprocal folding, theology and mathematics are seen as 
intimately connected, each concerned with the same divine subject matter and end. Finally, 
with the pieces of his careful excavation of Christian Pythagorean theology in place, 
Albertson convincingly demonstrates the intellectual debt to Thierry owed by Cusa, who sees 
mathematics as the most reliable way to contemplation of God.  
 
Just as the rise of modernity is often associated with the supremacy of mathematical and 
scientific models at the expense of religious belief, recent scholarship has tended to perceive 
in Cusa a shift away from the constraints of medieval Christian doctrine to a modern, 
mathematical epistemology. Against this prevailing narrative, Albertson shows that Cusa 
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offers a unique account of the mutual interaction between mathematics and theology. For 
Cusa, God is best exemplified by the maximal enfolding of number, of particular things in the 
world. The Incarnation can be seen in mathematical terms as representing the intersection of 
the transcendent ground of number and the potentially infinite multiplicity of created 
numerical difference. Moreover, theological thinking is itself properly seen as an ecstasy of 
mathematical thinking, a sort of mathematical mysticism in which the vision of God is 
achieved through the realisation that human and divine self-measurement (or self-
understanding) are synonymous. On Albertson’s reading of Cusa, God is the ultimate 
mathematician, and the human mind may ascend to the divine when it understands its own 
mathematical categories as reflections of God’s mathematical nature. Cusa’s mathematical 
account of divinity and humanity thus serves as the mechanism by which they are united. In 
this sense, Albertson concludes, Cusa’s theology fulfils Thierry’s vision of an integration of 
mathematical cosmology with traditional Christian beliefs. 
 
Albertson focuses specifically on what he refers to as ‘experiments in Chartrian theology’ in 
Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia, including the geometrical and cosmological discussions in 
Books I and II.
552
 In terms of Book I, he argues that Cusa presents mathematical knowledge 
as a via negativa to God, since it is ‘fundamentally an encounter with an absent divine 
perfection, equality, or precision.’553 This is because finite minds cannot measure anything 
with precision, and number can only imperfectly capture the infinite degrees of difference in 
the world. He cites Cusa’s claim that just as a polygon could never equal the flawless 
curvature of a circle even if it were infinitely multiplied, so the limitations of human 
mathematics fall short of perfect measurement.
554
 God is ‘Maximum Equality’, coinciding 
with minima beyond the categories of human (or mathematical) understanding. Mathematical 
measurement, which seeks (yet ultimately fails to) encompass all of the possible degrees of 
difference, implies a sense of infinity, just as God’s presence within the (privatively) infinite 
universe is marked by ‘the absent trace of equality’.555 Albertson therefore stresses the 
negative terms or descriptions Cusa uses for God, such as Cusa’s claim that no image is 
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‘equal to its exemplar’556 or that God is ‘Equality of being of the things which God was able 
to make, even had He not been going to make them.’557 
 
In terms of Book II, Albertson believes that mathematical knowledge as a negative way to 
approach God continues to frame Cusa’s cosmological discussion. He notes that Cusa’s 
reflections on the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy) suggest that the 
mathematical measurements of these disciplines ‘provide a negative index of transcendent 
Equality.’558 In arithmetic, numbers can only be related through proportions and harmonies. 
In geometry, the perfection of abstract shapes is never reflected in material analogues. In 
music, no harmony achieves perfection. In astronomy, calculations are imprecise due to the 
(apparently) unpredictable motions of planetary bodies. While useful forms of knowledge, 
together the inherent limitations of these disciplines reflect the ‘infinite horizon of human 
unknowing’, or another instance of Cusa’s notion of learned ignorance.559 Since only God 
embodies the perfect unity and equality sought by each of these mathematical disciplines, 
Cusa concludes that they were originally divine activities: ‘In creating the world, God used 
arithmetic, geometry, music, and likewise astronomy.’560 Albertson notes that, unlike Plato’s 
Timaeus, in which the experience of mathematical order and harmony of the world points 
clearly to its intelligible source, Cusa invokes the quadrivium precisely because it fails to 
achieve precision and perfection. Humans only use the quadrivial arts imperfectly, glimpsing 
negative traces of God in our failure to attain precision, while God alone is ‘the sole 
mathematician’, capable of fully realising the precision of the quadrivium.561 
 
Albertson’s achievement is to convincingly demonstrate that Cusa’s ‘powerful recasting of 
mathematical theology for the fifteenth century… outstripped many Neopythagoreans of the 
past with its boldness and confidence.’562 God, the ‘Infinite Oneness’ and the ‘enfolding of 
number’ and all things,563 created the universe with the divine arts of arithmetic, geometry, 
music, and astronomy. That the boundlessness of creation images God’s infinity can be 
understood with reference to the geometric image of the sphere whose centre is everywhere 
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and whose circumference is nowhere. The Incarnation can also be understood in 
mathematical terms, with Christ defined as ‘the unique intersection of the Equality of the One 
and the singularity of numerical series.’564 Given God’s mathematical perfection, the human 
mind (as God’s image) is also mathematical and self-measuring. The pursuit of mathematical 
knowledge, as represented by the quadrivial arts, ‘seizes the mathematician up into a vision 
of God: a mysticism not opposed to mathematics but within it.’565 While Albertson 
successfully shows that Cusa’s mathematical theology (drawing heavily on Thierry’s own 
Pythagorean variant of Christianity) offers a fully integrated religious cosmology, his 
historical account largely overlooks the metaphysical role of mathematics, an aspect of 
Cusa’s thought that is crucial to consider in the broader context of cosmological 
considerations. 
 
4.4.2 Cusa on Mathematics and Participation 
 
For Cusa, mathematics serves a metaphysical purpose. Its measurements and numbers 
become symbols not merely of mathematical knowledge, but of a metaphysical participation 
in divine creativity and perfection. Albertson hints at this in his description of mathematical 
mysticism, but he restricts his consideration of Cusa’s geometrical and cosmological 
speculations in DI to the way in which mathematics is associated with describing God in 
negative terms. This focus on negative theology, while instructive, does not fully account for 
Cusa’s metaphysical vision of mathematics as an image or copy of God’s mind. It will be 
important to draw out this participatory aspect of Cusa’s mathematical theology because it 
will help to provide the basis of a response to Tegmark’s view of mathematics in the 
following section. 
 
In Book I of DI, Cusa explains that, as the title of Chapter 11 puts it, ‘Mathematics assists us 
very greatly in apprehending various divine truths.’566 While Albertson stresses the 
uncertainty and limitations of the quadrivium, it is equally important to remember Cusa’s 
insistence that mathematics captures truth more fully than any other mode of human 
knowledge. It is because of the ‘incorruptible certainty’567 of mathematics that Cusa sees it as 
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a more reliable pathway to God than the ‘continual instability’568 of the perceptible objects of 
other fields, though he accepts that mathematics is not entirely free of material associations. 
Since mathematics concerns abstract objects, which are ‘very fixed’ and ‘very certain’,569 it 
invites us to turn from the imperfect sensory realm to the non-sensory realm. The practice of 
contemplating non-sensory mathematical operations represents a valuable preliminary step to 
ascending further to the intelligible realm of divine perfection. Indeed, as the most certain and 
reliable form of human knowledge, mathematics is the best (or perhaps, as Albertson’s 
emphasis on negative theology might suggest, least worst) guide to the divine mind. To 
underline its importance, Cusa appeals to the authority of previous mathematically-minded 
philosophers, including Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Boethius, all of whom 
used mathematics to address the fundamental problems of human existence.  
 
Cusa outlines a threefold process for using mathematical symbolism as a way of ascending to 
God.
570
 First, we must understand that all mathematical figures are finite. Second, we must 
apply these relations in a ‘transformed way’ to corresponding infinite mathematical figures. 
Third, we must (in an even more ‘highly’ transformed way) apply these relations of the 
infinite figures to the simple Infinite, or God, who is truly independent of all figures. With 
this symbolic approach, the mathematical attempt to grasp infinity becomes an image of the 
metaphysical ascent to God’s infinite perfection. Infinity in mathematics points to and serves 
as a metaphor for a wholly different order of divine infinity. Here, Cusa uses the analogy of 
an infinite line to illustrate how we can move from contemplation of finite things to infinite 
mathematical figures and finally to the infinite God. He explains that an infinite line is 
‘actually and infinitely all that which is in the possibility of a finite line’.571 Since it contains 
all possible parts or varieties of a finite line, an infinite line may be said to be the essence of a 
finite line, in a similar way as God is the essence of all things. Equally, just as an infinite line 
is indivisible and hence immutable and eternal, Cusa infers that God, the essence and 
measure of all things, is immutable and eternal.
572
 Thus, the infinite mathematical figure 
becomes an image of divine infinity by means of this symbolic reasoning. 
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However, there is an additional participatory aspect to this relationship between mathematical 
infinity and divine infinity which Albertson overlooks in his survey of the historical roots of 
Cusa’s mathematical theology. It is not just that mathematical symbolism provides a way to 
think about God. It also leads to a deeper understanding of the participation of finite creatures 
in God’s infinite being. Since, as discussed earlier in this chapter, participation is Cusa’s way 
of bridging the gap between the finite and infinite realms, it is not surprising that it features in 
his account of mathematical and divine infinity. To understand how it is possible to 
participate in God, Cusa continues his consideration of the infinite line. As the essence of all 
other finite lines, the infinite line is ‘participated in in different ways.’573 Differences of 
participation occur because there cannot be two things (or lines) that are exactly similar and 
‘participate precisely and equally in one essence.’574 For example, a curved finite line (since 
it is a deficiency of what is straight) will participate in an infinite line ‘according to a mediate 
and remote participation’, whereas a straight finite line will participate according to a more 
‘simple and immediate participation’.575 Similarly, finite beings will participate according to 
various degrees of immediacy in God, the measure of all things which participate in Him, ‘no 
matter how differently.’576 
 
For Cusa, mathematics is ‘a symbolism for searching into the works of God.’577 As the only 
precise form of knowledge open to our limited intellects, it provides a ‘mirror’ or copy of 
divine knowledge, by virtue of which we might gain some partial knowledge of God’s nature. 
It should be noted that this mirror is not to be found in the mathematical entities themselves, 
but in the activity of our mind in producing them. On Cusa’s account, the human mind 
constructs mathematical entities such that they are more present within the mind than as they 
exist outside the mind.
578
 He denies that they have ‘another, still truer, supra-intellectual 
being’ that exists beyond the mind.579 He rebukes Pythagoreans and Platonists for failing to 
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understand that mathematical entities proceed from our mind, do not represent perceptible 
things, and ‘are only the beginnings of rational entities of which we are the creators.’580 
While this striking claim will be of particular significance in the context of Tegmark’s 
mathematical multiverse theories (to be discussed next), it remains an important participatory 
insight. Mathematical entities may be the products of human thought, at least insofar as they 
are rendered and expressed by us, but they are also copies of the divine mind, since the mind 
itself is a copy of the divine mind. Mathematical entities therefore image and participate in 
God’s own self-numbering, which is the ultimate source of number—and of the universe, as 
described earlier in God’s use of mathematics to create the universe.581 
 
4.4.3 Tegmark on the Mathematical Universe 
 
Albertson’s reassertion of the robust mathematical foundations of Cusa’s religious cosmology 
is particularly relevant in a modern context in which the intensifying mathematisation and 
expansion of the cosmos might appear to be proceeding without the need for theological 
explanation. He shows that medieval theologians such as Cusa embrace a mathematised view 
of the cosmos in the name and the categories of their own religious beliefs. His genealogy 
therefore argues for greater continuity between medieval and modern thought, as well as 
religion and science. As such, it would be instructive to bring Cusa’s highly mathematised 
theology into dialogue with the modern cosmological work of Max Tegmark, who—as 
discussed earlier in this thesis—sees the (possibly infinite) cosmos in vividly mathematical 
terms. While Albertson’s reappraisal of the mathematical themes in Cusa’s cosmology is 
timely and constructive, the metaphysical dimensions discussed in the previous section also 
merit consideration, since they provide a necessary corrective to some of Tegmark’s 
philosophical assumptions. 
 
Central to Tegmark’s understanding of reality (on which his multiverse hierarchy is based) is 
the claim that ‘reality isn’t just described by mathematics—it is mathematics.’582 As evidence 
of this, he refers to space, which he regards as a purely mathematical object in the sense that 
its properties (such as dimensionality and topology) are mathematical. He sees things in the 
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physical world in similar terms, since they comprise elementary particles whose properties 
(charge, spin) are mathematical. He notes that most (but not all) physicists subscribe to the 
theory that there exists an external physical reality independent of humans. With a broad 
definition of mathematical structure (to mean an abstract set of entities with relations between 
them), he believes that this theory implies that our external physical reality is a mathematical 
structure. This is because such mathematical entities have no ‘baggage’—no intrinsic human-
defined properties other than mathematical relations—such that they could be understood 
without reference to humans and therefore satisfy the notion of an external reality completely 
independent of humans. If so, this means that we live in an immense mathematical object and 
that everything in existence is purely mathematical. 
 
Moreover, if mathematical existence implies physical existence, then all mathematical 
structures exist physically, which forms the Level IV multiverse. Curiously, Tegmark sees 
this as a ‘form of radical Platonism, asserting that all the mathematical structures in Plato’s 
“realm of ideas” exist “out there” in a physical sense.’583 Whereas all the Level I, II, and III 
parallel universes obey the same fundamental mathematical equations, Level IV universes 
correspond to different mathematical structures and so any parameters ‘could in principle be 
derived by an infinitely intelligent mathematician.’584 Tegmark quickly dispels any notion 
that this might be equated to a creator or first mover: ‘You can’t make a mathematical 
structure—it simply exists. It doesn’t exist in space and time—space and time may exist in 
it.’585 Since all mathematical structures have the same ontological status (that is, they all 
exist, in a condition that Tegmark calls ‘complete mathematical democracy’), he claims that 
the most interesting question is not about which structures exist physically, but about which 
structures contain life. Given that mathematical structures lack the complexity to support self-
aware substructures, he thinks it is likely that the Level IV multiverse ‘resembles a vast and 
mostly uninhabitable desert, with life confined to rare oases, bio-friendly mathematical 
structures such as the one we inhabit.’586 Ultimately, he believes that such mathematical 
structures (along with formal systems and computations) are different aspects of ‘one 
underlying transcendent structure whose nature we still don’t fully understand.’587  
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Certainly, Tegmark’s conception of a mathematical universe is fertile scientific territory for 
Cusa’s highly mathematised religious cosmology. In light of Albertson’s account of the 
extent to which Cusa draws heavily on Thierry’s Pythagorean reception of Christian 
theology, it is worth noting that Tegmark himself notes that the idea that our universe is in 
some sense mathematical ‘goes back at least to the Pythagoreans’ of ancient Greek 
philosophy.
588
 Tegmark also concurs with Plato’s cosmological account in the Timaeus that 
the building blocks of the universe are mathematical, though of course he goes on to claim 
that the universe is itself part of a single mathematical object. Although he does not 
specifically mention Cusa, there are some clear parallels between the medieval theologian’s 
mathematical theology and Tegmark’s mathematical universe. First, they both believe that 
the cosmos has a self-evident character of mathematical relations and harmony. Second, they 
both believe that mathematics is a remarkably precise and exact form of human knowledge, 
that it provides insight into our finite world, and that this insight has a certain beauty and 
majesty—in short, and to use physicist Eugene Wigner’s term, they are convinced by the 
‘unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics’.589 Third, they both view mathematics as a 
means of turning beyond our immediate cosmic realm and rising to an intimation of infinity 
(although Cusa is ultimately concerned with divine and not only cosmic infinity). 
 
However, there are also crucial differences between Cusa’s mathematical theology and 
Tegmark’s mathematical views. These differences arise from the fact that Cusa’s project is 
fundamentally metaphysical, not mathematical. Contrary to Tegmark’s view that 
mathematical insights can provide an explanation for the whole universe, Cusa understands 
that these insights serve only as an image or likeness of divine infinity, on which the whole 
universe depends and in which we participate to different degrees. Since the human mind is a 
copy of the divine mind, mathematical knowledge is merely a copy of divine knowledge. 
Though providing intimations of divine creativity, mathematical entities are inescapably 
products of human thought and, as noted earlier, Cusa denies that such entities have any real 
being outside of the activity of the mind that produced them. This contradicts Tegmark’s 
view that mathematical structures correspond to physical structure in the universe. Tegmark 
equates mathematics with no human ‘baggage’ (or concepts or language), whereas Cusa 
believes that mathematical thought is inescapably human, even if it is ordered toward and in 
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some sense originates in the divine realm. If we somehow discovered a Tegmarkian ideal 
realm of mathematical objects, it would by definition not be self-subsistent, but a 
construction of human thought. 
 
In addition, Tegmark attributes the mathematical structure of the universe to a ‘transcendent 
structure’ that we do not yet (and may never) fully understand. As the totality of both 
mathematical and physical existence, this structure seems to serve as a replacement for God 
(or some kind of divine designer) within Tegmark’s system. Instead of replacing divine 
infinity with mathematical infinity, Cusa believes that mathematical symbolism provides an 
intimation of God’s infinity. The example of the infinite line shows that mathematical 
symbolism can help guide us from finite things to infinite concepts and finally to knowledge 
of, and participation, in the infinite God. The infinite line thus images and exemplifies divine 
infinity. It is not, as Tegmark might suppose, thought to exist in physical reality or beyond 
physical reality as a transcendent structure—it is just the means by which we can improve our 
understanding of creaturely participation in God’s infinite being. In Cusa’s cosmology, God 
is transcendent, absolutely perfect and infinite, and mathematical operations serve as 
metaphors or images of His infinity—they are not themselves, and never could be, the 
transcendent underlying structure of the universe. 
 
As Albertson demonstrates, Cusa’s mathematical theology is increasingly relevant in a world 
that is ever more mathematised and a cosmos whose horizons are ever more expansive. 
Instead of Tegmark’s Level IV insistence on mathematical democracy and mysterious 
transcendent super structures, we might conclude with the reflection that a more promising 
way to reconcile God and the multiverse (and thereby theology and science) would be to 
imagine a more straightforward Level I multiverse realm in which the infinity of the cosmos 
and the mathematical figures used for its description are seen as expressions of God’s 
infinity. Since Level I multiverses obey the same laws of physics with which we are familiar, 
this is perhaps a less controversial way to relate Cusa’s mathematical theology with 
Tegmark’s expansive cosmology. It also stands as another example, following our 
consideration of Tegmark and Plato in Chapter 2.4, of the way in which Tegmark’s focus on 
the Level IV model raises so many complications and ambiguities that it deters positive 
theological engagement. With that, Cusa’s mathematical theology reminds us that 
mathematics is not an end in itself, regardless of whether it describes a Level I or Level IV 
cosmos, but serves ultimately as a way to approach (and not replace) God. 
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4.5 Summary 
 
In this third chapter on a key participatory thinker, I explored the speculative and enigmatic 
metaphysical thought of Nicholas of Cusa. In his mystical theology, which is at once 
prayerful, playful, and profound, he views participation as a way to bridge the gulf between 
finite creaturely being and the infinite being of God. He explains that the infinite God has 
ordered all finite things in the cosmos to participate in Him in different ways. The cosmos 
itself, in Cusa’s powerful cosmological vision is infinite, but in a contracted or limited way, 
standing as an image of divine infinity. The distinction between cosmic and divine infinity, 
and its basis in participatory metaphysics, is the central concern of this chapter in which I 
evaluated a diverse range of contemporary thinkers. This included a scientist-theologian, a 
postmodern theologian, and a historian of religion, all of whom offer accounts of infinity in 
Cusa that do not attend sufficiently closely to his participatory outlook. 
 
First, I critically engaged with Rodney Holder’s reading of cosmic infinity in Cusa. Holder is 
a multiverse sceptic in part because he is troubled by the notion of cosmic infinity, with 
which he associates Cusa. In response, I suggested that Cusa’s cosmology in fact offers an 
orientation towards infinity, standing as potentially (or contractedly) infinite in likeness to 
God’s absolute infinity. I further argued that this participatory account of Cusa can provide a 
counterweight to some of Holder’s objections to multiverse concepts.   
 
Second, I considered Catherine Keller’s rendering of Cusan cosmology. Like Rubenstein in 
Chapter 2, Keller is particularly interested in what she takes to be the ‘perspectival’ aspect of 
the Cusan multiverse; that is, the postmodern emphasis on the multitude of entangled 
perspectives in a vast cosmos, and its apparent social and political implications. I argued that, 
instead of the anachronistic attribution of postmodern concepts to Cusa’s metaphysics, he is 
more properly seen as insisting on the importance of participation as a way of transcending 
one’s own finite perspective and coming to know the infinite God. I also proposed that a 
careful account of Cusa’s understanding of human uniqueness would be more consistent with 
his metaphysical approach than Keller’s conscription of his cosmology to serve her own 
political ends. 
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Finally, I offered a critical reading of David Albertson’s genealogical study of the roots of 
Cusa’s mathematical theology as a means of re-engaging with Max Tegmark’s idiosyncratic 
conception of mathematics. I observed that Albertson overlooks the role of participatory 
metaphysics in Cusa’s conception of mathematics; specifically, that mathematics plays a 
participatory role in enabling us to know and ascend to the infinite God. I argued that 
Albertson’s oversight is of relevance to Tegmark’s multiverse thought, which similarly 
neglects the transcendental participatory scheme in which Cusa situates mathematics. 
 
Having extensively examined the participatory thought of Plato, Aquinas, and Nicholas of 
Cusa within the specific multiverse contexts of, respectively, cosmic multiplicity, diversity, 
and infinity, it would now be beneficial to turn to the concluding chapter in which I will 
provide a general summary and closing reflections on the participatory enterprise of this 
thesis. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have shown that participatory metaphysics represents fertile theological 
ground on which to engage with scientific multiverse theory. The approach I have set out in 
this thesis, the first of its kind in the field of theology and science, involved bringing the 
metaphysical insights of key participatory thinkers into dialogue with multiverse advocates 
and ideas. To that end, I have constructively and critically engaged with contemporary 
theologians, philosophers, and scientists and in each case I have demonstrated that their 
approach to thinking about multiverse theory could be enriched with reference to 
metaphysical participation. In that sense, I have attempted to advance beyond the hitherto 
somewhat sterile theological preoccupation with design arguments and offered a new and 
substantive way in which theologians might reevaluate the multiverse hypothesis, which 
continues to be an important research area in modern physics and cosmology. 
 
In this concluding chapter, I will briefly revisit and summarise the central thematic concerns 
and arguments of the three preceding chapters. I will then outline what I believe to be the 
overall value of my project and how it represents a new approach to engaging theologically 
with multiverse thought and thereby offers an original contribution to the broader 
contemporary theology and science dialogue. Finally, I will propose ways in which both 
theologians and scientists might draw on this research to continue to advance the theology 
and science dialogue in a productive direction. 
 
Multiplicity in Plato 
 
I began my exploration of participatory thinkers with consideration of the dialogues of Plato, 
who may be regarded as the foundational exponent of explicitly participatory thinking as it 
has developed in the history of Christian theology and philosophy. As part of his 
participatory approach, he is preoccupied with the complex structures of the universe, their 
interrelations, and their source and intelligibility. His Timaeus dialogue depicts a beautiful 
and orderly universe that is the handiwork of divine rationality and intelligence. This work 
lends itself to thinking about multiverses, since the idea that our cosmos includes an 
enormous multiplicity of parts or regions is central to multiverse theory. The core argument 
of this chapter is that the recognition that there are many more parts to the universe than 
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previously imagined is not just a question for scientific or philosophical accounts of mixture, 
but is central to Plato’s participatory vision of the manifold parts of the cosmos participating 
in their perfect and eternal source. To demonstrate how Platonic participatory metaphysics 
might illuminate our understanding of cosmic multiplicity, specifically as described in 
multiverse models, I engaged with a theologian, a cosmologist, and a philosopher, all of 
whom are deeply interested in multiplicity in Plato and cosmic structures and yet all of whose 
work overlooks the critical participatory character of his metaphysical approach. 
 
First, I considered Mary-Jane Rubenstein’s treatment of multiplicity in Plato’s cosmology. 
The decision to focus on Rubenstein as my first interlocutor was not accidental—not only 
does my project itself serve as a response to the ‘unscientific postscribble’ with which her 
multiverse survey ends,
590
 but she is also attentive to the metaphysical dimensions of both 
multiverse thought and Plato’s cosmology, though I believe that her attention is misdirected 
in a postmodern relativistic direction rather than informed by a theological emphasis on 
participation. This is an ironic oversight given her insistence that theological receptions of 
multiverse thought have been insufficiently metaphysical. I argued that an explicitly 
participatory account of the cosmological vision in the Timaeus in general, and of the 
Receptacle in particular, would in fact be more in keeping with her own demand for deeper 
metaphysical scrutiny of cosmic multiplicity. As befitting her postmodernist style influenced 
by Derrida, she too often lapses into language about ‘mixing the multiple’ by which she 
means that the cosmos comprises many-layered mixing, emerging ‘as a mixture of itself and 
what is not itself, of different and same, of ‘both/and’ and ‘neither/nor.’591 
 
In response, I argued that Plato’s cosmology is not just a matter of mixing things together like 
the ingredients in a cake, but lends itself to a participatory understanding of sharing, 
imparting, and reception. This is embodied by the Receptacle, the mysterious yet 
fundamental place which receives the likenesses of eternal Forms. I applied this participatory 
understanding to Laura Mersini-Houghton’s concept of a connected multiverse, which she 
describes in strikingly participatory language. Crucially, I noted that multiverse theorists like 
Mersini-Houghton cannot avoid using participatory concepts and so inescapably find 
themselves in this territory and bearing witness to the participatory tradition. As a 
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 Rubenstein, Worlds Without End, pp. 235-36. Again, this is her insight that theological engagement with 
multiverse thought should move beyond narrow questions about design and give more weight to metaphysical 
considerations. 
591
 Rubenstein, Worlds Without End, p. 26. 
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consequence, theologians (and perhaps scientists) should recognise this dynamic and make it 
an explicit part of the interdisciplinary discourse on theology and multiverse thought. 
 
Second, I critically evaluated Max Tegmark’s idiosyncratic (and mistaken) interpretation of 
Platonism and its implications for Level IV of his multiverse hierarchy. On Tegmark’s 
reading of Plato, mathematics is the highest form of knowledge, whereas it is more properly 
seen in the Timeaus as serving an important mediating role in bridging the sensible and 
intelligible realms. In describing his Level IV multiverse, Tegmark invokes Plato to claim 
that all mathematical structures exist physically, though in the Timeaus mathematics provides 
the model for the physical cosmos, but this cosmos is distinct from its non-physical, 
intelligible source. Tegmark also believes that Level IV universes are disconnected and have 
different fundamental equations of physics, yet Plato’s cosmos of multiplicity shares a single 
eternal source and operates according to a single mathematical structure. In light of these 
discrepancies, I concluded that Tegmark’s account of Platonism complicates and undermines 
his Level IV multiverse, which is in any event the most needlessly provocative level of his 
hierarchy and whose controversial nature provides a rich target for theologians seeking to 
reject multiverse thinking. To advance the theology/multiverse dialogue more constructively, 
I proposed that a participatory reading of Platonism is more consistent with and can enrich 
the other levels of his hierarchy, suggesting as it does a diverse yet interconnected cosmos, 
which shares in a common ground and operates according to consistent mathematical 
principles. 
 
Third, I considered Verity Harte’s mereological project, not least because it represents one of 
the most systematic and sophisticated recent accounts of the cosmological and metaphysical 
aspects of Plato’s Timaeus. I observed that, as with Mersini-Houghton’s scientific model of 
connected multiverses, Harte’s account of Plato’s metaphysics of structure is implicitly 
participatory in its concepts and language. In particular, her depiction of the Receptacle as 
that upon which contentful structure is imposed consistently makes use of participatory 
terms, such as imitation, reception, and traces. While Harte has a useful sense of what might 
be called ‘intra-finite’ participation—the participation of parts in one another—I argued that 
we should consider how participation in a transcendent source, informed by Plato’s account 
of the manifold parts of the cosmos participating in an eternal model, would be of relevance 
to the Level II multiverse of inflationary bubbles coming forth from the same source. In that 
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sense, I drew on an underdeveloped strand of participatory thinking in her work in order to 
highlight new ways of thinking about a multiverse model from a theological perspective. 
 
Diversity in Aquinas 
 
Following Plato, I turned in Chapter 3 to consideration of metaphysical participation in 
Aquinas, one of the pivotal exponents of the participatory tradition in Western theology. For 
Aquinas, creation is necessarily diverse since it is only as such that it can participate in God’s 
unity and simplicity in a riotous diversity of ways. Each diverse part of creation shares in the 
fullness of God’s being according to its own nature, and is thereby utterly dependent on God 
for its existence. The core argument of this chapter is that such a participatory vision is not 
only consistent with the kind of vast cosmic diversity evident in multiverse theory, but also 
provides a strong metaphysical basis for the intelligibility, order, and beauty of this diversity. 
To develop this argument, I considered the work of three important thinkers working at the 
intersection of theology, philosophy, and science, and whose multiverse reflections can be 
enhanced with a closer attention to Thomistic participation. 
 
First, I engaged with the work of Robin Collins, who is one of the leading theological 
advocates of the plausibility of multiverse theory. Given this, it is perhaps surprising that his 
awareness of the importance of diversity in Thomistic metaphysics is evident in his 
discussion of multiple incarnations, but not in the context of his consideration of the 
multiverse hypothesis. I highlighted that, for Aquinas, diversity is a fundamental 
characteristic of the cosmos, reflecting the diverse ways in which all parts of creation 
participate in God, the source of existence on which all of creation is utterly dependent. I also 
stressed that, in Aquinas’s view, creation is diverse by necessity, since imperfect created 
beings can only approach and participate in God in a multitude of diverse ways. This 
participatory insight can serve as a counterweight to theological multiverse critics who 
dismiss the idea of an immensely diverse and expansive cosmos as too arbitrary or 
inexplicable. I then applied the notion of diversity in Thomistic participatory metaphysics to 
the string theory landscape proposal, a multiverse theory in which diversity is paramount. I 
observed that string theory gives powerful scientific expression to the cosmic diversity and 
intelligibility that are such crucial elements of participation in Aquinas. 
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Second, I critiqued Don Page’s theistic account of the multiverse hypothesis, which (like 
Collins) is insufficiently metaphysical and which (also like Collins) regards string theory as 
expressing the beauty of cosmic multiplicity. I demonstrated that Aquinas’s metaphysical 
notion of beauty, an important aspect of his participatory thought, would strengthen Page’s 
own concepts of God and creation. For Aquinas, beauty is evident in the participatory order 
of being, with a diversity of beings participating in God’s being in their own ways. I proposed 
that Aquinas’s participatory account of the beauty of the created order offers a supplement to 
Page’s more narrow conception of the beauty of the selection mechanism that gives rise to a 
diversity of cosmic realms in string theory. This emphasis on the inherent beauty and 
goodness of God’s creation may also provide a rejoinder to criticisms of multiverse theory on 
aesthetic grounds, enabling us to maintain that a vastly expanded view of cosmic diversity 
need not preclude notions of beauty, elegance, and goodness. 
 
Third, I challenged Bernard Carr’s problematic image of the cosmic uroborus on the basis 
that it presents a vague and metaphysically weak conception of unity, thereby failing to 
provide the kind of fundamental model for the multiverse that he desires. Instead, I offered 
Aquinas’s theological circle of being, which expresses the movement of creatures who have 
received being from God and ultimately return to God, as a superior alternative model that 
more adequately conveys the unity and purpose of a cosmos grounded in a transcendent 
creator than Carr’s strictly cosmological vision. While Carr stands out among scientific 
multiverse theorists in terms of acknowledging the importance of humanity in the cosmos and 
arguing for the compatibility of God and the multiverse, his approach is at once theologically 
timid and conceptually ambiguous. With attention to Aquinas’s participatory creation 
account, I highlighted a way to situate his notions of cosmic unity and interconnectedness on 
firmer metaphysical foundations. 
 
Cosmic Infinity in Nicholas of Cusa 
 
Finally, in Chapter 4 I examined the profound and at times mystifying metaphysical and 
cosmological thought of Nicholas of Cusa, a key participatory thinker often overlooked in 
contemporary theology and science discourse. Cusa’s prayerful contemplation of the 
participatory relationship between cosmic infinity and divine infinity is of clear relevance to 
the multiverse debate, with its intimations of infinite or infinitely many cosmic regions. The 
core argument of this chapter is that, for Cusa, the infinity of the universe stands as an image 
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or a participation in the infinity of God, and that this more qualified form of infinity and its 
dependence on the divine ground of perfect infinity is important to remember when 
considering cosmic infinity. Here I engaged with a theologically-informed scientist, a 
theologian, and a philosopher, who each share an interest in Cusa’s cosmology, as well as 
misapprehensions about the metaphysical and participatory basis of his idea of infinity (and 
its potential application to multiverse thought). 
 
First, I provided a response to Rodney Holder’s view of infinity in Cusa’s cosmology, which 
Holder identifies as a notable historical precursor to modern multiverse models. In common 
with other theological multiverse critics, and perhaps understandably as a result of Cusa’s 
distinctively enigmatic, opaque, and prayerful mode of expression, Holder neglects the 
participatory character of Cusa’s metaphysical system, in which the universe is an image 
whose infinity is of an imitative nature. Against Holder’s reading of Cusa that the universe is 
infinite in the conventionally understood sense, I noted that Cusa’s universe is potentially 
infinite; his mystical approach, to the extent it can be interpreted, is more concerned with an 
orientation towards infinity, rather than actual infinity. The cosmos is unbounded in the sense 
of the possibility of spatial or numerical endlessness, but this is distinct from God’s perfect 
simplicity and infinity. As such, I argued that Cusa should not be regarded as an example of 
the (alleged) problem of infinity in multiverse thought, but as offering some useful 
metaphysical resources to negotiate the kind of conceptual concerns that Holder himself puts 
forward. 
 
Second, I presented an alternative participatory reading of Cusa to Catherine Keller’s 
reception of his cosmology, which (in line with Rubenstein) is preoccupied with its apparent 
relevance to a postmodern multiplicity of entangled perspectives. Rather than associating 
Cusa with postmodern notions of interrelation and perspectivism to help advance her own 
vision of political and social renewal, I highlighted the importance of his participatory 
imperative of transcending our limited perspectives within a vastly expanded cosmos and 
ultimately coming to know and love God. Cusa sees each being in the boundless cosmos in 
its own unique goodness, as an image and participant in God’s infinity. This is a rich 
cosmological vision in which we each share in the ground of the universe while remaining 
fundamentally ourselves. Keller’s attempt to impose a postmodern construction on Cusa’s 
cosmology (an attempt which she herself admits is anachronistic) follows directly from her 
neglect of the participatory character of his metaphysical thought. 
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Third, I critically engaged with David Albertson, whose broad and detailed recent account of 
the historical roots of Cusa’s mathematical theology is masterful in demonstrating Cusa’s 
continued relevance to a world that is ever more mathematised. However, I noted that 
Albertson overlooks the role of participatory metaphysics in Cusa’s conception of 
mathematics; it is not merely a descriptive practice, but also a guide for metaphysical 
speculation and ascent to the infinite God. I argued that Albertson’s neglect of the 
metaphysical role of mathematics in Cusa is also of relevance to Tegmark’s multiverse 
thought, which (as discussed earlier) is based on a curious understanding of mathematics. 
Against Tegmark’s Level IV insistence on mathematical democracy, I proposed that a 
properly Cusan approach would be to imagine a Level I universe in which the infinity of the 
cosmos and the infinite mathematical figures used for its description are seen as expressions 
of God’s infinity. 
 
Value 
 
I believe that the value of this thesis to the theology and science debate is threefold. First, I 
have outlined a new pathway to move the (currently unproductive) multiverse debate in 
contemporary science and theology beyond its narrow preoccupation with design. If (as is 
increasingly believed by cosmologists) there is a multiverse of the kind depicted by any of 
the current cosmological models, then this raises profound metaphysical issues about the 
relationship between other universes and ours, as well as between these universes and God. 
Such considerations are surely more urgent and indeed paramount than simply reducing 
debates about the multiverse to an updated version of the familiar dispute over whether the 
cosmos is or is not divinely designed. 
 
Second, I have demonstrated a new way in which the theology and science dialogue can be 
enriched by ancient and medieval theological resources. It is a regrettable feature of much 
contemporary science and theology discourse that it tends only to make cursory references to 
central figures in Christian theology, despite the fact that such figures have often considered 
issues of direct relevance to current scientific debates. The recent and growing theological 
interest in the multiverse (discussed in Chapter 1) is itself evidence of the urgent need for 
theological depth, yet multiverse treatments in contemporary theology and analytical 
philosophy invariably focus on design or similarly marginal issues. This thesis is part of a 
191 
 
new theological shift towards considering the multiverse in a more constructive manner and it 
seeks to accelerate and deepen this shift by contributing a new metaphysical perspective that 
has hitherto been missing. I hope that this thesis helps encourage theology to engage 
confidently and constructively with the multiverse hypothesis, creating a new wave of 
positive interaction after the initial negative reaction to the concept. 
 
Third, I have highlighted the value of the metaphysical tradition of participation and 
demonstrated how it might be newly relevant, not just theologically but also scientifically. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, participation had until recent years fallen into relative disuse even 
among theologians and philosophers. Yet its inextricable link with issues such as multiplicity, 
diversity, and part-whole relations means that it is surprisingly pertinent to multiverse 
thought. By underlining the centrality of participation to a productive theological engagement 
with multiverse theory, my project could help to introduce an unfamiliar and potentially 
valuable theological idea to the theology and science field, while also prompting theologians 
to reconsider the history and meaning of participation so that it might be used to help further 
elucidate the relationship between God and creation. 
 
Future Directions for Theology and Science 
 
Though the first sustained theological effort to bring a participatory perspective to multiverse 
thought, there remain many ways in which the ideas in this thesis can be developed in new 
research directions. Together, I believe that the weight of evidence, much of it considered 
here, shows that Plato, Aquinas, and Nicholas of Cusa are three of the most remarkable 
participatory thinkers in Western theology. Yet there are other enormously significant figures 
whose participatory insights may be pertinent to the key themes of cosmic multiplicity, 
diversity, and infinity. For example, the idea of participation is critical to the thought of the 
late fifth or early sixth century Christian Neoplatonist theologian Pseudo-Dionysius the 
Areopagite
592
 and one of the most important Church Fathers in Western Christianity, 
Augustine of Hippo,
593
 as well as medieval theologians such as Anselm of Canterbury
594
 and 
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 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987). For a 
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 Anselm, Monologion and Proslogion, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1996). 
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Bonaventure.
595
 Given the recent renewal in theological interest in participation (discussed in 
Chapter 1), it would be worthwhile to explore the extent to which these figures can be 
brought into dialogue with contemporary multiverse models. 
 
Furthermore, it is important that this recent participatory turn should be applied to other 
topics in the theology and science dialogue. While the focus of this thesis is multiverse 
thought, it would be possible to imagine a similar project in which participatory insights were 
brought into contact with evolutionary biology. Perhaps, for example, the change in 
characteristics of species over successive generations through evolutionary processes might 
be understood as a dynamic process, indicative of the necessity for a diverse creation to 
approach and share in God in a multitude of ways over time.
596
 Alternatively, we might apply 
participatory insights to artificial intelligence, particularly the ‘value learning problem’, 
which refers to the idea that AIs must be designed to learn, adopt, and retain our goals.
597
 
Here, it would be possible to adopt a distinctive theological approach in which values are 
understood not as self-standing systems, but as entwined with the natural (and perhaps 
artificial) order as a consequence of their common, participatory origin in God. This would 
put AI in a deeper context than the somewhat narrow focus on value systems (such as 
utilitarianism) that often prevails in AI discourse. Just as participation has been shown here to 
be a surprisingly effective way of showing continuity between theology and the multiverse 
proposal, perhaps it might also emerge as one way in which theology and science more 
broadly can interact constructively. 
 
From a scientific viewpoint, this thesis has demonstrated that notions of cosmic multiplicity, 
diversity, and infinity are not new in the history of Western thought and have indeed 
preoccupied pivotal ancient and medieval thinkers. In particular, we have also discovered the 
remarkable extent to which the language, categories, and ideas in multiverse discourse are 
explicitly or implicitly participatory, with scientists often employing participatory terms such 
as traces, intimations, sharing, and mixing. This might add to the growing understanding that 
the boundaries between multiverse thought and metaphysics are not strictly separate and that 
scientists are therefore well advised to give due concern to metaphysical issues raised in 
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theology and philosophy, or at least to acknowledge that multiverse thought inescapably 
encompasses such issues. 
 
In addition, I believe that important questions or opportunities for new scientific ways of 
thinking about the multiverse have been raised throughout this study. For example, scientists 
might reflect on what precisely it means to believe that there are different ‘parts’ of a 
multiverse, or different cosmic realms that might originate from a common source, 
particularly in light of the participatory idea that different parts stand in relation to each other 
and ultimately in relation to God, the source and origin of being. They might also give 
renewed consideration to what it means to speak of cosmic diversity in relation to Level II 
bubbles or string theory landscapes, if that diversity is understood to be a necessary part of 
how an imperfect creation approaches a perfect God. This, in turn, might have implications 
for scientific views on the necessity, the aesthetic value, and the selection principles 
underlying multiverse models. Furthermore, scientists might further reflect on what cosmic 
infinity might mean in relation to divine infinity, especially on a participatory view that our 
(potentially) infinite cosmic realm might stand as an image or participation in the perfect 
simplicity of an infinite creator.  
 
The central argument of this thesis is that a participatory account of the relationship between 
God and creation argues for greater continuity between theology and the multiverse proposal. 
Earlier in Chapter 1, we saw Bernard Carr respond to the apparent fine-tuning of our own 
universe by appealing to the multiverse as a scientific solution to the unwelcome intrusion of 
theology: ‘If you don’t want God, you’d better have a multiverse.’ In fact, the multiverse 
proposal cannot be so easily disentangled from theology. In light of the participatory vision 
outlined in this thesis, in which cosmic multiplicity, diversity, and infinity are seen as 
intelligible expressions of the manner in which creation relates to God, perhaps it would be 
more apt to conclude that ‘if you want a multiverse, you’d better have God.’ 
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